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ABSTRACT 
This thesis presents a New Zealand analysis, at the 
aggregate level, of the impact of fiscal policy on the 
external accounts. The theme of this research is to 
disclose a new method of formulating the balance of 
payments. There are seven chapters. The initial four 
chapters investigate and review: the background of the 
economic problem; approaches to balance of payments 
analysis; the state of New Zealand's balance of 
payments; and the impact of fiscal policy in New 
Zealand. The final three chapters: review previous 
analytical models; develop a simultaneous equation 
policy simulation model; and use the model to analyse 
the inter-relationships between Government expenditure, 
its consequent financing and impact- upon both the 
private and the Government sectors' net current account 
position. The thesis highlights the impact of the 
Government's invisibles deficit, resulting from 
incre~sed external borrowing, on the external current 
account. The major conclusion is that fiscal policy 
should not be used to insulate the economy from 
fluctuations in the external accounts, especially when 
financed by external borrowing. 
ii 
KEYWORDS 
Fiscal policy, Government debt interest payments, 
'invisibles' account, money multiplier, private sector's 
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disequilibrium. 
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"The crucial point is that whenever Government tries to 
do something it always involves some people spending 
other peoples money for the benefit of third groups. And 
nobody spends someone else's money as carefully as he 
spends his. own" 
Milton Friedman 
"I place economy among the first and most important 
virtues, and public debt as the greatest of 
dangers .... we must make our choice between economy and 
liberty, or profusion and servitude. If we can prevent 
the Government from wasting the labors of the people 
under the pretence of caring for them, they will be 
happy" . 
Thomas Jefferson 
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
New Zealand's balance of payments always receives 
special attention in contemporary economic policy. Such 
importance is placed, not because a balanced external 
account yields utility in itself, but because a chronic 
external deficit represents a constraint on the 
achievement of internal objectives, such as economic 
growth and employment. The fact that our current 
payments for imports have exceeded our current receipts 
for exports in all but three of the last twenty years 
has given rise to a string of policies designed to 
. . t' 1 lmprove our POSl lon These policies have, in the main, 
acted as fiscal incentives designed to entice 
exporters to increase production or sell less on the 
domes~ic market, thereby expanding our export receipts. 
1 New Zealand Statistics Department balance of payments 
figures, years ending March, are used for this 
calculation. These accrual figures should be 
distinguished from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand's 
overseas exchange transaction data which are derived 
using a cash flow basis. 
2 
The long-term decline in our terms of trade and high 
rates of internal inflation (leading amongst other 
things to reduced export competitiveness and increased 
imports) are the two usually cited causes of New 
Zealand's recent sluggish economic performance (Table 
3.6 presents a summary of New Zealand's economic 
indicators)~ For example, Muldoon (1983) suggested that 
"we have experienced high levels of inflation and 
unemployment caused substantially by a serious decline 
in our terms of trade and consequent balance of payments 
difficulties" '(p.l). However a decline in the terms of 
trade (see Muldoon, p.30-31) does not adequately explain 
continued disequilibrium in New Zealand's external 
current account. As a small country New Zealand must 
accept that export income is subject to variations. In 
the short-term there are two buffers to absorb any 
income change, viz. running down reserves of overseas 
funds held by the Reserve Bank, and borrowing overseas. 
The natural mechanism that adjusts a country's spending 
to its income - a general weakening of economic activity 
and ihereby reduced spending on imports - has not fully 
occurred in New Zealand. Governments have persistently 
endeavoured to insulate the economy against downward 
fluctuations in activity in the interests of sustaining 
high levels of employment and production. This has 
usually been achieved by fiscal stimulus which, at least 
! •. -:"'~-~~-.:.-':~~-:.~~ . 
l'::~::;-;;-:: ::. ;-;::::;~. ~ ~ 
I:-~c_-"C',-,_-_-~ 
.;.: : :.; ~:: - - - -
3 
since the first oil shocks in the early 1970's, has led 
to large domestic budget deficits. In turn, this has 
apparently exacerbated the external deficit. 
All countries must eventually achieve balance in their 
overseas accounts. A chronic balance of payments deficit 
cannot be sustained indefinitely, although some 
developing countries have certainly been able to carry 
external deficits for many years due to rescheduling of 
debt servicing payments and principal repayments. In the 
case of a small developed country like New Zealand, 
persistent current account deficits make financing more 
difficult over time. In 1977 Low stated "(r)egular 
official borrowing by a developed country, continuing in 
relatively good times, will sooner or later be 
questioned by the people from whom we borrow, and our 
credit standing could suffer" (Taylor, 1977, p.64). The 
1983 move by Standard and Poors which downgraded New 
Zealand's credit rating from AAA to AA+ and the small 
drop in New Zealand's credit rating reported in a survey 
of in~ernational bankers in the International 1 Investor , 
are timely reminders of this. Continued increases in 
external indebtedness (through "official" - Government 
1 See Appendix 8 
:. ~ _. 
[-"':"" 
:-'. , .... 
4 
and Reserve Bank overseas borrowing or private 
overseas borrowing in New Zealand) will entail 
increasing debt servicing costs which themselves 
contribute to current account deficits. The general 
conclusion is that there are limits, albeit poorly 
defined, to which a small country can borrow overseas to 
sustain a chronic balance of payments deficit. 
1.2 Purpose of study 
The aim of this research is to investigate, at the 
aggregate level, the impact of fiscal policy on the 
external current account balance. Other alternative 
approaches to balance of payments policy range from 
increasing protection to a major devaluation. Frameworks 
used in analyses include partial and general equilibrium 
models, and .their theoretical bases cover classical, 
Keynesian and monetarist grounds. However, the theme of 
this study is to present a new method of formulating the 
balance of payments. The approach taken is to assess the 
balance of payments problem by examining the public and 
private sector contributions to New Zealand's balance 
of payments deficit. As Corden (1977) stated, "just 
assume for the purposes of discussing balance of 
j.:-:':-. 
r';'-> .7~~_ -_:: .... ~~,_:.:. 
W~::::{:;:~~ 
l 
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payments issues, that the private sector knows what it 
is doing and what is good for it as far as spending and 
savings decisions are concerned II (p. 45). Then the 
spotlight is turned on to the deficit incurred by the 
public sector. Congdon (1982) remarks, lithe central 
misunderstanding of traditional theories has been to 
regard the balance of payments problem as distinct from 
the problems of the budget deficit and Government debt 
sales ll (p.l). 
The main hypothesis is that Government deficit spending 
and its financing, impact directly and indirectly on the 
external current account. An important implication of 
the study is that previous policies, chiefly those 
providing fiscal incentives to exporters, have not, and 
could not have, effectively reduced the external 
constraint, because they have added to the fiscal 
deficit rather than reduced it. 
1.3 Outline of Thesis 
To facilitate the analysis of the main hypothesis, it is 
necessary to review and discuss the relevant theoretical 
6 
and empirical backgrounds of balance of payments and 
fiscal policy. In Chapter 2, alternative theoretical 
frameworks for discussing balance of payments analysis 
are presented. The following Chapter presents the 
empirical features of New Zealand's external condition. 
In addition, the economic problem is assessed, and the 
nature of -the policy-makers' dilemma - choice between 
conflicting objectives - is discussed. In Chapter 4, the 
stabilization role and impact of fiscal policy is 
discussed. Both Chapters 3 and 4 provide the empirical 
background necessary to provide the basis for the 
'fiscal approach to the balance of payments' used in the 
model presented in Chapter 6. In Chapter 5, previous 
analytical frameworks used to examine balance of 
payments policy are briefly reviewed. The results from 
these alternative qualitative and applied models are 
discussed. A small econometric model, designed for 
policy simulation, is formulated in Chapter 6. A 
significant departure from other frameworks used to 
analyse the external constraint is the formulation of an 
aggregate private import equation. The coefficients in 
the simultaneous equation model are initially estimated. 
In Chapter 7, an amended set of hypotheses are tested, 
the model is simulated, and conclusions are offered, 
along with areas for future research. 
7 
CHAPTER 2 
A SKETCH OF THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE BALANCE OF 
PAYMENTS 
There are several good discussions of the various 
approaches to balance of payments analysis, notably 
Deane (1982), Frenkel and Johnson (1976), Gawith (1977), 
IMF (1976), Johnson (1976, 1977), Michaely (1980) and 
Thirlwall (1980). Therefore in this. chapter an 
introduction to current alternative theoretical 
approaches to balance of payments analysis are 
presented. 
2.1 The Classical Automatic Mechanism and Purchasing 
Power Parity 
The earliest view of international monetary theory 
advocated that, through import substitution and export 
promotion policies, a country could resolve any balance 
of payments deficit problem. The first rebuttal of this 
approach came from 1 Hume using the price-specie-flow 
1 David Hume was an 18th century economist. Reprints of 
his letters and essays can be found in Rotwien (1955) 
8 
mechanism. Hume claimed that an automatic adjustment 
would take place to correct a payments imbalance. His 
reasoning followed these lines: if a country was in 
external surplus then it would accumulate gold (external 
reserves), which would translate into an expansion of 
the domestic money supply, a rise in domestic prices and 
a reduction in the balance of payments surplus as 
imports became relatively cheaper and exports became 
relatively more expensive. Where a country had an 
external deficit, a loss of gold would lead to a 
contraction of the money supply, a fall in domestic 
prices and an improvement in the balance of payments as 
imports became relatively more expensive and exports 
became relatively cheaper. 
-
The classical monetary theory assumed a system of fixed 
exchange rates, these rates being attached to a gold 
1'- -
measure. However, as Thirlwall points out, "the I ',C e"·-;-: ;,: ;":; 
classical approach to balance of payments adjustment 
contai:ned no analysis" and this was "more relevant after 
1931 when the gold standard collapsed" (p.67). Therefore r' ,,·"t:·,,·,:: ,.: 
I.:" ; «.0- 0-
the approach did not indicate appropriate exchange rate 
policy and was succeeded by the purchasing power parity 
(hereinafter ppp) theory of exchange rate determination. 
This theory was initially promoted by Cassel (1918) and 
9 
I "";'~'. ",". - ",' 
~'>-''::"~.: . .::-:-=-:-.:: :' 
has been reviewed by Officer (1976). ~~{~~~~2~?-~~ 
The ppp theory has two versions. From Michaely,"(o)ne -
earlier and more 'primative' - states that equilibrium 
exchange rates would be those that make price levels 
equal everywhere" (p.34). The assumptions required for 
this version are obviously quite restrictive. That is, 
we need to assume zero transportation costs and have all 
goods as tradables. The second version offers more. It 
essentially focuses on the maintenance of relative 
exchange rates, where any price level changes between 
countries are represented by "appropriate" changes in 
exchange rates. 
The relative ppp theory has also been subject to 
criticism. There is a problem of finding a 'normal' base 
period "with the ideal being when absolute price parity 
existed" (Grimes, 1979, p. 3) , the task "being 
partic~larly difficult under a fixed exchange rate 
regime" (p.4). There are also good reasons why the 
exchange rate and its PPP might be different. Grimes 
outlines trade restrictions, speculation in the foreign 
exchange market, inflationary expectations and 
Government intervention in the foreign exchange market 
10 
(to support a disequilibrium level of the ~xchange rate) 
as causes of divergence, these all restricting the 
relevance of the ppp theory. 
It should also be noted that the ppp theory does not 
involve fiscal or monetary policy explicitly in the 
formulation of the approach. With respect to the monetary 
policy linkages via prices, Frenkel (1978) writes 
"(m)uch of the controversy concerning the usefulness of 
the PPP doctrine is due to the fact that the doctrine 
does not specify the precise mechanism by which exchange 
rates are linked to prices ... as a result the doctrine 
has been subjected to different interpretations" (p. 
169). Therefore the scope for PPP is in examining the 
prospects of exchange rate changes in dealing with the 
balance of payments problems, as opposed to analysing 
the effectiveness of alternative fiscal, monetary and 
exchange rate policy settings. 
, 
2.2 The Elasticity Approach and the Keynesian Multiplier 
The development of the elasticities approach, which 
focuses on examining the responsiveness of the supply 
11 
of, and demand for, imports to exchange rate changes, 
was largely to produce a theory for balance of payments 
adjustment under flexible exchange rates. The analysis 
is carried out under a partial-equilibrium framework 
focusing on the price elasticities of demand for exports 
and supply of imports. 
The Marshall-Lerner condition provides conditions for a 
"successful" devaluation. The condition rests on several 
restrictive assumptions. Firstly it is assumed that 
trade is initially balanced and that policy changes in 
the exchange rate are small. Secondly, as previously 
stated, the analysis is partial because only the effect 
of exchange-rate variations in the market for exports 
and imports is considered, all else is held constant 
(including the demand curves for exporta and imports). 
Thirdly the Marshall-Lerner condition assumes that all 
the elasticities of supply of output are infinite, and 
finally the approach ignores the monetary effects that 
result from changes in the exchange rate. 
On the weight of the above assumptions, the 
Marshall-Lerner formula derives the condition that a 
devaluation will improve the balance of payments on 
12 
current account if:-
( 2 .1) 
where 
e = m th~ price elasticity of demand for imports; 
and 
e = x the price elasticity of demand for exports 
Two problems with this approach have been noted. First 
the estimation of trade elasticities relies on 
consistent econometric results which, due to demand and 
supply shifts, may be biased. Orcutt (1950) discusses 
the sources of downward bias that may lead to elasticity 
pessimism. But in response to Orcutt IS poi.nts Thirlwall 
states, "it can be concluded that while biases may exist 
in the aggregate price-elasticity estimates, they may go 
either way, depending on the data used and on the 
equation specification (p.97). 
The second problem is that of the implied ceteris 
paribus involved. The elasticity approach fails to 
13 
describe the impact a devaluation would have on internal 
economic activity, especially incomes, invisibles, 
capital movements and the consequent decisions to spend 
or invest. The common version of elasticity analysis 
holds output constant and therefore implicitly assumes 
that a devaluation would correct an imbalance of excess 
expenditure over income. According to Johnson (1976) 
"(t)he most natural assumption, though one that 
underlines the unreality of the necessary assumptions of 
the analysis, is that the proceeds of any increase in 
exports and the savings from any decrease in import 
expenditure (noting that a smaller quantity of imports 
might be outweighed by a higher domestic currency price) 
are simply added to domestic savings or more accurately 
reduce domestic dissaving" (p.449-450). Therefore the 
elasticities approach tends to neglect the multiplier 
effects or income effects of a devaluation. It should 
also be noted that the effectiveness of fiscal, monetary 
and income policies as instruments to improve a balance 
of payments imbalance cannot be gauged using the 
elasticities framework. 
Due to the inadequacy 
subsequent enhancements 
of the 
included 
elas·tici ty 
the addition 
theory, 
of a 
Keynesian multiplier. This approach allows "for the 
14 
implications of changes in expenditure on output, 
income, expenditure and again output for balance of 
payments equilibrium" (Johnson, p.450). To adapt the 
Marshall-Lerner condition for income effects, it is 
necessary to make imports and exports a function of 
income as well, lowering the effect of a devaluation on 
the balance of payments. For example, following 
Thirlwall's presentation 
y A + (1 - s) Y + B/r ( 2 .2 ) 
B rX - M ( 2 .3 ) 
where 
Y = nominal income 
A = autonomous nominal expenditure 
s = marginal propensity to save 
B = balance of payments measured in foreign 
currency 
r. = exchange rate 
X = exports measured in domestic currency 
M = imports measured in foreign currens::y 1- __ --__ - --
15 
Equation (2.3) can be differentiated with respect to a 
small change in the exchange rate. So that 
dB 
dr 
= - aM) 
ar· 
( 2 .4 ) 
Rearranging the right hand side variables and expressing 
them in terms of elasticities (2.4) provides
l 
dB 
dr 
= X(l - e - e ) x m (2 .5 ) 
which forms the basis of (2.1), the Marshall-Lerner 
condition. 
Incorporating the income effects involves adding the 
marginal propensity to import term, m, to equation 
(2.5).This gives 
dB - X(l - e - e ) - mY 
dr x m 
or 
dB = X (l - e - e ) dr - m(dYr) (2 .6 ) x m 
Given that there is no change in nominal autonomous 
expenditure dA=O. Equation (2.2) provides 
dY = dB/sr 
Therefore (2.6) becomes 
s 
dB = s + m X (l - e - e )dr x m ( 2 . 7 ) 
1 As long as: trade is initially balanced; and the domes-
tic price of exports remains unchanged; and the foreign 
price of imports rem,ains:the same. 
16 
Clearly from (2.7) the sign of the Marshall-Lerner 
condition is unchanged but, because 0< s/(s + m) < 1 
-tthe magnitude of the change in dB will be smaller than 
when the expansionary effects are overlooked. 
Johnson however, using a diagramatic approach states 
that "(t)he balance of payments will improve only if the 
multiplier effect of higher output on total domestic 
expenditure (domestic goods plus imports) is less than 
the increase in income itself" (p.450). Using Diagram 
2.1 consider a country initially in equilibrium, with 
imports equal to exports and income equal to expenditure 
Diagram 2.1 - Simple Income-Expenditure Model 
Expenditure E=Y 
D' 
cE+X=D 
! ~ -.. _. . 
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Suppose the nation devalues to create a balance of 
payments surplus, and equation ( 2 .1 ) holds. The 
devaluation will shift D to D' and through the 
multiplier will increase income to Yl . If the new level 
of total domestic expenditure (E) lies above El the 
devaluation will improve the balance of payments. But if 
the new E lies below El "the devaluation, by increasing 
imports more than exports will worsen the balance of 
payments" (p.451). Johnson's crucial requirement to 
improve the balance of payments, is for expenditures to 
rise less than output, . "in other words, that the 
country must have a positive marginal propensity to 
save". 
The approach still fails to "incorporate adequately 
capital flows and monetary effects, especially the 
consequences of second round domestic credit creation 
for the balance of payments" (Deane, p.8). Also, 
according to Johnson (1976), the Keynesian multiplier 
appro~ch· "assumes unemployed resources whose rate of 
utili~ation can vary without ulterior consequences as a 
result of devaluation" (p.451). 
2.3 Keynesian Policy Analysis 
A more sophisticated approach, Keynesian policy 
analysis, was originated by Meade (1951) and Tinbergen 
1-"-_ .~~:-__ '. -••.• _-:-_-
I_~~.::_ -, :~;'-»:A.>:":'::-: 
f;)~¥l~;::: 
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(1952). It assumes that Governments use fiscal, monetary 
and exchange rate policies to satisfy objectives of full 
employment and balance of payments equilibrium, that is 
internal and external balance. Whitman (1970) has 
surveyed the body of internal-external balance 
literature, and Chapter 5 incorporates her analytical 
formulation· of the approach. 
The Meade-Tinbergen policy approach "inverts the 
traditional method of problem solving" (Whitman, p.2). 
By taking the desired levels of employment and the 
balance of payments the approach solves the described 
system for the corresponding values of policy variables. 
These policy variables may be, for example, a change in 
interest rates, indirect taxes or exchange controls. The 
process of adjustment involves combining_a devaluation 
with deflationary policies in the correct proportion to 
obtain "full employment total (foreign plus domestic) 
demand for output while reducing total domestic demand 
for £oreign and domestic goods below the level of total 
domestic output by fiscal or monetary restraint" 
(Johnson, p.451). 
The Keynesian policy approach has the advantage over the 
[.- .-,".- ----'- .. ",-. 
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elasticity approach and the multiplier approach in 
explicitly stating that "if one is concerned about mass 
unemployment one should adopt the proper policy 
combination to eliminate it, rather than merely ask 
whether devaluation would help" (Johnson, 1977, p.258). 
The approach acknowledges that an effective instrument 
of economic policy (for instance income tax rates) 
normally affects more than one target (say a reduction 
in a balance of payments deficit and a reduction in 
unemployment). Also the approach recognises that anyone 
macroeconomic target may be affected by several policy 
changes. 
A guide to the assignment of instruments to targets was 
provided by Mundell (1962). His criterion, termed the 
Principle of Effective Market Classification states that 
"a system works best if variables respond to the markets 
on which they exert the most influence" (Mundell, 1968, 
p.169). This development by Mundell has encouraged 
further work using the instruments to targets approach. 
As Whitman states, it "has led to the recognition of 
internal and external balance as explicit policy goals 
rather than equilibrium states automatically achieved", 
1 0 -. 
this "has emphasized the need to develop new policy 
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instruments or at least free the shackles on existing 
ones and has encouraged the utilization of 
econometric estimation techniques as an important 
adjunct to the formulation of economic policy" (p.44). 
But Johnson concludes that the approach "disregards the 
role of domestic monetary policy in determining both 
whether a devaluation is necessary to correct a balance 
of payments deficit, and whether it will be successful 
in so doing" (p.259). 
2.4 The Income-Absorption Approach 
As a departure from arguments over the size of supply 
and demand elasticities, Alexander (1952) concentrated 
on the association between real expenditure and real 
income and on the relationships of both these to price 
levels. The approach he developed contributed to better 
discussion of the instruments-targets framework, and 
therefore like that approach, emphasises the 
inter~relationships between the balance of payments and 
other economic objectives. 
1-'-------'· . 
i-- .---."--",-.".-.-
The approach basically revolves around the familiar 
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national accounting identity, 
y C + I + G + X M ( 2 .8 ) 
The balance of trade (B) equals exports (X) minus 
imports (M). Domestic expenditure (E) is equivalent to 
private consumption (C) plus private investment (I) and 
Government expenditure (G). Thus the identity 
B X M = y E ( 2 .9 ) 
implies that policies increasing national income (y) 
will improve the balance of trade if domestic 
expenditure (also called absorption) rises by a smaller 
amount than national income. Therefore any balance of 
payments policy can be evaluated as to whether it raises 
Y relative to E. 
The examination of policy and response relationships is 
generally classified into two areas. First, those 
polic~es that raise income are termed 
expenditure-switching policies. Examples of these 
policies are a devaluation, import tariffs and 
restrictions, and export subsidies. Second, those 
policies that reduce absorption are called 
t~=;:'::':~;;::~::~:-~:~::;:~~~ 
rj;:0~:.~'='oc: 
.- .. ;.:.-;:-:.-,-
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expenditure~reducing policies. Examples include tighter 
monetary and fiscal policies. 
The approach, whilst easy to understand, presents no 
more analysis than an identity. According to Deane, "it 
is necessary to go well beyond it (the identity) if the 
basic factors causing an external deficit or surplus are 
to be determined" (p.9). Therefore it is wrong to infer 
"that balance of payments deficits are necessarily 
caused by plans to spend in excess of plans to produce" 
(Thirlwall, p.106). For instance the balance of payments 
may be in deficit because of sectoral difficulties or a 
deterioration in competitiveness. 
2.5 The Monetary Approach 
The central theme of the monetary approach has been 
expressed by Frenkel and Johnson (1976) who suggested 
that !"the balance of payments is a monetary phenomenon, 
repres.enting a disequilibrium in the market for money" 
(p.262). Therefore, according to the theory, a balance 
of payments deficit is essentially caused by a net 1----.----------
1"·'·-' 
excess supply of money. Any imbalances in flows of money 
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will continue until monetary stocks are in equilibrium. 
It is the stock adjustment equilibriation of 
actual-to-desired real money balances that forms the 
mechanism for correcting a payments imbalance. 
The initial~ and most common, formulation of the 
monetary approach examines the overall balance of 
payments, both capital and current account balances, 
recognising that there are only two ways to alter the 
money supply. They are through changes in foreign 
reserves and by changes in domestic credit. In the case 
of an excess supply of money over domestic demand for 
money, interest rates would fall, leading to an outflow 
of capital and therefore a loss of reserves, giving an 
overall balance f t d f ' , 1 o paymen s e lClt . The stock 
disequilibrium is considered "transitory and must in 
1···-
time induce monetary consequences which will tend to 
adjust or 'self correct' the deficit" (Deane, p.9). 
Accordlng to Johnson (1977) "any balance of payments 
policy must be conceived of as speeding up a process of 
adjustment and that it must work by reducing or 
reversing the initial disequilibrium between the 
quantity of money demanded and supplied" (p.260). 
1 This assumes flexible interest rates 
.-~~ and internationally mobile capital. 
Basically the approach assumes Friedman's stable demand 
for money function, 
Md = f(Y,r,P) (2.10) 
where Md = the demand for money 
Y = real income 
r = the rate of interest 
P = general price level 
and a money supply identity, 
Ms R + 0 (2.11) 
where Ms = the supply of money 
R = overseas assets backing the money 
supply 
0 = domestic assets backing the money 
supply 
....... ,.,'.-. 
In equilibrium 
Ms = Md 
R + 0 = Md 
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The overall balance of payments can be shown as 
= 6Md (2.12) 
In the case of New Zealand, a decrease in overseas 
reserves (an increase in the overall balance of payments 
deficit) could be explained by excess domestic money 
expansion over that demanded. To maintain a level of 
overseas reserves, a Government must borrow overseas or 
operate policies to balance the demand for money and the 
amount internally supplied - for example smaller budget 
deficits or more emphasis on internal financing of 
Government deficits. A devaluation effectively increases 
the nominal amount of money demanded, by increasing 
domestic prices and hence reducing the real value of the 
existing money stock. It should be noted, however, that 
any increase in domestic credit creation would offset 
the reduction of real balances of money. 
The ~onetary approach to the balance of payments is 
often 'considered the best framework for examining the 
external sector. The approach has relevance to fiscal 
policy in that the macroeconomic impact of deficit 
financing can be considered by outlining the monetary 
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reactions. The budget deficit constitutes part of 
domestic credit creation and is therefore often 
considered a monetary variable; the demand for 
Government debt (for example KISS stocks) is itself a 
function of interest iates, thus importantly, monetary 
and fiscal policy initiatives exhibit mutual dependence 
in New Zealand's case some argue that fiscal policy 
has played the dominant role whilst monetary policy has 
been merely accommodating. For instance, in Deane (et 
al) (1983) "the scope of monetary policy in the past has 
sometimes been severely inhibited by sizeable variations 
in the stance of fiscal policy" "(po 282). 
The monetary approach should not be confused with 
monetarism, nor with global monetarism. The proponents 
of global monetarism make further assumpti-ons which lead 
to conclusions that "fiscal and monetary stabilization 
policies are, at worst, undesirable and, at best, 
unnecessary" (Ball, 1982, p.85). Global monetarism 
assumes the independence of the rate of growth of real 
GDP and monetary variables. It also places complete 
emphasis on the importance of changes in the real stock 
, _ .. ------
of money, ignoring the effects of 
, .. - . - - ~ .. -. -
other asset 
portfolios. The relationship between the supply of world 
money and the supply of world output is said to 
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determine the world level of inflation. Therefore 
inflation becomes the world's problem. But the world's 
money supply is apportioned between nations through the 
mechanism of the balance of payments. "Those with an 
excessive share of world money will run deficits, and 
those who have insufficient will accumulate more through 
running surpluses" (Ball, p.87). Under fixed exchange 
rates, global monetarism suggests that the relationship 
between inflation and monetary policies provides the key 
to balance of payments problems in the long-run. 
2.6 Summary I
··: -.. -. -..•. '.---.;-.'0:-
Chapter 2 has reviewed the main theoretical approaches 
to balance of payments policy analysis. Emphasis has 
been placed on the mechanisms through which corrective 
policy action is suggested under each approach. As 
Mundell (1968) has pointed out, when comparing the 
elasticity, absorption and the monetary approaches, "it 
is not' meaningful to question the validity of the three 
approaches they are all correct and assert 
identical propositions" (p.150-l5l). This chapter 
therefore has indicated the progression of the 
theoretical literature relevant to the analysis of 
balance of payments problems. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF NEW ZEALAND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
SITUATION AND POLICY 
The following discussion presents the main features of 
New Zealand's external co~dition: it assesses the 
economic problem and briefly discusses other objectives 
of economic policy. 
3.1 Features of New Zealand's Balance of Payments 
situation 
In 1977 Mr. Highet, representing the Prime Minister, in 
a convention discussing New Zealand's balance of 
payments, introduced his contribution by saying III don't 
think you'll find it a happy speechll (in Taylor, 1981, 
p.8). Indeed Graph 3.1. and Table 3.3 indicate that New 
Zealand's prosperity and trading strength, based on the 
efficient production of primary products, has been 
undermined. 
., ... - .. -
29 
GRAPH 3.1 
New Zealand's Balance of Payments 
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Even though balance of payments policy has been accorded 
much emphasis in the policy debate, the external 
deficits have continued to, on average, worsen 
throughout the 1970's to date. Suggested "causes" of the 
, 
conti~\ling economic problem include: soaring fuel 
prices'; stagnant farm production; difficulties in 
access to traditional markets; internal inflation; and 
adverse movements in terms of trade. 
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Is it important that we continue to trade? 
The essence of the 'classical' 1 theory regarding the 
importance of trade lies in the theory of comparativ'e 
advantage. Briefly, the 'classical' theory states that 
each country concentrates on the production of those 
goods it can produce relatively more cheaply than other 
countries and exchanges the surplus against the surplus 
goods other countries produce relatively more cheaply. 
Because of the division of labour (internationally) it 
is possible to produce more of every commodity on a 
world-wide basis, with surplus production representing 
the gains from trade to be distributed amongst the 
trading partners. As Chacholiades states, "(t)he 
greatest classical achievement was to demonstrate that, 
even under the present circumstances where one country 
is more' efficient than the other in every line of 
production, an international division of labour would 
also take place that could (potentially) increase the 
world ! output of every commodity" (p.20). The theory of 
comparative advantage, therefore, does not require each 
country to have an absolute advantage in the production 
of any goods. In terms of opportunity costs "where two 
countries are producing two different commodities, one 
country should specialize in the production of that 
1 As opposed to the 'neoclassical' 
theories - see Chacholiades (1978) 
and 'modern' 
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commodity in which the country's opportunity cost is 
lower than the second country's opportunity cost ll 
(p.23). The classical theory, whilst demonstrating that 
free trade is potentially the best policy, does not 
provide the reasons behind differences in comparative 
costs between countries. The "modern" theory attempts to 
explain differences in relative prices, and derives two 
testable propositions. First, a country will export that 
commodity (hence import the other), the production of 
which uses relatively intensively the country's 
relatively abundant factor. This proposition defines the 
'cause' of international trade, and is known as the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem 1 Second, the 'effect' of 
international trade is to equalize both relative and 
absolute factor prices - the Factor-Price-Equalization 
theorem 2 - where, according to the StoLpher-Samuelson 
theorem 3 the real factor price increases as the 
relative price of the commodity, the production of which 
is relatively intensive in that factor, increases. 
Howev~r, the validity of all three propositions relies 
on ce:r;-tain restrictive assumptions which constrain the 
generality of the theorems regarding the causes and 
effects of international trade. This thesis does not 
address the importance of international trade; instead 
1 See Chacholiades (p. 206, 258). 
2" " (p.255-257). 
3" " (p.487-491). 
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it is assumed that movements toward 'free' trade may 
allow a fuller utilisation of a country's natural 
resources. 
3.1.1 Dependency 
The New Zealand economy is said to be dependent on the 
rest of the world, (see Deane, Nicholl and Walsh, 1981, 
p.544) and (Chatterjee and Michelini, 1983, p.3). Thus 
we are, to a large extent, under the influence of other 
economies (of their purchases and sales, of their 
economic policies and financial relationships), without 
exhibiting a marked degree of reciprocal influence. Such 
dependence is highlighted by several factors:-
1. A high ratio of the value of external trade, imports 
and exports, to gross domestic product (GDP). These 
ratios are sometimes used to define the degree of 
openn~ss of an economy, and are widely regarded as 
"important indicator(s) of the potential size of r ~.::. -:-:'. -.:~-:--.;-, .-.'~'-
1-': -.--.-." 
externally induced income and expenditure 
fluctuations ..... because the more open an economy is, 
the larger will be the external sector income 
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fluctuations generated by given changes in the terms of 
trade" (Deane (et al), p.S47). As recorded by Deane (et 
al), New Zealand's trade ratios have not changed 
significantly since the 1960's, whilst those of other 
countries have, on average, continually increased. Table 
3.1 outlines the trade ratios for New Zealand's major 
trading partners, and the OECD average for the two 
periods 1960-62 and 1978-79. It should still be noted 
that, compared with the OECD average, bearing in mind 
1----
the positive impact the EEC has had on that average and 
the United Kingdom's average, New Zealand remains 
relatively more open than other countries, and therefore 
more dependent upon trade. 
TABLE 3.1 ;- --.-
Trade Ratios 
... -.~ 
100*Exports/GDP 100*Imports/GDP 
Year 
ending Dec. 1960-62 1978-79 1960-62 1978-79 
New Zealand 20.7 20.4 20.7 19.0 
i""';;. ;·;·co ".".' 
Australia 13.6 14.4 lS.2 14.7 
Japan 8.6 10.0 10.3 8.2 
united Kingdom 14.S 22.7 17.1 2S.3 
united states 4.0 7.3 3.2 9.0 
OECD Average 10.4 lS.8 9.9 16.6 
SOURCE Deane (et al), 1981, Table 26.1 
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TABLE 3.2 
Commodity composition of New Zealand's major imports 
and exports. 
IMPORTS 
Machinery & Transport 
Equipment 
% 
29.8 
EXPORTS 
Meat 
% 
23.1 
Manufactured Goods 20.2 Wool 18.1 
Mineral Fuels 19.6 Dairy Products 15.5 
Chemicals 12.5 Pulp and Paper 4.8 
Food 4.2 Hides, Skins & Pelts 3.5 
Other inedible crude Fruit and Vegetables 2.5 
materials 4.2 
Beverages & tobacco 0.9 Tallow 0.8 
Other 8.4 Sausage cas~pgs 0.7 
Other 31. 0 
100.0 100.0 
SOURCE: Based on 1980 NZ Stats. Dept. data. 
i 
I 
I 
~; ~ ~ -. 
~-
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2. New Zealand has a poor ability to substitute domestic 
production for imports. This occurs because a high 
proportion of New Zealand's imports comprise raw 
materials, components and capital equipment, therefor.e 
complementing rather than substituting for domestic 
production. Table 3.2 indicates the commodity 
composition of New Zealand's imports. 
3. Table 3.2. also indicates that a substantial portion 
of our merchandise exports are pastoral products, which 
cannot be sold at home when export sales decline. 
Therefore New. Zealand has a poor ability to absorb 
domestically, goods that are currently produced for 
export markets. 
4. A composite indicator of export commodity 
concentration has been derived for New Zealand data by 
Deane (et al) (1981, p. 552). They take the sum of 
square~ of the proportion each commodity classification 
, 
represents of total. exports. Of our major trading 
partners, only Japan had a greater degree of export 
commodity concentration. This fact supports the evidence 
Table 3.2 provides in suggesting that New Zealand is 
dependent for export receipt upon a small product range 
of exports. 
TABLE 3.3 
Recent trends in New Zealand's - external trade 
Year ending 
June 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
Export 
Prices 
(i) 
1.9 
2.8 
16.1 
26.9 
12.1 
-8.6 
23.1 
24.0 
4.7 
15.6 
21.8 
, 
l7 .5 
23.5 
7.9 
Import 
Prices 
(i) 
4.1 
6.3 
4.5 
5.0 
12.2 
32.1 
32.1 
13.9 
5.8 
6.6 
31.9 
10.5 
13.5 
4.1 
Terms 
of Trade 
(ii) 
87 
84 
93 
112 
112 
78 
72 
79 
78 
86 
79 
76 
77 
73 
Trade 
Balance 
$m 
276.0 
168.3 
314.5 
524.4 
-101. 2 
-716.7 
-236.5 
183.7 
422.2 
707.1 
755.1 
876.5 
394.5 
1067.5 
(i) Percentage change from previous year 
(ii) Index numbers, base year 1957=100 
(iii) Overseas exchange transactions, $m 
Invisibles 
$m 
-214.4 
-182.5 
-184.2 
-199.4 
-232.8 
-350.1 
-468.0 
-714.2 
-911.1 
-1160.4 
-1287.1 
-1601.1 
-1881.1 
-2120.5 
SOURCES: Deane (et al), 1981. RBNZ Bulletin, various issues . 
. j: 
':> 
Current AIC 
Balance 
(iii) 
61.5 
-14.3 
130.3 
325.0 
-339.9 
-1066.8 
-704.4 
-530.5 
-488.9 
-453.3 
-530.0 
-724.5 
-1486.6 
-1053.0 
ill! 
W 
0"1 
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3.1.2 Terms of trade 
New Zealand's terms of trade display great variability 
(see Table 3.3). This is mainly because the types 6f 
products New Zealand produces for export diverge from 
the types of products it imports. During the 1970's, as 
indicated by Table 3.3, the price received for New 
Zealand exports changed dramatically. The coincidental 
increase of import prices, including the impact of the 
oil price rises, has caused severe fluctuations in New 
Zgaland's terms of trade over the last ten years. 
TABLE 3.4 
Terms of trade volatility indicator 
New Zealand 
~ ~ 
Australia 
" 
Japan 
United Kingdom 
united States 
OECD Average 
Standard deviation of the 
logarithm of the terms of 
trade 1961-1979 
0.12004 
0.06550 
0.14499 
0.06512 
0.10672 
0.05099 
SOURCE: Deane (et all I 1981, Table 26.4 
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The standard deviations of the logarithms of the terms 
of trade indexes for our major trading partners (in 
Table 3.4) indicate how important external currency 
reserve management is for New Zealand. Compared with 
f:':"~~":":?';3:'~~ 
r-/~~':;;'~~~~:~~:~~~~ .,. --~-~--.'-, 
other countries, except Japan, New Zealand has 
experienced a volatile terms of trade. It should also be 
noted that not only has the nation experienced 
changeable external price indices, but that the terms 9f 
trade have been, on average, worsening over the last 
decade. These two factors are important, because 
traditionally countries like New Zealand have borrowed 
overseas to maintain an acceptable level of external 
currency reserves to purchase imports. However, given 
that a return to 1973-1974 terms of trade levels seems 
highly improbable, continued borrowing purely to sustain 
real incomes at the early 1970 level cannot continue. 
Further discussion regarding external reserves 
management will follow in section 3.~.5 
The possibility of a continuing downward trend in the 
terms of trade is indicated by Chatterjee and Michelini 
(p. 25-26). They outline three factors: 
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a. a continuing increase in the price of 
oil - based on OEeD estimates 
b. a possible increase in agricultural 
trade barriers compelling New Zealand 
to sell at lower prices in less 
favourable markets 
c. a continuation of the world recession, 
preventing the price of agricultural 
products rising 
Although the above factors may cast an exaggerated 
gloom, a general concensus exists regarding the 
improbability of a return to the peak terms of trade 
levels in the early 1970's, let alone those of 1950-51. 
3.1.3. Trade account 
An excellent account of New Zealand's pattern of trade 
and the trade account can be found ln Deane (et al) 
(1981, p. 93-299). Therefore, 
outlin~d only briefly. 
in this section trends are 
As Table 3.3 indicates, the trade balance (that is 
physical exports less physical imports) has been 
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negative in only three (1974-1976) of the last thirteen 
years.In 1974 imports by volume increased by 31.8%, the 
largest June year increase since 1955: this was matched 
by an 11.3% decrease in export volumes, the largest fall 
ever recorded. It is therefore well documented that New 
Zealand's balance of payments performed poorly in 1974. 
Yet in the following year the problem was compounded. As 
Table 3.3 indicates, export prices fell by 8.6%, and 
import prices rose by 32.1%. The combined price effect 
(a terms of trade fall) upon the trade account created 
the largest trade deficit New Zealand has experienced. 
In 1976 the terms of trade fall continued, but the 
economy imported 18.7% less by volume and export volumes 
increased by 17.8%, therefore the trade deficit was 
reduced. Since 1976, the merchandise trade balance has 
remained positive, increasing to one billion dollars in 
the year ending 1983. The focus of attention has since 
.. -
been placed upon the invisible transactions balance. I; ;cc.,.o: --_ •. : -. : 
3.1.4 Invisibles account 
" •• " .. -,--;<.;-:.:,-- -.-;-, 
As Table 3.3 indicates, the nominal level of the 
invisible trade deficit has increased tenfold over the 
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fourteen year period. Appendix 1 breaks down the 
invisibles deficit, and highlights the major 
contributing cause of the increase. During the fourteen 
year period 1970-1983, invisible receipts increased 12.4 
times, and total invisible payments 11.0 times, also the 
invisibles deficit increased as a proportion of GDP from 
a low of 2~4% in 1973 to 6.9% in 1983. In 1970 invisible 
payments were 2.4 times as large as invisible receipts; 
this decreased to 2.1 times by 1983. In terms of bales 
of wool sold, in 1970 the invisibles deficit equated 
with 3.8 million 100kg. bales of wool, compared with 8.3 
million 110 kg. bales in 1983 1 . Appendix 1 also shows 
the change in Government debt interest since 1974. This 
increased by a factor of 19.7, whilst invisible receipts 
and private invisible payments increased by 4.6 and 5.6 
times respectively. If by 1992 the same trends continue, 
Government debt interest payments will account for 42% 
of total invisible payments, compared with 5% in 1974 
and 17% in 1983. These calculations, whilst simplistic 
with the ceteris paribus assumption, highlight the 
alarm~ng consequences of continued overseas borrowing to 
support either an external deficit or to finance a 
Government budget deficit. 
1 This is, based on a 1970 price of 56.48 cents per 
Kg. of greasy wool and a 1983 price of 255.70 cents 
per Kg~ of greasy wool. 
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3.1.5 Capital account 
Capital account transactions indicate changes in 
ownership of New Zealand's claims on non-residents, 
foreign assets, and indebtedness to non-residents, 
foreign liabilities. The nature of New Zealand's current 
account transactions; the high turnover of funds 
(relative to GDP); the existence of a deficit between 
receipts and payments; and the seasonal fluctuations 
that occur, indicate the need to maintain a cash reserve 
of overseas funds. The Reserve Bank holds foreign 
exchange to ensure "that the flow of payments for 
exports and imports and capital transactions proceed 
smoothly and without interruption" (Deane (et al), 
p.332). Appendix 2 gives a summary of New Zealand's 
official overseas reserves. According to Low, if the 
level of reserves "represents little more than two 
months imports" then this level is "enough to show that 
the country is vulnerable". He concludes, "in present 
circumstances , (1977 levels) we cannot regard the present 
level' of reserves as a buffer except in an extreme 
emergency" (in Taylor, 1981, p. 60). Indeed the 1982 
level of reserves represented less than two months 
imports, compared with the extraordinary peak reserve 
level of over seven months imports in 1973. New 
....... ",'.', ..... >. 
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Zealand's reserves in June 1983, more than double those 
of June 1982, were still below the 1977 levels discussed 
by Low above. Therefore New Zealand must borrow overseas 
to finance any short-term (three months to six months) 
balance of payments deficit. 
Figge (1967) outlines three reasons why a dependent 
economy may borrow externally. 
It "may properly borrow for two reasons: 
Short term borrowing to overcome a temporary balance of 
payments difficulty caused, in New Zealand's case, by 
the instability of primary produce prices on the one 
hand, and the steady upward trend in the price of 
imported raw materials and manufactured goods on the 
other. 
Long-term borrowing to provide for the development of 
new capital works and industries which in due course 
will increase productivity, reduce the dependence on 
imports and stimulate exports to a degree that will 
carry the increased costs of overseas debt servicing. If 
new borrowing does not do this, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to justify. When at the same time the control 
of New Zealand industry passes more and more into the 
hands' of overseas groups, the chances of material 
benefits to the country decrease even more." 
and 
"There is a third reason why some countries borrow. To 
consume more by way of goods and services than the 
country is earning. In other words, living beyond one's 
means. A country can no more do this without a time of 
reckoning than a person can" (p.102-103). 
I, " 
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TABLE 3.5 
Total official overseas debt and the ratio of offical overseas 
debt interest payments to export receipts 
Year Total Ratio Official Debt interest as 
ending Official of Total Debt a percentage of: June Overseas Official Interest 
Debt Debt to Payments Exports Current Receipts 
(i) GDP% (ii) 
1937 13.4 10.0 
1957 6.8 1.2 
1970 606.7 11.8 34.5 3.0 2.6 
1971 591.8 10.1 33.0 2.8 2.4 
1972 653.5 9.5 33.4 2.4 2.0 
1973 564.0 7.1 37.1 2.1 1.7 
1974 465.2 5.1 33.9 1.9 1.6 
1975 1081. 2 10.8 61. 3 3.7 2.8 
1976 2163.5 18.8 119.4 4.8 3.8 
1977 25~3.3 18.6 170.0 5.1 4.2 
1978 3255.8 21.4 208.1 6.1 5.0 
1979 3676.4 21.0 253.6 6.2 5.1 
1980 4296.8 20.5 312.4 6.1 5.1 
1981 4809.0 19.9 349.6 5.7 4.7 
1982 6776.9 23.7 519.4 7.7 6.2 
1983 7313.9 23.9 670.3 9.2 7.3 
(i) Year ending March -- Govt. and Reserve Bank 
(ii) Year ending June 
SOURCE: RBNZ Bulletins - Sept. 1978, 1980, 1983 
- March 1983 
.t» 
.t» 
-
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Given these reasons, should New Zealand reassess its 
borrowing programme? In 1964 the Monetary and Economic 
Council indicated "that there is insufficient public 
awareness of the extent of overseas borrowing .... and of 
the increasing degree to which the maintenance of 
investment and consumption in New Zealand has come to 
depend on such borrowing" (in Figge, p. 103). A measure 
commonly used to assess the impact of official debt 
interest payments is to express these as a percentage of 
export receipts (or current receipts). This is done in 
Table 3.5. 
The policy of external borrowing in 1975 and 1976, where 
total official overseas debt doubled each year and more 
than trebled over the two years as a percentage of GDP, 
is reflected in the increasing official debt interest 
payments. In 1974 only 1.9% of receipts were needed to 
cover debt interest payments - not far removed from the 
1957 low of 1.2%. This figure increased to 9.2% in 1983 
clqse to the 1937 high of 10%. Another important 
factor in regard to official debt is the "average 
interest rate" paid on the debt. A crude measure of this 
is obtained by calculating official overseas debt 
interest payments as a percentage of total official 
overseas debt. In 1972 debt interest payments equalled 
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5.1% of total debt: by 1983 this had risen to 9.2%. 
Although this trend is influenced by international 
monetary conditions the crude lIaverage interest rate ll 
measure indicates the required social return on 
borrowing. This implies a higher present expenditure 
level, basep on external borrowing, and a lower 
expenditure level at some time in the future, because 
capital repayments will be required. 
Other capital account transactions include net private 
capital transactions and I.M.F. transactions. These 
flows are presented in Appendix 2. Since 1975, excepting 
1979 when lI eas ier domestic liquidityll and IInarrowing 
interest rate differentials ll (R.B.N.Z. Bulletin, Sept. 
1975, p.330) allowed a refinancing of external loans 
internally, the private sector have been-net importers 
of capital. In 1982 and 1983 the flows increased 
markedly. A warning regarding this increase states lIin 
the longer term the present strong increase in 
investment flow presages an increase in future payments 
which 'will not be a problem provided that the current 
investment is made in economically viable assets which 
will yield a real return to the countryll (RBNZ Bulletin, 
Sept. 1982, p.366). As the net private capital flow is 
based on private business decisions to invest, as 
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opposed to the public need to supply official overseas 
reserves or to finance Government budget deficits, the 
result of net private overseas borrowing does not 
provide a reason for national concern regarding any 
long-term effect. In the short run, however, the cash 
inflow may have two effects. First, it may disrupt 
domestic monetary policy (by creating an increase in the 
money supply), and second it may mask the real need to 
eventually finance all current account deficits. This 
second effect arises because unless New Zealand can 
sustain a positive net private capital inflow, then at 
some future date, given that- the country still faces 
current account deficits, there will be a need for 
official borrowing to cover the current account deficits 
and the negative private capital outflow. 
The scale of overseas debt repayments presently reaches 
a peak in 1988, with over $2.2 billion worth to repay in 
that year (see RBNZ Bulletin, sept. 1983, p.395). 
, 
Private sector debt only represents 13.7% of this debt 
and only 20.6% of the total outstanding surveyed 
overseas debt, which stood at $14.3 billion in March 
1983. 
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3.2 The Economic Problem 
As Graph 3.1 indicated, the current account deficit has 
on average continued to deteriorate since 1973. Is this 
an economic problem? The view held by Low in 1977 
indicated hi~ opinion, which usefully highlights the 
situation: 
IIIn 'normal' times we could expect to receive a net 
private capital inflow of between $100 and $200 million 
a year. Government could without much trouble borrow say 
$200 million a year. This suggests that a current 
account deficit of between $300 and $400 million could 
be manageable and realistic year after year. This I 
regard as too simple a calculation, especially for the 
next few years ahead, my reasons being: 
a. We are not in a normal position to start with 
b. Our reserves are rather low relative to what weI 
should have, if they are to be used as a~buffer . 
c. Our offi~ial interest cost {about $150 million 
a year)2 is now high enough to be a major influence 
on our lIinvisible" deficit. We would be wise to 
reduce it. 
1 See Appendix 2 for a summary of official overseas 
reserves 
2 Table 3,.5 indicates the official interest costs 
between 1970 and 1983. In 1983 it amounted to $670.3 
million. 
1
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d. There are some heavy loan maturities overseas 
in the next four years, and a good deal of 
refinancing will need to be donel . While I do 
not expect any major problem, it would be easier 
to obtain the refinancing if we were not 
borrowing much new money at the same time. 
e. Regular official borrowing by a developed 
country, continuing in relatively good times, 
will sooner or later be questioned by the 
people from whom we borrow, and our credit 
standing could suffer2 ." (in Taylor, p.63-64). 
Tucker, commenting on Low's paper, states that he would 
"discard the naive optimism" Low has "in favour of 
policy that recognises the harsh realities of New 
Zealand's economic pl ight" . Tucker finds that" there can 
belittle doubt that the level of spending on imports is 
the most fundamental problem associated with New 
Zealand's balance of payments" (in Taylor, p.69). 
Therefore policy aimed at enhancing exporters 
competitiveness may not be a very efficient method of 
dealing with the problem. Indeed, New Zealand's large 
1 See R.B.N.Z. Bulletin, Sept. 1983 (p.395). This 
indicates that at least $1 billion is due for 
repayment e~ch year between 1984 and 1990. In total 
over these seven years, more than $10 billion is due 
for repayment. 
2 The 1983 move 
New Zealand's 
small drop in 
in a survey 
International 
point that Low 
by Standard and Poors which downgraded 
credit rating from AAA to AA+ and the 
New Zealand's credit rating reported 
of International Bankers in the 
Investor are timely reminders of this 
makes (see Appendix 8). 
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deficits on the current account "were at their worst (in r~~~~~; 
1975-1978) when our export competitiveness was at its 
peak. Clearly the problems of export uncompetitiveness 
were not at the root of the problem" (Grimes, 1979, 
p.16). 
The absorption approach, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
indicates that a current account deficit reflects a 
situation where total domestic expenditure exceeds total 
domestic income. As Deane (et al) remark, the absorption 
approach "really masks what may be a rather complex 
interaction of several factors in contributing to a 
country's external difficulties during anyone period" 
(p.16). Several of these difficulties have been 
discussed in section 3.1, but incumbent on these 
problems are pressures resulting from-monetary and 
fiscal policies. For example "in late 1977 through to 
mid-1978, despite a large external current account 
deficit, monetary and fiscal policies tended to be 
, . 
in order to lift the out of the expan~lonary economy 
recession and to ease the problem of rapidly rising 
unemployment. Not surprisingly, the demand for imports 
was greatly stimulated" (Deane (et al), p.18). 
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Although much blame for the rise in import payments is 
laid on the cost of oil, the "general expansion of 
economic activity from the second half of 1978 through 
1979 was associated with a strong rise in non-oil 
imports" (p.18). Therefore, given that import payments 
are controllable through domestic demand management of 
expenditure, then that expenditure should be adjusted, 
to ensure that the volume of goods imported is changed 
to allow import payments to equal export receipts. The 
reason for concentrating on volumes is that New Zealand 
is too small to influence import prices. 
The monetary approach to the balance of payments, also 
discussed in Chapter 2, identifies the influence on the 
problem (the current account deficit) as an excess 
supply of money. The excess supply of --money stimulates 
expenditure on goods and services, the mechanism being a 
'real balance effect'. This theory is discussed in more 
detail in Chapters 5 and 6. In New Zealand, Government 
trans~ctions play an important role in determining the 
current account deficit. The supposition that the 
Government, finding itself with an excess supply of 
money, rearranges its portfolio by spending more on 
social infrastructure, defence equipment and so on seems 
implausible.Therefore, to correctly examine the cause of 
: :. -" . - -.. --.-. - ~.',' 
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the economic problem, aggregate expenditure and current 
account data needs to be divided into private and 
Government sectors. To date there has been no regular 
published source of New Zealand quarterly data 
identifying the two sectors contributions to the current 
account1 . Using data collected from the Reserve Bank, 
Graph 3.2 depicts the annual data for years ending June 
(C6mp1ete quarterly data used to derive Graph 3.2 is in 
Appendix 3). 
Graph 3.2 gives an insight into the components of the 
current account balance. Rather than indicating a 
continuing downward trend in the net private sector 
balance, the graph depicts two periods of payments 
imbalance. These are between 1974 and 1978-and the June 
years 1981 and 1982. This suggests that the private 
sector, given appropriate demand management policy, can 
at least balance its contribution to the current account 
defic~t. 
1 See Appendix 4 for a comparison of two other sources. 
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Government and private sector contributions 
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It could be reasoned that during 1974-1978 and 1981-1982 
the private sector was responding to 'easy' monetary and 
fiscal conditions which masked the real need for the 
private sector to purchase fewer imports as export 
receipts fell relative to import payments. Even if such 
reasoning cannot be validated, Graph 3.2 absolves the 
private sector from accusations that the root of New 
Zealand's balance of payments problem lies with the 
private sector's export production or spending on 
imports. Therefore, policies designed specifically to 
increase the output of the export sector, notably export 
incentive schemes and supplementary minimum payments, 
should be questioned as to their efficiency in dealing 
with the balance of payments problem. If indeed, with 
appropriate settings of monetary and fiscal policy, the 
private sector can balance its current account 
transactions, then the focus of the economic problem 
becomes the Government's current account balance. 
3.3. ~onflicting objectives 
The balance of payments objective is often considered an 
intermediate objective in that a deficit is "seen as one 
of the major constraints on the ability to manoeuvre the 
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economy towards a higher rate of " economic growth" (Deane 
(et all, p. 15) . In general most texts on economic 
policy outline four other major economic objectives, 
which are designed to improve the welfare of the nation. 
They are a desire for real growth in the economy, full 
utilization of resources (especially human), achievement 
of price stability and a notion of satisfying a 
distributional objective. Indicators of the first three 
objectives, and the balance of payments objective are 
presented in Table 3.6. 
The notion that to increase national welfare we need 
only move toward the achievement of the targets of 
macroeconomic policy is fraught with difficulties. The 
most important problem is that more often than not, all 
the objectives cannot be achieved simultaneously; any 
movement toward one often results in a movement away 
from another, sometimes several quarters later. So the 
task of the policy maker is to assess the trade-offs 
among: objectives, and decide which policy actions are 
most appropriate. As Table 3.6 indicates, New Zealand 
policy makers have needed to determine objective 
priorities, as unemployment, erratic rates of economic 
growth and inflation have compounded the 1974/1975 
balance of payments difficulty. 
:';:-;-;'-;'----'--'-::-'--
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TABLE 3.6 
Measures of economic objectives 
Year Current Alc Unemployment Real GDP cpr 
ending Deficits as as a % of % % 
March a % of GDP Labour Force Change Change 
(i) 
1974 0.0 0.20 7.6 9.3 
1975 10.7 0.18 1.5 11. 9 
1976 8.1 0.80 1.2 15.7 
1977 5.2 0.98 -4.0 16.0 
1978 3.7 1. 73 0.0 14.4 
1979 2.8 3.87 0.9 10.9 
1980 2.7 4.10 -1. 6 15.7 
1981 3.4 4.55(ii) 4.4 16.3 
1982 4.7 5.58(ii) -0.8 15.5 
1983 5.7 6.53(ii) 0.0 15.3 
5.2(ili) 
(i) Using OET data. 
(ii) Computed using general economic indicators, 
columns (8) and (9) of RBNZ Bulletin, Dec. 1983. 
fiii) Year ending September, 1983. 
SOURCES: RBNZ Bulletins - May 1974, 1976 
- June 1980, 1983 
NZ Dept. of Stats. [Monthly Abstracts of Stats.] 
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3.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented the scenario of New Zealand's 
balance of payments. It has discussed the trends in the 
important data aggregates and the economic problem, and 
suggested causes. The division of current account data 
into private and Government sector contributions has 
shown two factors important in the debate on appropriate 
policy action, namely the importance of appropriate 
demand management policy to guide the private sector's 
external activity, and the need to examine policies that 
will arrest the continuing dramatic rise in the net 
Government current account deficit (over 50% of which is 
debt interest payments). The chapter finally alluded to 
the dilemma which faces policy makers when choosing 
among competing objectives. 
I'~:,.~,";:'_i .. :. :~_:. 
f';:";':":":S:-::,"';', 
f_,c-:'".-<:'7.'=·'-:"-
58 
CHAPTER 4 
THE IMPACT OF FISCAL POLICY IN NEW ZEALAND 
In Chapter 3, where an overview of New Zealand's balance 
of payments situation was given, it was suggested that 
demand management policy had important implications for 
the balance of payments deficit. In this chapter the 
contribution of fiscal policy to external balance and 
its channels of influence are examined, the 
stabilization role of fiscal policy is explained, the 
measurement of its impact (the multiplier and monetary 
effects) is discussed, and its character since 1972 is 
outlined. 
4.1 Fiscal Policy and the Objective of Stabilization 
The trrm fiscal policy refers to discretionary changes 
I 
in the level, composition and timing of Government 
expenditures and revenues from taxation and other 
Government charges. From the national accounting 
identity, equation 2.8, Government expenditure, 
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constitutes an injection in to the circular flow of 
income. The withdrawals from the flow are private sector 
saving, taxation and expenditure on imports. Therefore, 
as Deane and Smith (1980) point out, "the immediate 
purpose of Government spending on, for example, schools 
and hospitals may be to provide education and health 
care; but this expenditure also promotes further rounds 
of economic activity in the sense that it represents 
income to the builders of the schools and hospitals, who 
in turn spend their money on materials and labour; and 
so a chain of income expenditure effects is 
created"(p.l). In general, a fiscal deficit, an excess 
of Government expenditure over taxation and other 
revenue, is considered expansionary, ceteris paribus. 
Higher Government spending, which is not financed by 
higher taxes or Government charges will increase 
aggregate demand, ceteris paribus. This might stimulate 
higher domestic real output, thus increasing employment 
and lifting the economy from recession. But an increase 
in Government spending "might also stimulate the demand 
! 
for imports and worsen the balance of payments" (Deane, 
Nicholl-and Smith, 1983, p.268). 
Some of the main problems in using fiscal policy to 
stabilize a cyclical trend stem from the fact that 
I· ... 
I· 
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policy action is conducted in a dynamic setting. Because 
of the existence of unpredictable lag responses, some 
economists are of the opinion that discretionary 
stabilization of economies is mostly unsuccessful and 
can aggravate fluctuations that lead to the policy 
action. For example, if an expansionary policy does not 
take effect until the economy is being pulled out of a 
recession by other influences, the resulting "boom" 
could possibly be greater than that which would have 
existed in the absence of the expansionary policy, that 
is discretionary policy may be procyclical when it is 
intended to be anticyclical. Figure 4.la graphically 
describes the notion. 
In Figure 4.la from 0 to t represents a desired full 
employment. level. A decision to lift the economy out of 
the recession is made at t+l, the Government adopting an 
expansionary demand management policy. Yet at t+2 the 
recession turns itself, possibly through a global upturn 
in a~cti vi ty. Then the economy, which would have 
I 
naturally returned to a desired level at t+3, is now 
over~employed. This example represents the results of 
only one deliberate attempt to fine tune the economy. 
The pattern of a continued series of stabilization 
policies that (because of recognition, decision, 
r T~' -_-:-,-_.-:- ;-:-~..,: • .,;-:~~-T" 
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FIGURE 4.1a 
Effect of expansionary policy in a nat~ral cyclical 
recession. 
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implementation and effect lags) result in procyclical 
policy are depicted in Figure 4.1b. This Figure shows an 
assumed pattern of GDP with no discretionary fiscal 
policy, the pattern with procyclical filiscal policy and a 
trend line, which depicts the implementation of 
'perfect' anticyclical fiscal policy. Of note is the 
extenuation of the variations in GDP when procyclical 
fiscal policy is imposed. 
Economists who are against the use of discretionary 
policy or fine tuning are often of the monetarist or 
Chicago School persuasion and more recently, the 'new 
classical school'. Deane (1981) reviews the monetarist 
hypotheses. Monetarists hypothesise that inherent in 
market competition is an automatic adjustment mechanizm 
that will give continuous equilibria. They hold that 
demand management policies, that is discretionary 
changes in monetary and fiscal policies target ted on 
macroeconomic stabilization at high levels of economic 
activity, "can only temporarily alter real outcomes" and 
I 
therefore "under stable policies the economy will reach 
equilibrium ..... on its own" (p.14)1. 
1 Limitations 
monetarist 
referred to 
(1982) . 
of space preclude a thorough review of 
models in this thesis. The reader is 
Dornbusch and Fischer (1982) and Desai 
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Economists of the Keynesian tradition, on the other 
hand, suggest that demand management policies can have a 
significant effect on real output and labour employment 
whenever factors of production are not fully employed. 
Therefore, to them "some degree of fine tuning is 
possible and indeed necessary to ensure the maximum 
level of employment" (Deane, p.9). 
New Zealand empirical studies of the effectiveness of 
stabilization policy emphasise a pattern of mostly 
pro-cyclical policy, that is Government spending has 
tended to increase when least needed. For example, 
Morgan and Haywood (1977) indicate that any 
discretionary fiscal expenditure had generally been 
pro-cyclical, and therefore "Government expenditure 
policy has generally been inconsistent with-the domestic 
stabilization objective" (Deane, p.1S). 
The Reserve Bank econometric model has been used by 
Smith I (1979) to simulate the effects of adopting a 
neutral Government expenditure stance, rather than 
procyclical. He found that a constant simulated growth 
rate of Government expenditure, at 7.5% per annum since 
1974, reduced the four quarter running total of real 
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aggregate expenditure between 1975 and 1977. liThe 
overall decline in the level of expenditure eases the 
demand for imports which results in a lower current 
account deficit" (p.36). Yet simulated unemployment 
worsened for the 1976/1977 period, although tracking 
back to the actual level in 1978. Another policy option 
was imposed 'on the model by Smith. It involved the same 
constant growth rate of Government expenditure, three 
devaluations of the exchange rate in March 1974, 1975 
and 1976 of 10%, 11.4% and 5% respectively, and a 
tighter monetary policy through increasing the reserve 
asset ratios of the trading banks. His results show that 
lithe level of real aggregate expenditure is 
substantially reduced through most of the period which 
inevitably results in a higher level of unemployment. On 
the other hand, the current account deficit has been 
reduced .... II (p. 42). 
Deane and Smith (1980) assessed the trends in fiscal 
policy, examining 
I 
the relationship of these to 
externally induced events. One of their conclusions is 
that."large swings in the budgetary outcome ..... helped 
induce considerable uncertainty about the likely path of 
economic activity; at least seriously delayed 
adjustment to the overseas deficit; probably encouraged 
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rather than dampened inflation; and perhaps diverted 
attention from the pursuit of a more rational, phased 
adjustment to New Zealand's external difficulties". The 
"lesson therefore of this analysis is that we must 
endeavour in future to avoid such large swings in fiscal 
policy within such relatively short time horizons" 
(p.17). 
4.2 The Theoretical Impact of Fiscal Policy 
4.2.1 Measurement of the fiscal impact 
The raw budget data and accompanying comment, as 
presented in the annual budget statement, is considered 
by many as inadequate lias a vehicle for--promoting an 
improved understanding of fiscal policy" (Deane, p. 8 ) . 
Several New Zealand authors, notably Buckle and Snively 
(1979), Deane and Smith, (1980), Pope and Grindell 
(1974)! and Deane (1981), have underlined the fact that 
I 
the budget does not deal with the expected impact of 
fiscal policy on the nation, and therefore its effects 
on expenditure, employment, inflation and the balance of 
payments. In the New Zealand literature cited above, 
i'"-".-
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several alternative simple measures of the impact of the 
budget have been constructed. This section discusses the 
development of a simple adjusted domestic budget deficit 
measure to determine the internal effects of fiscql 
policy, and section 4.2.3 presents an extension of that 
indicator to account for the monetary effects of fiscal 
policy. 
Unfortunately, comparing between year differences in the 
Budget Table 2 deficit before borrowing data, shown in 
Table 4.1, may not 
the intended or 
be a precise 
actual effect 
or correct indicator of 
of fiscal policy. 
Furthermore the estimated (forecast) budget deficit may 
not provide a true indicator of the impact of future 
fiscal policy. As pointed out by Buckle and Snively "we 
need to have some idea of what otner exogenous 
influences the Government assumes will occur and their 
assumptions regarding the underlying behaviour of the 
economy which will cause an automatic change ,in the 
deficit" (p.13). For instance, a rise in unemployment 
would' necessitate greater social welfare payments, 
whereas a rise in private incomes would create an 
increased taxation flow. Thus a change in aggregate 
economic activity, induced either by a discretionary 
change in fiscal instruments or a movement in variables 
i: - : -_ .' _ ~-.',' --
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exogenous to the Government sector, may change the 
budget deficit. 
Several techniques have been developed to overcome the 
inadequaCy of using the raw budget deficit to assess the 
impact of fiscal policy. Some of these involve: scaling 
the deficit in relation to a defined full employment 
level of income 1 standardising the de'f ici t by 
separating the automatic and discretionary fiscal 
effects, summing the increase in discretionary policy 
changes; and weighting each component comprising the 
fiscal balance2 . However each of these methods have 
limitations (discussed in Blinder and Solow (1974)) and 
"(i)n the end, the most appropriate measure of the 
budget impact depends on the state of knowledge about 
macroeconomic behaviour and the abilit~ to isolate 
automatic fiscal effects from other economic effects" 
(Buckle and Snively, p.23). 
1 For example, an economy operating at near full 
employment will respond less (in terms of additional 
production) to a fiscal stimulus than an economy 
operating at less than full employment. Therefore the 
impact of a Government deficit may vary according to 
how close an economy is to its 'capacity utilization 
constraint'. For further details on research for New 
Zealand see Deane and Smith (p.9) and Lumsden (1974, 
p.13). 
2 For example the effect of a rise in expenditure 
may be different to that of a decrease in taxation. 
'f.::::.::: ........ . 
TABLE 4.1 
Government budget data conventional format 
Years Expenditure Revenue Government 
Ending Deficit March Annual % Changes 
June Before Year 
$m $m Borrowing Deficit 'Expenditure Revenue 
1970 1370.4 1285.7 84.7 75.8 
1971 1645.5 1586.5 59.0 80.6 20.0 23.4 
1972 1962.0 1820.4 141.6 72.3 19.2 42.2 
1973 2283.4 2083.2 200.2 206.0 16.4 14.4 
1974 2516.8 2311. 7 205.1 241. 7 10.2 11.0 
1975 3804.1 3080.6 723.5 390.4 51.2 33.3 
1976 4400.6 3505.5 895.1 1001. 7 15.7 l3.8 
1977 4663.3 4184.2 479.1 506.1 6.0 19.4 
1978 5844.2 5012.6 831.6 694.4 25.3 19.8 
1979 7076.6 5525.4 1551.2 1446.0 21.0 10.2 0'1 
1980 8160.0 6917.0 1243.0 1026.0 15.3 25.2 (Xl 
1981 9413.4 7860.8 1552.6 1524.9 15.4 l3.6 
1982 11530.1 9722.4 1807.7 .1818.3 22.5 23.7 
1983 12971.4 10879.5 2091. 9 1766.9 12.5 11.0 
SOURCES Government expenditure and ·revenue quarterly data from 
* 1970-1978 - Buckle and Snively (p.42) 
(except: that their 1974 March quarter figure is incorrect) 
* 1979-1983 - RBNZ Bulletin, Dec. 1983 
Annual March data from Deane and Smith (p.23) and 
RBNZ Bulletin, Dec . 1983 (p.566). 
. :;' 
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Table 4.1 gives a summary of the conventional Government 
budget data in Table 2 format for years ended June (for 
convenience to match with OET data presented in Chapter 
3) and years ended March. The two series of Government 
deficits before borrowing indicate a similar pattern of 
events, which will be discussed in section 4.3. 
To obtain estimates of the Government's direct impact on 
aggregate domestic demand, both the Buckle-Snively and 
Deane-Smith papers exclude from the budget Table 2 data, 
the Government's transactions with the external sector. 
But as is indicated in Appendix 4, the data used by each 
pair to exclude these Government transactions differ. 
Because differences could not be reconciled, a third 
data set was compiled by the author, using data on file 
at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. This data was 
presented in Graph 3.2 and is described in Appendix 3. 
As Table 4.2 indicates, the internal effect of the 
budge~ deficit implies a much lesser impact of fiscal 
policy on the domestic economy than raw budget data. A 
further refinement would involve adjusting the internal 
budget deficit data for inflation. But, as Buckle and 
Snively point out, "unfortunately there is no existing 
i 
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TABLE 4.2 
Government's Internal Budget Deficit 
$m Government 
Year Deficit 
ending Before 
June Borrowing 
1970 84.7 
1971 59.0 
1972 141.6 
1973 200.2 
1974 205.1 
1975 723.5 
1976 895.1 
1977 479.1 
1978 831.6 
1979 1551.2 
1980 1243.0 
1981 1552.6 
1982 1807.7 
1983 2091.9 
SOURCES 
Government 
% OET 
GDP Current A/c 
Deficit 
1.6 104.4 
1.1 112.0 
2.0 121.0 
2.4 135.8 
2.2 140.7 
7.0 264.6 
4.5 339.6 
3.4 383.2 
5.3 465.7 
9.1 582.3 
5.8 681. 7 
6.4 715.6 
6.3 892.2 
6.9 1141. 8 
Table 4.1 
Appendix 3 
Before Borrowing 
Government's 
Internal % 
Budget Deficit/ GDP 
Surplus (- ) 
Before Borrowing 
-19.7 (0.4) 
-53.0 (0.9) 
20.6 0.3 
64.4 0.8 
-----'---~--::::>-:~:.=-~:::-:.-==-:-
64.4 0.7 
458.9 4.5 
555.5 4.6 
95.9 0.7 
365.9 2.3 
968.9 5.7 
561. 3 2.6 :-:~~':- -"~, 
~ ~ ~ 
387.0 3.5 
915.5 3.2 
___ L ___ • • L_ 
L. __ ._.", ' __ ~ __ , __ p '_-,~' 
950.1 3.1 
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regularly published data acceptable for this procedure" 
(p.44) . Therefore expressing the deficits as a 
percentage of GDP gives an indication of their aggregate 
influence. Using this measure, Table 4.2. shows that the 
effect of the internal budget deficit approximates half 
that implied by the unadjusted data. Nevertheless, in 
all cases except 1983 the direction of change in the 
percentage of GDP figures is the same. Buckle and 
Snively conclude that "the raw budget balance as 
mea~ured by budget Table 2 adjusted for Government 
imports and exports provides as good a basis as any 
available to assess the budget's fiscal impact on 
aggregate demand" (p.44). But as Deane and Smith state 
"the difficulties in interpretation (of fiscal 
policy) . .... arise not just by the complications brought 
to bear by a large and volatile external sector, but 
also from a lack of sophistication in the budget impact 
measures themselves" (p.8). Therefore it is necessary to 
discuss formally the impact of fiscal policy within a 
well structured model which describes the set of 
relati~nships involved. As Deane (1981) points out, 
"(t)he influence of the budget on the economy can only 
be satisfactorily described within the context of a well 
specified, comprehensive model of the economy as a 
whole" (p.8). Indeed the model to be presented in 
Chapter 6 intends to embody only the essential aggregate 
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relationships, the parsimony adding to the pedagogic 
power of the model. Comprehensive models are notoriously 
difficult to develop, being representations of a very 
complex world. However, in the following sections, a 
simplified model is suggested as a useful compromise 
between comprehensiveness and manageability. The model 
is further developed and estimated in Chapters 6 and 7. 
4.2.2 The multiplier effects 
As previously mentioned, any increase in national income 
following an increase in Government spending may be 
greater than the initial injection, because this induces 
a chain of increases in private income and expenditure. 
Higher Government expenditure "may also stimulate the 
demand for imports and thus worsen the balance of 
payments" (Deane and smith, p. 2 ) • But import 
expenditure, like taxation, results in a leakage from 
the multiplier 
! 
process. The theoretical fiscal 
multi~lier can be developed using the following simple 
macroeconomic model. The model does not include any 
monetary effects it is assumed that monetary 
disequilibria do not exert any influence on real 
variables) . 
I 
! . ~-' - --- . -.. ' -
A comparative static model 
Y _ E + G + (X-M) 
E = a + b( Y-T) 
T = c + d(Y) 
M = e + f(E) 
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( 4 . I ) 
( 4 .2 ) 
( 4 .3 ) 
( 4 .4 ) 
All the variables are in real terms. The notation and 
restrictions are: 
'f = national income 
E = private domestic expenditure, consumption and 
investment 
G = Government spending 
X = current account export receipts 
M = current account import payments 
T = taxation receipts 
and 
.0 < b, d, f < I 
I 
, 
Substituting (4.3) into (4.2) yields 
E = a + b(Y(1 - d) - c) ( 4 .5 ) 
10"-
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(4.5) into (4.4) gives 
'M =e + f(a + b(y(l - d) - c)) (4.6) 
Then sUbstituting (4.5) and (4.6) into (4.1)~ yields 
Y = a+b(Y(l-d)-c)+G+X-e-f(a+b(Y(l-d)-c)) (4 .7) 
Rearranging and taking the derivative of Y with respect 
to G gives 
dY 
dG = 
1 
1 - (1 - f)b(l - d) 
The mUltiplier dY/dG is greater 'than one as all values 
of b, d and f satisfy the constraint 
0«1 - f)b(l - d)<l 
since 0 < b, d, f <1' 
This form of aggregate multiplier analysis simplifies 
reality, because alternative forms of Government 
spending or taxation might have different multiplier 
effects. This is because those who receive the initial 
Government injection, or those who have their tax rate 
increased, may have different consumption and savings 
! -
I:· ',C','.',','C.':';- .,., 
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patterns with dissimilar lags. For example, as Deane and 
smith state "wage earners are normally thought to have a 
relatively high propensity to consume, and thus the 
impact of a dollar spent on higher wages for Government 
employees may be larger and quicker than a dollar spent 
on, say, a Government office block or a hydroelectric 
dam where the gestation periods can be very long, and 
where the recipients,. business firms and corporations, 
may perhaps spend less and save more in relative terms 
than wage earners" (p. 2) . 
4.2.3 Monetary impact 
The multiplier effects of fiscal policy, reviewed above, 
also influence financial markets, which in turn may 
contribute through monetary aggregates to the impact of 
the budget deficit. The complete monetary impact of 
fiscal policy is difficult to assess merely be deriving 
a single measure. This is due to a diverse range of , 
imping~ng factors including: the size of the budget 
deficit; the method used to finance it; the condition 
of the economy (including the 'mood' of the financial 
sector); the nature of monetary policy; and the 
proportion of available credit spent on imports (which 
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TABLE 4.3 , 
Measure of the monetary impact of the budget 
$m 
Year 
ending 
June 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
Governmen tis 
Internal 
Budget Deficit/ 
Surplus (-) 
Before Borrowing 
-19.7 
-53.0 
20.6 
64.4 
64.4 
458.9 
555.5 
95.9 
365.9 
968.9 
561. 3 
837.0 
915.5 
950.1 
Government's \ 
Net Internal 
Borrowing 
from Non 
M3 sector 
25.9 
22.7 
23.0 
183.6 
14.1 
17.4 
-55.5 
307.8 
259.2 
488.3 
288.3 
567.6 
820.5 
1911.6 
Governmen tis 
Budget 
Contribution 
to the M3 
money base 
-45.6 
-75.7 
- 2.4 
-119.2 
50.3 
441. 5 
611. 0 
-211.9 
106.7 
480.6 
273.0 
269.4 
95.2 
-961. 5 
SOURCES Table 4.2 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand data base as at 
Jan. 1984 used for'the Government's Net 
Internal Borrowing from Non-M3 sector' 
Variable used was GSP. 
, ~ ~ 
. ','- '-"",-. 
1-.<·"·.·.7-'<~·:.-.~.-> .-:_ 
"',. 
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acts' as a leakage from the money base). Nevertheless, in 
Table 4.3. a measure of the budget's direct contribution 
to the M3 definition of the money base is given. 
The monetary impact of the budget deficit may therefore 
be opposite to the fiscal impact. The factor that 
determines the difference between monetary and fiscal 
impacts is the manner in which the deficit is financed, 
although the actual response of the economy to a 
monetary injection (or withdrawal) of funds by the 
Government will also depend upon ,other monetary changes 
in the economy. The source of these changes may include: 
private sector's overseas exchange transations; Reserve 
Bank transactions with the private sector (mainly with 
marketing boards); and changes in lending to the private 
sector by M3 institutions. 
The M3 monetary base comprises: cash holdings of banks, 
other M3 institutions and the non-financial private 
I 
sector; Government stock and Treasury bills held by 
trading banks and other M3 institutions; and trading 
bank time deposits at the Reserve Bank. These are 
commonly called the 'uses' side of the monetary base. 
The internal budget deficit after borrowing from the 
I 
I 
I 
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non-M3 sector comprises one 'source' of change in the 
monetary base. The other two 'sources' are Reserve Bank 
transactions with the private sector and private 
overseas exchange transactions. 
It is possible to formally express changes in the money 
stock ( M3) in terms of changes in the monetary base of 
M3 institutions (often called high-powered money, or H) 
using an algebraic formula that depends on two ratios, 
the public's currency to deposit ratio, and reserve to 
deposit ratios of M3 financial institutions. Defining 
M3 
H 
BR = 
C = 
where 
C = 
D = , 
BR = 
r = 
c = 
C + D 
C + BR 
rD 
cD 
currency held by the public 
total deposits 
reserves of M3 financial institutions 
reserve to deposit ratio, 0 < r < 1 
currency to deposit ration, 0 < c < 1 
( 4 .8 ) 
(4 .9) 
(4 .10 ) 
(4.11) 
r--;'-;-;-;-;-:';;-"" ','c'. 
to,:,,;:::,,:::,,:,:;-:::;:,:;:: 
r-:-:~~:-:.~~:,=~:",::,:~:::;:: • .: 
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Dividing (4.8) by(A.9) yields 
M3 C + D = H C + BR 
Using (4 .8) and ( 4 . 9 ) in (4.12) yields 
M3 (l + c)D = (c H + r)D 
Then letting (1 + c)/(c+r)' = m, 
6M3 = m(t.H) 
where 
t.H = monetary impact of budget + net private 
overseas transactions + Reserve Bank 
transactions with private sector 
(4.12) 
(4.13) 
(4.14) 
It is often argued that if m 1S relatively constant, 
then an increase in H would be accompanied by a multiple 
expansion of the money supply. For instance, Goodhart 
(1975), "a knowledge of movements in the high-powered 
money base should allow one to predict the movements in 
the money stock with some accuracy" (p.153). However, a 
curso~y glance at New Zealand's annual data 1970-1982 
(in Deane (et al), 1983, p.275, columns (6) and (7)) 
reveals that the money multiplier has not been constant: 
its range of fluctuation was between -2.8 (1975) and 
16.0 (1982), the standard deviation of the period (4.5) 
being larger than the mean (4.2). 
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Explanations for the instability follow at least three 
lines. First, the parameter c in equation (4.11) can be 
hypothesised to be a function of interest rates. That 
is, the public desire to hold less (more) money, as 
interest rates rise (fall), in relation to bonds, shar~s 
and other assets. Second, r could also be a function of 
interest rates, as banks could hold cash reserves at 
levels above'those legally required and r might be an 
influence on the size of such 'excess' reserves. Third, 
the supply of credit may be "constrained by monetary 
policy and other economic policies in various ways. For 
example, an increase in the trading banks' reserve asset 
ratios would reduce their margin of free reserves and 
should thereby influence the banks' lending policies" 
(Deane (et al), 1983, p.176). 
Evidence presented using New Zealand data has apparently 
shown "a close correlation, after allowing for time 
lags, between changes in the monetary base and the money 
stock and private sector credit" (Buckle and Snively, p. 
80). These authors used the estimated equation in 
Appendix SA to investigate the relationship. 
Appendix SA also contains two updated estimations of the 
81 
Buckle and Snively equation. It must be stressed, 
however,· that the regression results presented in 
Appendix 5A provide no guide as to the behavioural 
responses involved in influencing growth patterns of the 
money supply. Therefore the Buckle and Snively equation 
provides only tentative evidence that there exists a 
relationship between percentage changes in the money 
base and the money supply. This evidence is somewhat 
weakened by the ordinary least squares (OLS) updated 
estimation of their equation: the coefficient of 
determination adjusted for degrees of freedom (R2) has 
decreased, indicating a poorer fit, the Durbin-watson 
statistic (DW)l testing for autocorrelated error term 
disturbances has deteriorated. This suggests either that 
other factors are impinging on the growth in the money 
supply, or that the random error term is autocorrelated. 
The results of the first-order autoregression equation 
are more satisfactory, the DW-statistic indicating that 
we should tentatively fail to reject the null hypothesis 
of no autocorrelation. 
i 
1 The Durbin Watson statistic is measured using the 
formula presented in Table 4.4, note (iii). For 
further reference see Koutsoyiannis,(p.212) and 
Chow, 1983, (p.85) 
.. '~ .:,-.: .. -:<,-.-.~->-
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Some presentations of the monetary approach to the 
balance of payments directly test for the presence of a 
money multiplier as shown in equation (4.14) (see for 
example Bean, p. 327; Zecher, p.287, and Genberg, p.309 
- all in Frenkel and Johnson, 1976). As Genberg states 
" (t) he multiplier is postulated to summarise the 
behaviour of the public and the commercial banks with 
respect to the composition of their assets. This is 
influenced by wealth and income levels and market rates 
of return on one hand, and policy variables of the 
central bank on the other" (p.309). 
Table 4.4 presents regression results for a money 
multiplier equation using New Zealand quarterly data. 
These results are not encouraging, as the Durbin Watson 
statistic falls outside the required upper and lower 
limits shown in the Table. For this reason, empirical 
analysis in later chapters uses a money supply identity, 
which effectively restricts the money mUltiplier to a 
value ~ of one. This is a pragmatic compromise given the 
results in Table 4.4. 
I 
f.-:----
i--:" 
: -" . _. - -- .. -:-:~, - , . ,-, 
1-- -
83 
TABLE 4.4 
Regression results for a New Zealand money multiplier 
1. Ordinary least squares equation 
flM3 = 0.799flM3B 
(8.15) 
R,2 = 0.18 
DW = 0.54 
2. First-order autoregressive equation 
flM3 = 0.667L1M3B R,2 = 0.84 
(16.95) DW = 2.76 
P = 0.778 
(9.76) 
Notes: (i) t scores are in brackets. The critical 
value of the t-statistic for 56 degrees of 
freedom = 1.675 at the 95% confidence level. 
(ii) R,2 = coefficient of determination adjusted 
for degrees of freedom. 
(iii) DW = Durbin-Watson statistic 
n 
L (et-et_])2 
DW = t=2 -------n 
L et 2 
t=l 
where 
e = residual 
The critical value of dL and dU at the 95% 
confidence level are 1.53 and 1.60 
respectively. Therefore in equation 1. above 
DW<dL so we reject the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation and accept that there is 
positive autocorrelation of the first order. 
Therefore assuming that the autocorrelation is 
due to mis-specification of the random error 
term a first-order autoregressive equation is 
estimated. However the results of the Durbin-
Watson test are not encouraging, although the 
R2 is much improved. As 4.0 - 1.53 = 2.47, 
which is lower than 2.76, we still reject the 
null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and 
conclude that the problem may be due to the 
exclusion of other variables, an incorrect 
mathematical form, or errors in measurement 
of the variables. 
(iv) Data period 1969(8) - 1983(J). 
(v) Data from Appendix 5B. 
t:,:::::,:::::c::/::::::.:: 
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4.3 The stance of New Zealand's Fiscal Policy 
4.3.1 Brief history of fiscal policy in New Zealand 
As a colony of Britain, New Zeal~nd adopted some ideas 
and protocol that stem from British society. But as 
Hawke (1982) points out, "these particular ideas did not 
carry weight with colonial decision makers. The role of 
Government was worked out mostly in the light of local 
realities" (p.S). Hawke outlines general reasons for 
Government intervention in the developing years of New 
Zealand's economy. The reasons he gave were: creating 
diplomatic offices; providing a legal system; and 
exercising "the power to borrow on the security of the 
essentially coercive power to levy taxes to fund 
repayments and interest obligations. The last of these 
was much more important . ... than in England" (p.6 ) . An 
interesting feature of these developing years was that 
the Government "engaged in building railways or in other 
! 
forms of capital formation financed by the 
borrowing ..... it was exceptional to New Zealand" 
(p.lO). The list of activities which Hawke discusses 
underlines the early commitments the Government entered 
into in a fiscal sense. They include the Bank of New 
ri~~g';;:':ii£~F: 
! 
, ~-
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Zealand, the Government Life Insurance Office, the 
Public Trust Office, the support given to Producer 
Boards, and transfer payments to maintain an extensive 
social welfare system. 
Development of the idea that the Government's fiscal 
policy should also be concerned with balancing aggregate 
demand with the supply of goods and services available 
gained vogue in the late 1930's and 1940's. This quashed 
the older dictum of the need to 'balance the budget'. 
But as Hawke states, "by the 1970's there was growing 
regret that the discipline of having to balance the 
budget had been destroyed too completely; the surplus 
or deficit appropriate to any particular prevailing 
economic conditions was necessarily more ambiguous than 
equality of Government revenue and expenditure, and 
pressures for increased expenditure were greater than 
for increased taxation" (p.54). This last point of 
Hawke's, that of unequal pressure on expenditure and 
taxat~on, highlights the importance of regular critical 
revisions of public expenditure, and the need to enter 
into 'sunset clauses' for items of increased expenditure 
or reduced taxation that are especially introduced as 
instruments of demand management policy. To conclude 
this section on the historical perspective, it is 
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important to note that prior to the 1970's, the budget's 
internal influence (as measured by Table 4.2) fluctuated 
around zero. Additionally, "before the early 1970's, 
fiscal policy did not usually make a direct injection to 
demand in New Zealand" (Hawke, p.55). 
4.3.2. A brief overview of the direction of fiscal 
policy since 1970 
The following description of the path of fiscal policy 
uses only the three indicators presented in Graph 4.1. 
These measures express the budget deficit, the internal 
budget deficit, and the budget deficit's contribution to 
the monetary base, all relative to nominal gross 
domestic product. 
The three measures in Graph 4.1 all suggested differing 
levels of relative impact upon the economy. In all June 
years ~ the unadjusted deficit indicates a larger impact 
I 
than the adjusted internal deficit. Relatively, except 
t--,-; , _____ . 
in 1976 when the Government repaid more private sector 
debt than it incurred, the internal budget impact has 
been greater than the budget impact on the money base. 
a... 
C) 
(.!) 
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0 
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GRAPH 4.1 
Measures of the impact of the Government's 
budget deficit. 
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The graph highlights 
First, since 1972 the 
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two other important features. 
unadjusted and adjusted deficits 
before borrowing have, on 
a proporation of nominal 
September 1983 Reserve 
average, continued to rise as 
GDP. As is pointed out in the 
Bank Bulletin "(t)his upward 
ratchetting of deficit levels has important longer term 
consequences, with each increasing addition to the level 
of public debt involving accelerating debt service 
charges, which increases the difficulties policy makers 
face in containing or reducing future deficit levels" 
(p.385). Of course, if deficit Government spending is on 
capital development which will provide income enough to 
service the debt and capital repayments, there is little 
concern although there may be some crowding-out of 
private sector investment. However, as debt interest 
payments contribute 
process of reducing 
the deficit may 
more to the budget deficit, the 
the deficit becomes more difficult; 
become "self-reinforcing, with 
increasingly adverse effects on monetary growth, prices, 
intere~t rates, the external accounts and private sector 
acti vi·ty" (p.385). 
The second feature of Graph 4.1 is the large 
".,'.-." -
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fluctuations in the impact of fiscal policy since 1972. 
The large apparent "swings" in the direction of fiscal 
policy are emphasized by all three indicators, showing 
expansionary periods in 1975, 1976, 1978 and 1979 and 
contractionary periods in 1977 and 1980. Many 
commentators discussing the impact of fiscal policy have 
attributed these peaks and troughs as cyclical in 
nature, centering on three year cycles which match those 
of the parliamentary term. Whilst it is difficult to 
attribute the reasoning behind fiscal policy and its 
outcome to any particular policy response, it is likely 
that the 1974/1975 budget deficit was at least as much a 
response to an anticipated slump in economic activity 
following the first oil shock and the subsequent 1974 
balance of payments deficit as it was electioneering. 
In fact Deane and Smith state "the Government 
endeavoured to insulate the domestic economy from the 
full impact of the massive turnaround in the balance of 
payments by adopting an expansionary fiscal stance" 
(p.4). There can be little doubt that the expansion in 
! 
expenditure was a deliberate fiscal action, since on a 
June year basis, Government expenditure rose by 51.2% in 
1974/75 (see Table 4.1). 
The first dramatic contractionary period in the 1970's 
~:"~;c~;.:'.>:._.;;:; •.. ,:.: 
t~:~~~~ii~~:~t~:;~; 
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90 
is recorded in 1977. In this year, following the 
persistent current account deficits and worsening rates 
of domestic inflation (see Table 3.6), Government 
expenditure grew by only 6.0% in nominal terms, whereas 
revenue increased by 19.4%. As a result, the March and 
June year budget deficits were halved. The 
contractionary monetary impact of the deficit was due to 
more private funds flowing into Government stock; this 
followed the "removal of interest rate controls and 
upgrading of the competitiveness of Government's own 
securities" (Deane and Smith, p.16). 
In 1978 the economy moved into a severe recession. 
Although the increase in discretionary Government 
spending "was less than $300 million" the rise in 
automatic spending "was two-thirds of the overall 
change" (p.10). The 1978 impact of the internal deficit, 
shown in Graph 4.1, was less than either the 1975 or 
1976 effects; the monetary impact was also relatively 
neutra1. In 1979 the Government delivered an 
I 
expans·ionary budget deficit before borrowing; this 
: .. ' 
followed possible concern over "rising unemployment, a 
deepening recession and a prospective election" (p.6). 
However, the monetary impact of the 1979 deficit was 
less than it had been for the 1975 or 1976 deficits, 
91 
\ 
indicating the continuing use of private Government debt 
sales to finance the growing deficits. 
Since 1979 the relative impact of the Government "s 
deficit on the domestic economy (the internal deficit) 
has remained between 2.5% and 3.5% of GDP. This level, 
whilst high compared with pre-1972 levels, is low 
relative to the levels indicated by the unadjusted data, 
a fact due to the increasing size of the Government's 
current account deficit. The impact of the deficit on 
the monetary base shows the influence of the marketing 
of Government stocks - New Zealand Government Savings 
Stock, Inflation Adjusted Bonds, Kiwi Saving Stock and 
various tap issues. Although not reflected in the data, 
the late 1983 move to tender Government stock will also 
contribute to restraint of the monetary im~act of the 
Government deficits. 
4.4 A Comparison and Summary 
I 
~ .' • :: ':. : ~. ~ :.: :.: r ~ 
It is interesting to briefly compare the stance of New 
Zealand's fiscal policy over the last decade with that 
of Sweden. Faced similarly with the international 
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recession ln 1974-1975 and a fall in their terms of 
trade following the oil shock, the Swedish Government 
also adopted the policy of 'bridging the gap'. According 
to Jonung (1983), an author who has published several 
articles on Swedish monetary and stabilisation policy, 
the strategy of bridging the gap "involved a highly 
expansive fiscal policy, whereby domestic demand was 
supposed to tide Sweden over the slack period of demand 
abroad" (p.27). As was the case in New Zealand, the 
continuing international recession frustrated this 
stabilisation policy and stimulated inflation rather 
than demand, therefore Sweden's international 
competitiveness deteriorated. Jonung states that 
"domestic fiscal policy was unduly expansive and 
contributed to the deficits on the current account 
during the period 1973-1980", postponing "measures for 
restoring external balance" (p.27). Concluding from the 
lessons of the 1970's, Jonung claims that in "the 
Swedish system (that of a mixed economy where the 
framing 
i 
of fiscal policy is largely influenced by 
margin'al votes) there is a danger that fiscal policy 
actually becomes a source of disturbances and 
instability" (p.32). He suggests, to improve the 
prospects of using fiscal policy for stabilisation 
purposes, that "central Government expenditures should 
roughly match Government revenues. In this way there 
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would be a direct link between public expenditures and 
~gB:lili:i8~~ii;~ 
their financing, this counteracting the present system's 
tendencies to postpone the issue of costs" (p.32). 
This chapter has briefly reviewed the role of fiscal 
policy, measures of its impact and the stance taken by 
the Government over the last decade. The objective of 
this Chapter and Chapter 3 was to provide background 
into movements in the major aggregates, thereby 
previewing the theoretical review of the next Chapter 
and model development in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 5 
A REVIEW OF ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS 
Past analyses of balance of payments policy have mainly 
concentrated' on three methodologies; the elasticity 
approach; the absorption approach; and the monetary 
previously reviewed in Chapter 2 . The I I approach, all 
I ..• 
following review emphasizes qualitative and applied 
models that provide the basis for the fiscal approach 
used in the model outlined in Chapter 6. 
Support for the fiscal approach was provided by Milne 
(1976) who examined a form of the Keynesian identity for 
a large number of countries. Her paper~eviewed the 
-'.".< .," 
development of the Cambridge New School, the debate 
developing in letters and articles written in The Times. 
Writers of the Cambridge New School "advanced support 
for tne existence of a causal relationship between the 
I 
level 'of the budget deficit and the .balance of payments 
on current account" (Milne, p.2). The New School debate 
also emphasized the monetary consequences of budget 
deficit financing. For example " an excessive 
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budget deficit would require as a monetary 
counterweight a rise in interest rates so draconian as 
to produce unacceptable contradictions in policy " 
and "(h)ence an excessive budget deficit is always 
accompanied by a rapid increase in the money supply 
" (Nield, 1974). Although, as Milne states, "the 
Cambridge model is not set out in explicit mathematical 
terms, which makes it difficult to appraise as a set of 
logical propositions following from a precise set of 
assumptions" (p.3). It is clear that' the central 
hypothesis is that the current account balance depends 
mainly on the Government budget deficit. 
From the elementary identity 
C + S + T _ Y _ C + I + G + (X - M) 
where T= taxation, 
we can derive three goods markets; foreign, private and 
public. It follows that 
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(M - X) _ (I - S) + (G - T) 
If the private sector balance (I - S) is 
predictable, then 
(M - X) = a+ S(G - T) + ~ 
small and 
In this framework an autonomous increase in Government 
spending would result 
multiplied effect on 
in increased imports with II no 
domestic income" (p.5). The 
approach outlined by Milne, whilst yielding a testable 
empirical relationship between Government deficits and 
the trade balance, does not imply causality. Furthermore 
the approach is deficient in that while focusing on 
credit creation and the balance of payments, linkages 
between these are not made explicit. In practice, when 
part of a fiscal deficit is 
monet~ry policy are being 
'monetised', both fiscal and 
employed the degree of 
acco~odation in monetary policy 
degree of monetisation of 
being determined by the 
the deficit. Therefore 
increases in the Government deficit after non-M3 
borrowing may be one of the. major factors causing 
- ..... " .. -, 
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increases in the domestic money supply which, according 
to the monetary approach, is likely to result in a 
worsening of the balance of payments. 
To the extent that monetary causes of balance of 
payments disequilibria are the result of fiscal 
deficits, longrun balance of payments equilibria may 
only be obtained through coordination of monetary and 
fiscal policies. This highlights. the interdependence of 
the two policies. 
Whitman's (1970) survey article of the internal-
external balance literature followed Meade's (1951) and 
Tinbergen's (1952) requirement that we set out a system 
of equations that represent the structural ~elationships 
between target levels and policy variables in an 
economy. Many models have been formulated to yield 
policy multipliers, for example Flemming (1962), Johnson 
(1966)! and Mundell (1962). The common features of these 
internal-external balance models are described in the 
following system, which is adapted from Whitman's 
presentation. 
(i) Assumptions 
* Monetary authorities sterilize the impact of balance 
of payments deficits on the money supplyl 
1 Sterilisation' basically means that monetary policy 
will offset the monetary impact. 
-'- -.. :-::~.:---~, - - . -
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(i) Assumptions continued ... 
* The foreign interest rate is constant 
* A zero marginal tax rate 
* Fixed exchange rates 
* (Not explicitly stated by Whitman, butimplied'by 
equation (5.3) is the assumption that the money supply 
will accommodate any change in the demand for money). 
(i i) The Model 
Y - E + CUB + G 
B - CUB + K 
M - L 
E = fl (Y, i) 
CUB = f2 (Y) 
K = f3 (i) 
L = f4 (Y, i) 
(iii) Notation and Restrictions 
Y = national income 
E = private domestic expenditure 
CUB = trade balance 
G = Government deficit spending 
K = net capital inflow 
B 1= balance of payments 
M = money supply 
L = money stock held by public 
i = rate of interest 
o < 3E/3Y < 1; 
3CUB/3Y < 0; 
3E/3i < 0; 
-3E/3Y < 3CUB/3Y; 
o < 3K/3i; 
o < 3L/3Y < 1; 3L/3i < O. 
( 5 .1 ) 
( 5 .2 ) 
( 5 .3 ) 
( 5 .4 ) 
( 5 .5 ) 
( 5 .6 ) 
( 5 . 7 ) 
!:. 
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The system can be totally differentiated, rearranged and 
written in matrix form, to obtain:-
(l-pE/ay-aCUB/ay) -aE/ai o dY dG 
-aCUB/ay -aK/ai 1 * di o 
aLlay aL/ai o dB dM 
,.' 
The three equation system has two policy variables, dG 
and dM, and three dependent target variables, dY, di and 
dB. The traditional policy multipliers for the change in 
the balance of payments target due to changes in 
Government deficit spending and the money stock are 
dB = aK/ai*aL/aT-aCUB/~y*aL/ai·> 0 
dG ~ < . 
and 
dB _-rlK/ai(1-aE/ay-aCUB/~R)-aE/ai*8CUB/aY 
dM - '1 ~ < 0 
where 
~= -aL/ai(I-8E/aY-8CUB/8y)-aE/8i*aL/8Y > 0 
i 
I 
.... -.. ~ - , . -.-,-,-,-.-'--.---~ 
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Therefore an increase in the money supply will worsen 
the balance of payments; however an increase in 
Government deficit spending may improve or worsen the 
balance of payments. This depends upon which of the two 
conflicting forces dominates: the negative effect of 
the increase in income on the trade balance or the 
increase in capital inflow caused by a rise in the 
interest rate. (Interest rates will rise when the money 
stock remains fixed with rising expenditure on goods and 
services). When net capital inflows are interest 
inelastic, the balance of payments will worsen with 
increases in Government deficit -spending as 
Focusing on the balance of payments current account, 
Vines (1976) developed a simple analytical model to 
explore the New Cambridge School debate and examine 
optima) policy settings for 
I 
external and internal 
balance. His model is a simple Keynesian model of an 
open, economy and is adapted here to highlight budgetary 
effects. , ' , 
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(i) Assumptions Ii::;~:~;~:~~:t~::'::: 
* The terms of trade are unaffected by a devaluation 
* A devaluation has no effect on the internal price 
level of horne produced goods 
* Government expenditure is the only instrument of 
budgetary policy 
(ii) The Model 
Y = E + G + X - M (5 .8 ) 
B = X - M ( 5 .9 ) 
E = eO + e (Y - T) (5.10) 
T = to + tY (5.11) 
M = mO + mY (5.12) 
(iii) Notations and Restrictions 
Y = I national income 
E = private domestic expenditure 
G = public expenditure 
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x = exports 
M = imports 
B = balance of payments current account 
T = tax receipts 
o < e ~ li 
o '~ t < li 
o < m < 1 
Notice that equation (5.11), the taxation equation, is 
incorporated in Vines' model therefore relaxing 
Whitman's assumption of a zero marginal tax rate. 
Totally differentiating (5.8) provides 
dY _ dG + dE + dX - dM 
From 
, 
(5.10) and (5.11) 
dE 
dY = e(l-t) 
and from (5.12) 
dM 
dY = m 
Using (5.14) and (5.15) in (5.13) yields 
dY = dG + dX + (e(l-t) - m) dY 
= 1 e(l-t)-m (dG + dX) 
= a * (dG + dX); 
(5.13 ) 
(5.14) 
(5.15) 
(5.16) 
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where a = l/(e(l-t)~m) ? 0 
Similarly a change in the balance of payments current 
account can be written 
dB = dX - dM 
= dX - mdY 
From (5.16), (5.17) becomes 
dB = dX - m(a (dG + dX)) 
therefore 
dB =-ma < 0 
dG 
(5.17) 
(5.18) 
The effects of a change in Government expenditure, as 
embodied in equations (5.16) and ( 5 .18 ) are shown 
diagramatically in Figure 5.1. 
Conti~uing on Milne's theme, Vines examined the facts 
that "two large devaluations of sterling - in 1967 and 
1972. had failed either to improve significantly the 
growth of British exports or to reduce the acceleration 
of imports" and "(in) addition massive increases in 
.~. __ ." ">' 0-. 
FIGURE 5.1 
Expenditure 
Expenditure 
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Current Account Balance Relationships 
Y=E+G +6G+X-M o 
Y=E+G +X-M o 
0~-------4----+---------~------------' 
I a6G I 'National income 
Current + 
Account 
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-ma6G { 
B 
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105 
Government expenditure and the resultant high budget 
deficits had seriously exacerbated balance of 
payments difficulties" (p.213). The parameter employed 
by Vines to test that the private sector exhibits a 
small and predictable surplus is equivalent to that used 
by Mi lne 1. 
Vines notes that the nonsense assumption that all taxes 
are lump sum must be employed for dB/dG = - 1 as then 
a = l/m. This assumption would stop internal leakages 
from the incomeflow.Therefore with t = 0, e = 1 and eO 
stable, any increase in Government expenditure would be 
matched by an equal import leakage. 
The introduction of a tax leakage, (t > 0) with constant 
private savings (e = 1, stable) results in 
equivalent increases in the ex post Government deficit 
1 It can be shown that in equation (5.10) if e=l and eo 
is small and constant then this is equivalent to 
stating that a = I-S. Equation (5.10) becomes E= 
K+(Y-T), where K = a constant and E = C+I. 
Therefore C+I = K+ (Y-T) , substi tuting for Y gives C+I= 
K+(C+I+G+X-M)-T. Rearranging this provides M-X=a + 
S(G-T) where a =K=(I-S) and $=1. 
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and imports. If 
D = G - T (5.19) 
where 
D = the 'Government budget deficit then from (5.11) 
D = G - (to + ty) 
differentiating yields 
dD = dG - dt - tdY o 
where dtO= 0 as tois a constant. Substituting for dY 
using (5.16) provides 
dD = dG - ta (dG + dX) 
If dX = 0 then 
dD 
dG = 1 - ta 
so that with (5.17) if rna = 
then 
dB 
dD = - 1 
1 That is l-e(l-t)-m-t=m; 
1 
1 - at 
(5.20) 
or (l-e)(l-t)=O; which occurs when e=l and o<t<l. 
--'.-.:.''; .. ' 
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Even if (1 - e) is close to zero in the medium term, 
then "the Government action will necessarily be 
responsible for a worsening (current account) deficit" 
(Vines, p.217). Vines suggests that we should extend the 
forecasting horizon to capture this effect. 
Criticism levelled at this analysis has emphasised the 
omission of consideration of monetary factors. The 
interest rate effect, following an expansion of private 
income, may cause a decrease in private expenditure. 
Therefore (5.10) may be written as 
E = eO + e (y - T) + yi +~ y < o. (5.21) 
This may constrain some of the feedback to the trade 
balance via the income multiplier effects. 
Mundell 
! 
(1968) also examined fiscal policy and balance 
of trade linkages. He makes the supposition that 
Government spending is to be solely financed by money 
creation. 
I 
1 •• -,,'-"--
I 
j'-"-' 
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( i ) Assumptions 
* no taxation 
* all Government borrowing through money creation, that 
is, there are no sales of Government securities 
except to the central bank 
* the central bank determines the money supply 
(ii) The Model 
";"'.' 
y - E + G + B (5.22) 
B :' dR/dt (5.23) 
dMs/dt - G + dR/dt (5.24) 
(iii) Notation 
y = national income 
E = private domestic expenditure 
G = Government spending 
balance of trade 
.- .. ---.. :.<:-; 
B = 
dR/dt = flow of exchange reserves 
dMs/dt = flow of money 
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substituting (5.23) in (5.24) provides 
dM s /dt = B + G (5.25) 
According to Mundell, the "Government, which may 
initially try to finance its deficit by creating more 
money, finds that its deficit is really being financed 
out of foreign exchange reserves (o)f course, the 
process cannot go on forever, because exchange reserves 
are not inexhaustible" (p.124). He concludes, "the basic 
assumption that there are no securities, means that 
monetary and fiscal policies are not distinct from one 
another and that balance of payments problems persist 
because of the failure of the authorities to balance the 
budget" (p.129). Other studies emphasizing a similar 
theme include Keller (1980) and Jonson (1976J. 
Keller used an income and absorption framework to 
analyse the effects of credit policies on the balance of 
payments current account. He concluded that "the 
increase in Government credit is initially reflected in 
an equally sized current account deficit" (p.471). 
~~ ;:: ~:.:.:: :::::: ~;~:::2;:~::'~,~ 
I:-'·:'"'--"'""~""'~·;"-·;-;; 
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Jonson formed a highly aggregated model to explore "the 
relatively rapid postwar growth of the Government 
sector, which has produced persistent trade 
deficits" (p.980). His disequilibrium monetary model 
explicitly links domestic credit creation with the 
budget deficit. Therefore Jonson could outline the 
monetary consequences of deficit spending, stating that 
these "have further added to domestic demand pressures, 
as excess money balances have increased private sector 
expenditures and produced balance of payments 
deficits" (p.980). 
Aktar, Putnam and Wilford (1979) examined the impact of 
fiscal constraints on monetary policy within the context 
of the monetary approach to the balance of payments. 
Their main contribution was to recogni~e that the 
"change in domestic credit is ultimately constrained by 
the budget deficit and net sales of Government 
securities" (p.204). So that, 
GC = G - T - CGSP (5.26) 
where 
GC = Government credit 
III 
'.-.--'.--. 
G = Government expenditure 
T = taxation receipts 
CGSP = public borrowing from the non monetary sector 
From Chapter 2 for convenience, the money demand and 
money stock eq~ations are restated; 
= f (Y,p,r) (5.27) 
= (R + D) (5.28) 
and in equilibrium provide 
6R = f (Y, p, r) - 6D (5.29) 
the estimating form of which is often (see Spencer, 
1978, p. 3) ·expressed as 
(R/Ms)~R = a ~Y + a ~P + a ~r 
1 2 3 
- (D/MS)~D + 11 
(5.30) 
where ~he notation used is 
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= change in log, f::. log 
= money demand 
y = national income 
p = prices 
r = int.erest rate 
MS = money stock 
R = overseas backing of the money supply, that is 
holdings of overseas currency reserves and gold 
D - domestic asset backing of the money supply 
u = stochastic term 
a = price elasticity 
2 
a = interest elasticity 
3 
and the restriction 
a 1 
1 
Since Government credit (GC) forms a part of the 
domestic backing of the money supply (D), equation 
(5.30) can be rewritten as 
! 
c' (R/MU)~R ._ a ~y + a ~p * a ~r 
123 
s s - (GC/M' ) 'l1GC - (PC/M ) ~PC - + ]J ( 5.31 ) 
' ..... : .. ""-'--.. ' 
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where 
PC = D - GC 
Equation (5.31) suggests that reductions in Government 
spending or .increases in taxation and non-monetary 
borrowing would improve the reserve position.· 
Much research using the monetary approach has emphasized 
the level of reserves as the objective of policy. The 
theory does not make "any predictions as to how the 
changes in foreign reserves of a country are brought 
about, i.e. whether through the trade balance or the 
capital balance or some combination of the two" (Khan, 
1976, p.l), but the monetary approach does suggest that 
the current account is influenced through some channel 
by the net excess supply or demand for money. Khan 
develops a monetary model of the balance of payments not 
dissimilar to Jonson's. An important contribution of 
~ 
both IKhan and Jonson is their development of a flow 
deman~·for money variable, which is defined as 
F =a (--.) - (--) ~ i1d MS J t P t P t 
(5.32) 
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where 
a = the coefficient of adjustment, and 
O<a<l. 
Both authors incorporate F as an explanatory variable 
t 
in a real expenditure equation. 
Following Frenkel and· Rodriguez (1975), Craig (1981) 
developed a monetary model of the balance of trade for 
fixed exchange rates. He postulated that the trade 
balance (B) is a function of transitory income and the 
real excess supply of money, that is 
B = a yt - a 
1 2 
(5.33) 
where 
yt == transitory income 
MS .- money supply 
Md = money demand 
p = prices 
: :« ~ ~.:.: -0" 
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By substituting a demand for real money equation, (see 
for example Frenkel and Johnson (1976)), (5.33) becomes 
t MS = a Y - a (--)+a Y + 
1 2 P 3 
a i 
It 
A more complete specification of 
(5.34) 
\ 
(5.34) may include the 
effects of monetary disequilibria on consumption and 
investment. Nevertheless, Craig concludes, after 
estimation of (5.34), that "monetary factors have a 
direct influence On the balance of trade" (p.466). 
Ursprung (1983) applying a similar methodology to Craig, 
but making prices endogenous, strikes a similar 
conclusion, in that "the persistent balance of trade 
deficit in New Zealand is and always has 'been due to a 
too expansionary monetary policy" (p.32). The argument 
presented by Ursprung for excluding capital flows from 
his New Zealand' model is also found elsewhere. For 
instance, Spencer (1978), "New Zealand is far from an 
I 
open 'economy in terms of the freedom of capital flows. 
Exchange restrictions have prevented New Zealanders from 
earning high interest rates on overseas capital markets 
and the traditionally low domestic rates have' distracted 
I;·:··:··,·;·:·,·,·······,··· 
,-.". ~." " . -,. .-,' 
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any substantial short term capital inflow. Hence any 
effects on the balance of payments due to monetary 
disturbances have effectively been limited to the 
current account" (p.7). 
Rather than 'estimate a single equation, similar to 
(5.30) or (5.31), Spencer empirically tested monetary 
hypotheses of the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments by extending the Reserve Bank of New Zealand's 
econometric Icore model I .He concluded, "(f)rom the 
statistical significance exhibited by the disequilibrium 
money terms and from the powerful feedback 
~:' " , 
relationship through the current account it 
appears that a Imonetary approach I is relevant to the 
analysis of New Zealand's balance of payments" (p.ll). 
Summary 
In thfs section alternative analytical frameworks that 
have been used to explore fiscal, monetary and balance 
of p~yments linkages have been considered. Milne exposed 
the debate of the Cambridge New School and developed a 
simple regression equation. Whitman, Vines, Mundell and 
- ,- • - : • : : :. ~ ': > 
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Keller developed qualitative models, the first three are 
discussed in full and the conclusions of all four are 
presented. 
Jonson's real monetary disequilibrium results are 
recorded and the reduced form' equation derived by Aktar 
(et al) is presented. Khan's criticism of this approach 
is outlined and his real monetary disequilibrium term is 
discussed. Two quantative balance of trade models are 
discussed, those of Craig and Ursprung, and finally 
Spencer's conclusions after testing of ~the monetary 
approach to the balance of payments (with the RBNZ core 
model) are summarized. 
I····· .. -- " r :-- ~,~ • ~ :.; : : - - -~ :.- - : 
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CHAPTER 6 
HYPOTHESIS FORMATION AND INITIAL ESTIMATION 
In Chapters 3 and 4 short perspectives on the nature of 
balance of payments policy and fiscal policy were 
presented. Overviews of the trends in the major 
macroeconomic magnitudes were also presented, and these 
should be considered as background to the model 
development. In Chapter 5 an analytical background for 
this chapter was established. In this Chapter, 
hypotheses about relationships between fiscal policy and 
the balance of payments are formulated, and quantitative 
estimation of the parameters in a small econometric 
model is commenced. 
In order to fully investigate the linkages between the 
budget deficit and the balance of payments current 
account, it is perhaps best 
I 
to develop a structural 
model~ Such a model should describe the set of <-;':'>.-. - ~ .... -
relqtionships between fiscal policy, its financing, 
domestic credit, money, private expenditure decisions, 
and thereby the current account. 
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The model to be presented derives much of its 
theoretical basis from work by Whitman (1970), Vines 
(1976), Jonson (1976), and Khan (1976). The departure 
from previous research is to formalise Corden's (1977) 
stated need to analyse the balance of payments problem 
by examining the public and private sector contributions 
to the current account balance separately (see Corden, 
p.45). 
In presenting the model it is most convenient to 
initially specify and discuss each equation 
independently. Comment on the properties and 
relationships of the model as a whole follows the 
revised estimation in Chapter 7. 
6.1. Equation Specification 
The s~andard Keynesian demand identity, 
y = C + I + G + X - M , 
can be transformed to provide 
Y = E + G/p + RCUB ( 6 .1 ) 
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where 
Y = real output 
E = real private expenditure, C + I 
G/p = real Government spending 
RCUB= current account of the balance of payments in 
real terms 
To derive real disposable income, it is necessary to 
introduce a taxation equation into the system. Income 
taxation receipts, TY, are considered a direct function 
of the value of aggregate output. Therefore 
( 6 .2) 
Real disposable income, YD, is by definition 
YD = Y - TY/P ( 6 .3 ) 
Equation (6.4) defines the desired level of private 
* domes~ic expenditure, E. * It is hypothesized that E is a 
funct~on of disposable income 
Therefore, 
( 6 .4) 
and 0 < a 
121 
Following the portfolio approach, and by "assuming a 
constant speed of adjustment", (Spencer, 1977, p.4), the 
partial adjustment formulation l toward short run 
equilibrium private domestic expenditure is often 
specified as 
( 6.5) 
where 
* W = desired wealth 
W = actual wealth 
p = prices 
\! = stochastic term 
The real balance effect depicted in equation (6.5) 
derives from the work of Archibald and Lipsey (1958). 
Since equation (6.4) embodies private decisions 
1 This formulation is attributed to Nerlove (1956, 1958) 
and is based on a 'stock adjustment principle', where 
the actual realised change in a variable is only a 
fraction of the actual change. Koutsoyiannis (1977, 
p. 310-313) gives a summary of the method. 
, -w". __ .".-.-_-.' 
~:Q£E~El~i£~~~ 
regarding 
as 
E -t Et - l = 
where 
B > 0 
1 
B < 0 
2 
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real assets, equation ( 6 .5) can be rewritten 
( 
Md MS ' 
* p)+ B 1 (E t - Et - l ) + B p \) ( 6 .6) 2 t 
and implies a lagged adjustment period; 
and 
indicating that, if the money supply is 
greater than the demand for money, private 
domestic expenditure will rise as households 
and firms act to expend their excess supply 
of real money balances 
Equations (6.4) and (6.6) can be combined to provide an 
equation for private expenditure. By 
* replacing E in (6.6) with equation (6.4) we derive 
il, MS 
Et - E t-l = B (ex YD +)l - E .. ) + B (p - p) + \) 1 1 t-l 2 
I· 
Rearranging terms yields 
Simplifying 
E t = (31 a 1 YD t + 
d 
+(3 (M 
2 P -
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+(v+(3 J.l 
1 
(v + (3 J.l 
1 
( 6 • 7 ) 
Consistent with Corden's idea that we should "just 
assume for the purposes of discussing balance of 
payments issues that the private, sector knows what it is 
doing, and what is good for it as far as spending and 
savings decisions are concerned", (p.45), the model will 
use the current account data formed in Appendix 3. This 
divides the data into Government and private sector 
contributions. It is therefore necessary to specify 
individual equations for the components. Both Government 
and private overseas current account receipts are 
treated as exogenous elements., Whilst it would be 
possible to utilise a world GNP proxy and a relative 
I 
price 'variable to model exports, it is felt that this 
would not greatly benefit the achievement of the 
objectives of the model. 
Equation (6.8) describes the desired demand for private 
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imports, PM. These are measured on a nominal OET basis. 
It is postulated 
sales {(E* P) and 
* that PM is 
nominal 
a function of (i) private 
private exports, PE) , 
representing the level of domestic activity, (ii) a 
relative price variable, 
PI(l + tm )/p 
where 
PI = import price index 
tm = effective tariff rate 
P = consumer price index 
and (iii) a proxy for Government import controls, ZM, so 
that 
( 6 .8) 
As with private domestic expenditure, private imports 
are ~ssumed to exhibit a partial adjustment toward 
equiltbrium "justified by uncertainty about future 
demand and the operation of short-run capacity 
constraints" (Jonson, 1976, p. 993). Therefore, the 
import adjustment process can be represented by, 
( 6 • 9 ) 
'c_._ 
I :-
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* By replacing PM in (6.9) with equation (6.8) we derive 
PMt - PMt - l = S U1(E + PE)t+ SU}PI(l + tm )/P)t 
+ Su
3
ZMt - SPMt - l + (v + B~ ) 
Rearranging yields 
PM '= Sa (E + PE)t+ Su(PI(l + t )/P)t t - 12m 
+ su
3
ZMt + (l -B)PMt - l + v + Sl-I (6.10) 
As already stated, when the Government runs a deficit it 
must find the requisite finance. The budget deficit, 
G - T (where T = TY + TI, TI = indirect taxes), can be 
financed by non-monetary borrowing, CGSP (that is the 
sale of Government securities to the private non-M3 
sector), or money creation, GMC. So that by 
definition 
G - T = GMC + CGSP 
therefore 
GMC,= G - T + CGSP 
To derive the internal monetary effect of the public 
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sector on the money base, as presented in Chapter 4, it 
is necessary to add to GMC net Government current 
overseas exchange transactions, GOET. These comprise-
current receipts, CURGi current payments on visibles, 
CUPGMi and invisibles, CUPGN. Therefore 
GOET =CURG - CUPGM - CUPGN 
and 
the net effect of the Government on the monetary base is 
given as 
GCE _ G - T - CGSP + GOET (6.11) 
A money supply identity is needed to make changes in the 
stock of money endogenous. The identity is adapted from 
those presented by Spencer (1978 and 1979) and Grimes 
( eta 1! ) (l 9 8 3 ) . 
6MB _ PE - PM + PK + GCE + CCMSR + DCE (6.12) 
. - .-.-; " ... -~- , 
127 
where 
6M
s = change in the M3 definition of the money supply 
PK = net private capital overseas exchange 
transactions 
CCMSR = chang~ in official lending to private sector 
mainly RBNZ lending to marketing boards 
DCE d 'd' ,1 = omestlc cre lt expanslon 
An equation describing the demand for money is used to 
create the real monetary disequilibrium term used in 
equation (6.7). The theory regarding the use and 
estimation of money demand functions is well documented 
(see Friedman, 1978, Goodhart, 1975 and Frenkel and 
Johnson, 1976) and this thesis is constrained to only 
estimate a suitable one for New Zealand. The initial 
specification uses the RBNZ data series on money demand, 
M3D, as the left hand side variable. Nominal national 
income, and the short term interest rate on Government 
! 
It' securl les, r, are used as explanatory variables, so 
1 DCE = 6Lending to private sector by trading banks 
and other M3 institutions + 6Net other assets of 
trading banks and other M3 institutions - Inter-
institutional demand and fixed deposits of trading 
banks and other M3 institutions + 6Deposits, 
savings bank cheque accounts + 6Compensatory 
deposits with trading banks. 
that 
where 
a > 0, 
1 
o > a 
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(6.13) 
2 
reflect a positive desire to hold money as output 
increases (income elasticity) and a negative desire to 
hold money as an opportunity cost of holding money 
increases. This specification therefore includes a 
transactions demand for money and a single interest rate 
to represent observed monetary yields on alternative 
assets. 
The model is completed with an identity defining the 
current account balance, 
CUB ,= (PE - PM) + (CURG - CUPGN - CUPGM) (6.14) 
The initial specification of the full model is presented 
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TABLE 6.1 
Initial specification of entire model and list of 
notation used. 
Y = E+ G/P+ RCUB 
TY '" (p*y) = au 
YD = Y- (TY/P) 
$. 2l YD t + 
'" 
Md MS 
a 23 Et - l Et = a22 (- - p)t + p 
logPMt = a31 log( (E*P)+PE)t + $.32 log(PI (l+tm) /P)t 
+ a 33 ZMt + a 31f log PMt - l 
GCE = G - TY - TIN CGSP + GOET 
~Ms = PE - PM + PK + GCE + CCMSR + DCE 
Md = alfl (p*y) + alf2 R 
CUB = (PE-PM) + (CURG-CUPGM-CUPGN) 
Notation 
Y = real output 
E = real private expenditure, C+I 
G = nominal Government spending 
P = consumers price index 
(6.1) 
(6.2) 
(6. 3) 
(6. 7 ) 
(6.10) 
(6.11) 
(6.12) 
(6.13) 
(6.14) 
RCUB = real current account balance, OET basis' 
= (CURG+PE)/PX + (PM+CUPGM+CUPGN)/PI 
PX = export price index 
PI = import price index 
TY = income taxation 
YD = real disposable iricome 
Md = money demand 
MS = M3 definition of money supply 
PM = private imports 
PE = private exports 
tm = effective tariff rate 
ZM = synthetic variable representing quantitative 
import restrictions 
GCE = Government credit expansion 
TIN = Indirect taxation 
CGSP = Net sales of Government securities to the 
private sector 
.... OVER 
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TABLE 6.1 
Notation - contd 
GOET = Net Government current account balance 
= CURG - CUPGM - CUPGN 
PK = Net private capital overseas exchange 
transactions 
CCMSR = change in official lending to the private sector 
- mainly RBNZ lending to marketing Boards 
DCE = domestic credit expansion 
R = interest rate on short-term Government securities 
CUB = current account balance, OET 
CURG = current overseas receipts, Government 
CUPGM = current overseas visible payments, Government 
CUPGN = current overseas invisible payments, Government 
,:.:.-~ ~.-~.------ ~-~ ~ -,---
t·';"·'·, ',. --. ,.-
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in Table 6.1, along with a complete list of notation. As 
Chow (1983) states "for an econometrician wishing to use 
the model of simultaneous equations (referring to a 
macroeconomic model) there are two major problems to be 
resolved. First is the problem of identification 
(second) ...... ... is the problem of estimation". The next 
two sections discuss these problems. 
6.2. Identification Condition of the Model 
For the identification of the entire model, there has to 
be at least as many independent equations as endogenous 
variables, and each equation in the model must be 
identified. The identification condition of a model must 
be satisfied else, "estimates of par.p.meters of 
relationships between variables measured in samples may 
relate to the model in question, or to another model, or 
to a mixture of models" (Koutsoyiannis, p. 346). 
The , structural form approach to establishing 
identification of the model has two conditions, the 
order and rank conditions. The order condition is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
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identification of an equation. It states, "for an 
equation to be identified, the total number of variables 
excluded from it but included in other equations must be 
at least as great as the number of equations of the 
system less one" (Koutsoyiannis, p. 352) . As Tabl e 6.1 
indicates, the model has 23 variables without any single 
equation having more than 6 variables. Therefore, at 
most, an equation has 17 variables excluded from it, 
which is greater than the 9 equations. Therefore the 
order condition is satisfied and indicates that the 
model is overidentified. 
The rank condition requires IIthat in a system of G 
equations, any particular equation is identified if, and 
only if, it is possible to construct at least one 
non-zero determinant of order (G 1 ) from the 
coefficients of the variables excluded from the 
particular equation but contained in other equations of 
the model II (p.353). However, as Wallis (1973) points 
out, i,n II many situations the rank condition will .... 
, 
merely underline the order condition for we usually 
simply assume that it is safe to proceed as if the 
relevant function of structural parameters were 
non-zero ll (p. 59). 
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6.3 Choice of Estimation Technique 
The choice of estimation technique depends on several 
factors including the purpose that the model was 
designed for, the identification condition, the nature 
of the relationship of residuals, the importance given 
to various explicit statistical properties as opposed to 
more general features of the model performance, and the 
desired degree of computational complexity. 
As Koutsoyiannis stresses, "the problem of choice of 
technique becomes important for overidentified systems" 
(p.499). The ranking of econometric techniques on the 
basis of their ability to 'test' economic theory uses 
evaluation of the desirable statistical properties of 
unbiasedness and minimum variance (for small sample 
estimates), and consistency and efficiency (that is the 
asymptotic properties, for large sample estimates). 
Given ,that the model is simultaneous and overidentified, 
there are two types of estimators available. The first 
of these are 'single equation methods', which are 
applied to each equation of the system individually. For 
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instance, instrumental variables (IV) and two-stage 
least squares (2SLS). The second set of estimators are 
'complete system methods', which are applied to the 
system as a whole. Examples of these are three-sta~e 
least squares (3SLS) and full information maximum 
likelihood (FIML)l. 
Due to the data requirements and computational cost, a 
single equation method is used. The method of 
instrumental variables chooses only a subset of the 
exogenous variables to use as instruments, ignoring the 
effects of other exogenous variables. Therefore the 
method of 2SLS will be used for the initial estimation 
as it takes account of the influence of all the 
predetermined variables in the model on the dependent 
variable. 
The 2SLS method assumes that the stochastic term (~) 
satisfies the usual assumptions of zero mean, constant 
! 
varia~ce and zero covariance. The last assumption, that 
of zero covariance, is required to ensure that there is 
no autocorrelation of the error term. Expressed in 
expectations form, this assumption is: 
E(~.,~. 
1 J 
= 0 for i"l j 
I For further references see Johnston (1972, Chapter 
13) and Chow (1983, Chapter 5). 
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other assumptions required are: that the explanatory 
variables are not perfectly multicollinear; that the 
variables are correctly aggregated; that the model is 
correctly specified in terms of the exogenous variables; 
1 and that the data set is large enough . 
The results of 2SLS estimation of equations (6.2), 
(6.7), (6.10) and (6.13) are presented in Table 6.2. 
6.4 Initial Estimation and Discussion of Results 
The initial regression results, read in conjunction with 
their accompanying notes, are not very encouraging. 
However, the dominant problem, at least in the taxation, 
expenditure and money demand functions, is the influence 
of an autocorrelated error term, as indicated by the 
Durbin-Watson and h-statistic results. These results are 
discussed in notes (iii) and (iv) of Table 6.2. 
Therefore one of the assumptions of 2SLS estimation is 
1 That is the number of observations is greater than 
the number of predetermined variables in the model. 
r--.-,' •. -.-.-.-.-,---.--~---. - - - . 
. . - - - - <-" '-~.-:-'. ---
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TABLE 6.2 
Summary of 2SLS regression results on initial 
specification. 
1. Income taxation equation 
TYt =0.1947(P*Y)t 
(14.44) 
R,2 = 0.51 DW = 3.15 
2. Real expenditure equation 
RMSE = 464.44 
A MdMs 
a. E t = 0 . 2841 (YD)t - O. 0033 (p - p) t 
(9.90) (0.12) 
+ 0.6831 (E)t-1 
(21. 01) 
R2 = 0.79 DW = 1.45 h = 2.10 RMSE = 97.24 
Md 
b. Et =0.2789(YD) - 0.0298(p (9.83) (1.08) 
MS 
P)t-1 + 0.6880 (E)t-1 
(21.37) 
R2 = 0.78 DW = 1.49 h = 1. 95 RMSE = 97.34 
3. Private import equation 
logPMt = O. 2073log ( (E*P) +PE)t - O. 0757log (PI (l+tm) /P)t (2.46) '(0.35) 
- 0.1013 (ZM)t + o. 7599LOG (PM) t-1 
(2.21) (7.64) 
R2 = 0.99 DW = 1.86 h = 0.77 RMSE = 0.074 
4. Money demand equation 
'" 
Md =1.8476(P*Y) - 5.6410(R)t 
t (17.36) t (0.09) 
R2 :J::: 0.97 DW = 0.70 RMSE = 746.12 
Notes: (i) Data period 1969 (D) - 1983 (J). 
(ii) Quarterly data is collectively presented 
in Appendix 6. 
(iii) The DW upper and lower levels at a 95% 
confidence level for equations one and four 
respectively are:- 1.53; 1.60 and 1.49; 1.64. 
Therefore for both equations we reject the 
null hypothesis of no autocorrelation . 
. . . . OVER 
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TABLE 6.2 - contd 
(iv) The h-statistic, which is a large sample test 
for serial correlation when there are lagged 
dependent variables present, was developed by 
Durbin (1970). using the first-order corre-
lation coefficient of the residuals, which is 
approximated as r = l-!..Id (where d is computed 
using the formulae in Table 4.4), we calculate 
where 
= the sampling variance of the 
coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable. 
If h >1.645 we reject the null hypothesis of 
zero autocorrelation at the 95% confidence level. 
Therefore we reject null hypothesis for both 
a. and b. specifications of the real expenditure 
equation and fail to reject it for the private 
import equation. 
(v) The root mean square error (RMSE) gives a 
measurement of combination of the unbiasedness 
and minimum variance properties of the estimated 
equation. Ideally the RMSE should be··small, it 
is calculated as, 
RMSE = ;(E(Fitted-Actual) 
2 
n 
(vi) t-statistics are in brackets underneath the 
coefficients. The two-tail t-scores with 
54 degrees of freedom at 90%, 95% and 99% 
confidence levels are 1.67, 2.00 and 2.67 
respectively. 
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violated, causing the results of 2SLS estimation to 
become less efficient compared with alternative 
estimators which account for the serial correlation of 
the error term in simultaneous equation models. These 
include a technique outlined by Fair (1970). 
Prior to Fair's suggested procedure, Sargan (1961) and 
Amemiya (1966) both developed estimators for the 
estimation of simultaneous equation models with serially 
correlated errors. According to Fair, Sargan's method 
uses a "large number of instrumental variables" and "is 
likely to be of limited practical use" (p.507). However, 
Sargan's method, referred to in the literature as S2SLS, 
yields consistent estimates, and is asymptotically 
efficient compared with 2SLS, when the model to be 
estimated is of the form 
AY + BX = U (6.15) 
I 
U ,= RU -1 + E (6.16) 
where 
Y = an h * n matrix of endogenous variables 
I'·'···' ...... . 
~~%;~:f~:~::i0E 
I 
......... -'. 
," 
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x = a K * n matrix of predetermined variables 
U, E = h'· * n matrices of residuals, E is distributed 
according to the normal stochastic 
assumptions 
A,B,R = h * h, h * K and h * h are matrices of 
coefficients 
n = the number of observations 
K = the number of predetermined variables 
h = the number of endogenous variables 
However, Fair modifies Sargan's procedure, reducing the 
computational requirements. using a given value of rho 
(r o is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient of 
the residuals), setting equations (6.15) and (6.16) 
equal, lagging by one period, multiplying through by rho 
and substracting provides 
(6.17) 
where! 
I 
I = an h * h identity matrix 
Equation (6.17) can be rewritten as 
(6.18) 
--. - .", -.' ~. 
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Therefore "any endogenous variable, such as Yit, can be 
expressed as a function of rO Yit- l ' of all the 
predetermined variables in the form Xit - rOx it- l , and 
of an error term" (Fair p.512). If all the residu~l 
coefficients are similar, -1 say to rO ' then A (R-r O I)U_ l 
in (6.18) is small. Fair's method involves avoiding many 
instruments. In the first stage of his modified two 
stage procedure a composite matrix of variables, 
X2 - rO X2_ ' (where X2 represents all the predetermined .. 1 
variables not in the equation being estimated) is used 
instead of regressing Yl on X2 and X2 _. 
- 1 
separately. 
Fair points out that this technique "uses substantially 
fewer instrumental variables, and thus substantially 
fewer degrees of freedom. However, it may, depending on 
how nearly equal Rand rOI are, have better (or at least 
not worse) small sample properties than S2S~S" (p. 512 -
513). Fair's technique is available in computer software 
package, Time Series Processor, Version 4.0, in Hall 
(1983), and therefore will be used where appropriate in 
the ~e-estimated model presented in Chapter 7. However, 
in th~ presence of lagged endogenous variables, Cooper 
(l972a) asserts that there will be a "downward 
asymptotic bias in the standard errors of the regression 
coefficients" (p.305). For instance if, 
Y = t (6.19) 
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is an equation to be estimated in a simultaneous 
equation framew6rk Cooper shows that, because the set of 
explanatory variables (predetermined, endogenous and 
lagged endogenous) can no longer be assumed to be fixed 
1 regressors the appropriate standard errors calculated 
using the unadjusted covariance matrices will be smaller 
than if the bias is accounted foi. Unfortunately no 
suitable computational formula to account for this bias 
appears to exist in the literature. 
The significance of most of the individual coefficients 
is satisfactory. However, given the presence of 
autocorrelation in three of the equations, these results 
are only tentative. Of especial concern are the size of 
the standard errors on four coefficients: the real 
monetary disequilibrium variable in the-- expenditure 
equations 2a and 2b; the relative price variable in the 
private import demand function; and the interest rate 
variable in the money demand function. Proposed 
altern~tive hypotheses will need be tested along with 
correcting for serial correlation of the error term. 
1 Because of the presence of the lagged endogenous 
variable 
i-:·:'~:·~·· -~-_:~:. -:-::.~,:~~ 
~~;~::~~~~m:i~~~ 
-:-.;. :. 
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In the case of the real monetary disequilibrium term, it 
is likely that the private sector's expenditure function 
displays some lagged response to changes in monetary 
conditions. The nature of the lag may depend on: the 
time taken to publish changes in the money supply and 
prices; a decision delay, which may be due to 
uncertainty regarding how to spend or save a net excess 
supply or demand of money; and an institutional lag, 
which delays the effect of monetary disequilibria on 
real expenditure. An example of the institutional lag is 
as follows. The Government may lower the ~trading banks 
reserve asset ratio, increasing the amount trading banks 
can lend. The banks lend to various customers, who 
purchase bonds or shares (financial assets), or spend 
their borrowed money on non-financial assets like real 
estate or consumer durables. Those who sell t.heir assets 
will, of course, receive money which they, in turn, use 
to purchase other assets. All of these transactions take 
place within the existing institutional framework, and 
they a~l take time. Therefore, because of this chain of 
events" a monetary disequilibrium in one quarter may 
have effects on expenditure in following quarters. Two 
versions of the Reserve Bank's econometric model have 
[_ •• , __ 0" 
used a lagged disequilibrium real money term as an 
explanatory variable in various consumption and 
investment equations. In two investment equations 
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Spencer (1979) found that a lag of up to two quarters on 
the monetary disequilibrium term was significant. In 
Chapter 7 the construction and estimation of a three 
quarter lag structure on this term will be discussed and 
presented. 
The signs of the coefficients on the relative price and 
interest rate variables are consistent with theoretical 
expectations. However, the t-scores indicate that there 
is little reason to believe that a relationship exists 
between either private imports and the relative price 
variable, or money demand and interest rates. Instead it 
is suggested that the terms of trade (TOT = export price 
index/import price index) may sufficiently represent the 
effect of import price movements. Excluding the interest 
rate variable from the money demand equation results in 
that equation representing only the transactions demand 
for money. The exclusion of the interest rate variable 
is supported by evidence which shows that the financial 
marke~s have been subject to various forms of interest 
I 
rate 'controls over much of the data set. Also Deane (et 
al) (1983) point out that seasonality plays an important 
role in determining the monetary base, and hence often 
the money supply (p. 164-165). The demand for money is 
influenced by the requirements of the agricultural 
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sector, therefore seasonal variables will be introduced 
into the money demand function. A dummy variable will 
also be introduced into the income taxation equation to 
explain the March quarter peak of taxation receipts. 
Further discussion of the results of the model will 
follow in Chapter 7 where a re-specified model is 
estimated using Fair's technique on the taxation, 
expenditure and money demand functions. 
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CHAPTER 7 
RE-ESTIMATION, PERFORMANCE OF THE MODEL, SIMULATIONS AND 
CONCLUSIONS. 
In Chapter 6 it was suggested that the principle problem 
of the estimated equations was the presence of a 
first-order autocorrelation scheme in, the residuals. 
Section 6.4 identified Fair's (1970) estimation 
technique as suitable for application to the taxation, 
expenditure and money demand equations to correct for 
the bias this autocorrelation introduces. In addition, 
several amendments were proposed to the initial 
hypotheses, the most important of these being the need 
to account for the lagged influence of the real monetary 
disequilibrium term on real private expenditures, as 
opposed to the initial hypothesis of a one period 
effect. 
This chapter considers the results from re-estimation of 
the. re-specified equations. It also discusses the 
transmission channels and performance of the main 
endogenous variables when the whole system is simulated. 
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Several theoretical, but not necessarily optimal, 
exogenous policy simulations are presented, and 
differences between the control simulation and the 
policy simulations are summarised. Overall conclusions 
on the whole thesis are presented, and the chapter 
concludes with suggestions for further research. 
7.1 Discussion of Re-estimation Results 
A summary of the resul ts from re-es·timation of the 
re-specified equations is presented in Table 7.1. The 
performance, as measured by the 
-2 
R 's and RMSE's of the 
individual equations, has improved and therefore, on the 
basis of 'goodness of fit', the results of the 
re-estimation are encouraging. As discussed in note (v) 
of Table 7.1, the use of Fair's (1970) modified 2SLS 
technique has successfully corrected for the presence of 
an autocorrelated error terml. 
7.1.1; Income taxation equation 
The inclusion of the synthetic variable (ZTY) to explain 
1 Ignoring Cooper's (1972a) 
the standard errors in 
endogenous v~riables. 
'non-computational' bias of 
the presence of lagged 
. ,-. '-"'-<~- -, 
r __ "·.-';'·L"~~·~' ,.' .... ~.-~: .. -
.... - .... -'---:.-.. 
147 
TABLE 7.1 
Summary of regression results from the re-specified 
equations. 
1. Income taxation equation 
2. 
A 
TYt = -252.3079 + 0.2069(P*Y)t (7.28) (31.07) 
+629.0J59(ZTY)t - 0.7552 ~t-1 
(12,.12) (7.93) 
R2 = 0.92 DW = 1. 80 RMSE = 192.54 
Real expenditure equation 
A 3 
Et = 0.3441(YD)t + r (22.41) i=O wi M3QEt . -1 
+ 0.5690(E)t_1 + 0.8262 ~t-1 
(21.06) (11.20), 
Third-degree polynomial lag coefficients: 
WO=0.0303 (0.91) 
W =-0.1121 
1 (5.28) 
DW=2.17 
W =-0.1189 
2 (6.77) 
h=0.676 
W =-0.0587 
3 (1.89) 
RMSE=89.38 
3. Private import equation 
logPMt =0.2385 log ((E*P)+PE)t+0.2583 log(PX/PI)t_1 (3.60) (2.70) 
-0.1582(ZM) + 0.7228 log(PM)t_1 
(3.83) (~.23) 
R2=0,.99 DW=1.93 h=0.319 RMSE=0.069 
4. Money demand equation 
~dt=1.8316(P*Y)t+367.8534(Sl)-30.1295(S2) 
(112.92) (3.00) (0.40) 
+44.2934(S3) + 0.6702 ~t-1 
(0.95) (6.21) 
DW=2.03 RMSE=487.83 
••••. OVER 
I" ,~,~ , 
r:----;-,' ,------,--' 
;: 
,-, 
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TABLE 7.1 - contd 
Notes: (i) Additional notation used: 
ZTY = a synthetic variable explaining the 
March quarter peak in taxation 
receipts. ZTY = 1 in March quarter, 
zero in June, Sept .. and Dec. 
W. 
1; 
M3QE 
= polynomial 
= (Md _ MS ) 
p p 
lag coefficients 
(ii) Data period 1969(D) - 1983(J) 
(iii) Quarterly data collectively presented in 
Appendix 6. 
(iv) See notes (iii) ,(iv) and (v) of Table 6.2 
for discussion of DW, h-statistic and RMSE. 
(v) Autocorrelation - in all four equations we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation at the 99% confidence level. 
(vi) The RMSE for each re-specified and estimated 
equation is reduced. This is desirable as it 
indicates that the fitted values more 
accurately represent the actual values . 
.. 
(vii) The lag distribution on the real monetary 
disequilibrium variable is an Almon (third-
degree polynomial) type constrained to zero 
slope at the right hand end, where 
LWi = -0.2593. The standard error of the 
summed lag coefficients is 0.05406. 
Therefore we reject the null hypothesis that 
LWi = O. The standard error of the sum 
of the lagged coefficients provides a 95% 
confidence interval of -0.1512 and -0.3674. 
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the March peak of income taxation receipts was found to 
be significant. It is of note, however, that the nominal 
income coefficient in the income taxation equation was 
not dramatically affected by the inclusion of either the 
constant term or the synthetic variable. The magnitude 
of the coefficient, 0.21, is consistent with 
expectations, as the average of the 'effective income 
tax rate of salary and wage earners' used in the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand's econometric model is 0.22, with a 
standard deviation of 0.04. 
Appendices 7a and 7b present a comparison of the actual 
and predicted series for each of the four estimated 
equations. The regression coefficient of the actual 
income taxation series on the predicted income taxation 
series shows little variation from the ideal value of 
one. Another measure used to evaluate the fit of an 
equation is Theil's inequality coefficient l . If the 
inequality coefficient equals zero there is a perfect 
fit; if it equals one the "predictive performance is as 
1 See Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
Koutsoyiannis (1977, p. 492) 
on the calculation of Theil's 
and various decompositions. 
(1982, p. 364) and 
for further discussion 
inequality coefficient 
- - -:- - :-: .-:-: ~.: - : --.--::.-
150 
bad as it possibly could be" (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, p. 
365). The various decompositions of Theil's inequality 
coefficient are discussed in Appendix 7b. with respect 
to the income taxation equation, these proportions 
present satisfying results, and therefore the equation 
should not prevent the entire model from simulating 
well. 
7.1.2 Real expenditure equation 
The decision to estimate an aggregate real expenditure 
equation, as opposed to the more comprehensive approach 
of having functions for different types of consumption 
and investment, may account for the comparatively low 
.., 
'goodness of fit' (R~ = 0.83), when compared with the 
adjusted i R-squareds of the other three estimated 
equations in Table 7.1 and the estimated real 
expenditure equation of Khan (1976, p.322). However, 
several authors estimating only components of real 
expenditure have presented lower adjusted R-squareds. 
For New Zealand examples see Grimes (et al),( 1983, p. 
23) and Carey, (1984, Appendix A, p.l). 
. .... , ... , .... " .... _-
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The coefficient representing the private marginal 
propensity to expend (PMPE) can be calculated by 
reconstructing the partial adjustment equations (6.4) 
and (6.6) using the estimated coefficients of the real 
expenditure equation in 
1 
Table 7.1 . 
of the real expenditure equation is 
From equation (6.7) 
A 
a = B ex 
1 
b = 1 - B 
Therefore 
A '" '" 
ex = a/ (l - b) 
1 
= 0.798 
The estimating form 
( 7 .1 ) 
1 The re-specified real monetary disequilibrium term 
does not affect the specification of the partial 
adjustment parameter as presented in equation (6.6), 
which is required to calculate the PMPE. 
152 
Thus the estimated PMPE is 79.8%, which according to 
theory is a satisfactory result. This indicates that a 
$100 million change in aggregate real disposable income 
would result in a $79.8 million change in aggrega~e 
desired real expenditure. 
The estimated partial adjustment coefficient (which 
equals one minus the estimated coefficient on the lagged 
endogenous variable) indicates that 90% of the 
adjustment towards the desired level of real private 
expenditures will take place in four quarters. This is 
calculated using a formula presented by stewart and 
Wallis (198l, p.40). Given a 'proportion of adjustment' 
(p) after In-periods' which equals: 
n 
P = 1 - b 
where 
( 7 .2 ) 
b = b from equation 7.1, that is, the estimated 
coefficient on the lagged endogenous variable 
then 
n = 
log (l - p) 
e 
log b e 
Therefore when P = 0.9 
( 7 .3 ) 
and, from Table 7.1, the 
coefficient on the lagged endogenous variable ln the 
\ . " . - ~--~.: - .-i .. :·_·_···· 
.< ;:--:-.. -.-. -. 
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real expenditure 
adjustment will 
equation equals 0.5690, 90% of 
take place in 4.08 quarters, 
the 
or 
approximately one year. This length of adjustment is 
comparatively rapid, as private real expendi tUrE~S 
include farm -and non-inventory investment items which, 
given a rise in disposable income, may take longer than 
one year to adjust. However many purchases of 
consumption durables may have a shorter stock adjustment 
process, perhaps two quarters, therefore balancing the 
overall adjustment of real expenditures. As this thesis 
is not specifically inquiring into the individual 
response relationships of items of real expenditure, the 
estimated partial adjustment coefficient (1 - b) will be 
tentatively accepted as 
adjustment process. 
representative of the true 
The response of real expenditures to changes in the real 
monetary disequilibrium term (M3QE) is spread over 
several periods. However, as Hebden (1983) points out: 
"there! are certain situations in which a finite lag is 
more appropriate. The constraint on infinite lags (such 
as the partial adjustment model) is that they necesarily 
imply a geometrically declining sequence of weights 
attached to successive past values of the causative 
variable, so that the effect of this variable wears off 
. . - -." .. -: '." -,~ . 
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steadily and at an ever-decreasing rate" (p.49). Whilst 
this infinite decline at an ever-decreasing rate is 
theoretically correct for the real expenditure response 
to changes in real disposable income and the private 
import response to changes in private sales, it is not 
appropriate for the real monetary effect. Instead, a 
finite lag scheme was estimated. The polynomial lag 
scheme was chosen rather than regressing individual lags 
of M3QE on E. The disadvantage of entering individual 
variables of M3QE t . into the equation is the strong -1 
possibility of multicollinearity in the M3QE's, since 
economic variables do not usually change erratically 
over time, but systematically, following a trend, so 
that a fairly regular connection may be found between 
M3QEt and its predecessors. The consequences of this are 
that the coefficients of the M3QE's may be poorly 
defined (that is have large standard errors) though the 
regression may fit well (as measured by the adjusted 
R-squared and F-statisticl ). 
1 See Judge, Griffiths, Hill and Lee (1980, p. 459) for 
a discussion of these effects. 
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A flexible lag distribution which allows the impact of a 
set of lagged regressors on the regressand to rise and 
decline non-linearly is the polynomial lag distribution. 
As outlined in section 6.4, the lag length estimated in 
previous equations extended to only two quarters. 
However, to capture 'all' the real monetary 
disequilibrium effects, a finite lag of three quarters 
is estimated. A thorough discussion of the polynomial 
lag distribution and its estimation is presented in 
Judge (et al) (p. 641 651). Briefly the procedure 
assumes a variable described by 
n 
.I 
1=0 
w. X
t 
. 
1 -1 
or in matrix form 
Xw 
where w. 
1 
weights; 
are unknown 
Xt . are -1 
distributed lqg 
lagged values 
( 7 .4 ) 
( 7 .5) 
coefficients or 
of the exogenous 
variaple; and n equals the lag length. It is assumed 
the lqg weights are values of an unknown function - say 
F ( i) , i=O, 1, ... n. Although the actual function is 
unknown, it may be approximated on a closed interval by 
a polynomial function. "Usually a third - or fourth-
degree polynomial will provide a sufficiently accurate 
approximation of the lag structure" (Pindyck and 
I· ..... -... 
1:.:.-... -.· ..... --
'.' ".'. '-""-
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Rubinfeld, p. 238). 
A third-degree polynomial was used to approximate the 
true polynomial function for the lagged values of M3QE. 
Therefore it was assumed that the lag weights fell on a 
polynomial of the form:-
wi = Co + Cli + C2i
2
+ C3i
3 
w. = 0 for i >3 
1 
i=O, 1, 2, 3 
( 7 .6 ) 
This specifies that the lag weights follow a third 
degree polynomial for the current period and first three 
lagged quarters, and after the third quarter changes in 
M3QE will not affect real expenditure. 
In matrix notation 
w = Hc ( 7 • 7 ) 
where 
[t 0 0 ~ H = 1 1 ( 7 .8) 2 4 
The matrix of variables used to estimate the set of 
- ., •... -,.- ... -........... . ~:it1~:ii~~ii.i~~: 
.-.". - " ........ --. . -- ... -.- ......... 
polynomial lag coefficients is obtained by substituting 
(7.7) into (7.5). That is 
XHc = Zc ( 7 .9) 
The matrix of the estimates of the coefficients on the 
lagged values of x, (B), can be obtained by the 
application of a least squares estimator to, for 
instance, 
y = Zc + jJ (7.10) 
(Z'Z)-l " The estimator c = Z'y is used to derive B = Hc. 
This approach is outlined by Cooper (l972b) as an 
alternative formulation of Almon's approach to 
estimating polynomial distributed lags. 
The results of the estimation of M3QE, as defined by 
(7.4) and (7.6) in the real expenditure equation, are 
presented in Table 7.1. These results are satisfactory 
in terms of their statistical properties and the desired 
I 
sign 'and size of the coefficients. The 95% confidence 
t·>,·.·.>'.·: >.','.': .', ,',' 
interval around the sum of the lagged coeffcients (note 
vii of Table 7.1), indicates that we expect the effect 
of increases in the real money supply to always exert a 
positive influence on real expenditure and vice versa 
for increases in the real demand for money. The strength 
of the first and second lags, wI and w2 ' as expected, 
account for the strong negative effect of M3QE on E. The 
third quarter lag has less statistical significance. 
However, we still reject the null hypothesis that w3 = 0 
at the 95% confidence level. The impact in the current 
quarter may be negative or positive as the 95% 
confidence interval around is between - 0.024 and 
0.097. 
Wo 
Also the t-statistic for this coefficient 
indicates that we only have a 60% confidence level in 
rejecting the null hypothesis that Wo = o. 
The low standard error of the sum of the lag 
coefficients, coupled with the attribute of having lag 
coefficient estimates with expected signs and sizes, has 
led to the acceptance of the estimated polynomal lag 
distribution of M3QE as presented in Table. 7.1. 
The comparison for actual and predicted series for the 
individual equations, presented in Appendices 7a and 7b, 
indicate satisfactory results for the real expenditure 
equation, although the regression of actual values on 
fitted values indicates that the fitted values are on 
,', 
.~ .. -', -
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averageoverpredicting the series by a small margin. 
This may inhibit simulation of the entire model system. 
However, a trade off between the ease of modelling one 
expenditure equation and the complications involved in 
modelling several consumption and investment equations 
to derive better 'fits' will always develop in 
macro-econometric work. 
7.1.3 Private import equation 
The inclusion of the terms of trade variable represents 
the only specification chinge in the private import 
equation. The inclusion of this alternative variable has 
not affected the stability of estimates of other 
coefficients in the equation. The adjusted R-squared 
remains significantly high at 99%, and the RMSE has 
reduced to 0.069. 
using: equation (7.3), 90% of the stock adjustment 
process will take place in the first seven quarters. 
This result seems reasonable, given the lags of 
1 decision, transport and payment involved.The most recent 
1 Note:as OET data is used all estimation 1S on a cash 
basis, not accrual. 
-. - - - ~ . --- _. 
.".".," .. ,' 
. ..... "'. ,', 
160 
estimation of the Reserve Bank's econometric model, in 
Carey (1984) indicates that for imports of goods and 
services 90% of the stock adjustment will take place in 
one and a half quaiters, whereas the Reserve Bank',s 
equation explaining changes in current payments for all 
imports indica,tes that 90% of the stock adjustment will 
take place in just under five quarters (see Carey, 
Appendix A, equations 7 and 8). A 95% confidence 
interval around the estimated coefficient of the lagged 
endogenous variable provides (as the extreme values) 90% 
stock adjustment lags of five quarters and ten quarters. 
Therefore the results are tentatively accepted as 
evidence for the present substantial lags in the private 
import adjustment process. Jonson (1976), investigating 
united Kingdom data, found lIan approximate mean time lag 
of just over 2 years for imports ll (p.1002). 
Solving for the estimated coefficient on the private 
sales variable in equation (6.8) indicates that: an 
increase in nominal private sales of $100 million will 
increase the desired demand for private imports by 
$52.58 million 1 . This result, using only private data, 
is more satisfactory than previous attempts at 
estimating the relationship between total sales and the 
1 Note: The estimated coefficient equals (0.8604); and 
the 10g(l00) = 4.60517. Therefore (4.60517)* (0.8604)= 
3.9622; exp (3.'9622) = $52.58 million. 
.;-,-:-:-:-:--;-'_ .... ---"-"-,-, 
f--·--"-'·'-' 
f-:->:~-----rl .-~.--'-'-_-. '.'.~ 
import of goods and services. As Grimes (et al) (1983) !:::,,:::::::~,::::::;;::::::::: 
points out, the Reserve Bank's coefficient on total 
sales (S) is "significantly greater than unity. This 
sriggests that in the long-run the desired demand for 
imports will increase more than proportionately relative 
to Si behaviour which is not supported by historical 
da ta" (p. 9 ) .. 
A point to note regarding the private sales variable is 
its composition. The first term, private nominal 
expenditure, is an endogenous variable (although prices 
are exogenous), and therefore when the model is 
simulated, any movements in variables explaining shifts 
in real expenditure will be passed on into the private 
imports equation. The second term, private exports, is 
exogenous to the model. However, a $100 million increase 
in PE, given that nominal expenditure stays constant, 
would still result in an increase in desired demand for 
private imports of $52.58 million. This is a significant 
result as incentives for domestic producers to export 
more, goods will have a direct impact on the current 
account balance of less than half the amount of private 
export income received. 
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Additional information describing the performance of the 
equation is presented in Appendices 7a and 7b. Of 
particular note is the regression coefficient of actual 
values on fitted values which equals 1.006; Theils 
inequality coefficient (0.0001) and the fraction of 
error due to. residual variance (0.9965). These results 
are welcome especially as they result from uncorrected 
2SLS estimation (avoiding Cooper's (1972a) 'downward 
bias' in the standard error of the coefficients), and 
also the coefficient estimates are consistent with prior 
hypotheses. 
7.1.4 Money demand equation 
The final functional form of the demand fo~ money is not 
dissimilar to that used by the Reserve Bank in several 
recent versions of their econometric model (see Spencer 
(1978, 1979, 1980), Grimes (et al) (1983) and Carey 
(1984~). Thereforei because the statistical properties 
are satisfactory, and as the specification of the 
equation is not original, the interested reader is 
referred to those references for further commentary. 
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, ' .. -.-.-. ~. _ .. ". ~ -
The re-estimation, using Fair's technique, has improved 15:~~IQ;i~ii~E~:i:~ 
the 'goodness of fit' of the equation and substantially 
decreased the standard error on the nominal income 
variable. Other statistical criteria and a graph of 
actual on predicted provide a reasonable basis to argue 
for the inclusion of the equation in the model system. 
7.2. Policy Simulations 
As outlined in section 1.2, the principle aim of this 
thesis is to analyse (at the aggregate level), the 
impact of fiscal policy on the external current account 
balance. The three paths that link changes in fiscal 
policy to the current account balance are defined within 
the model presented. Those three channels are: 
1. The direct link between levels of Government ,-.,. "-
--.--',-.- -,-.'-".--. 
external debt and Government current payments on 
invisible transactions. (Discussed ln section 
3.1.5 and presented in Table 3.5 - where in 1983 
'official debt interest payments' accounted for 
73% of 'total Government invisible payments'). A 
reduction in 'official debt interest payments' 
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resulting from reduced external borrowing by the 
Government can be simulated by reducing current 
payments for Government 'invisibles' by an 
appropriate amount. 
2. The indirect link of the impact of only fiscal 
policy on the current account balance is described 
by changes in: total income, identity (6.1); 
disposable income, using equation ( 6 .2 ) and 
identity (6.3); real private expenditure, as 
re-specified in Table 7.2; and thereby desired 
private import payments. As discussd in sections 
7.1.2 and 7.1.3, the stock adjustment process 
involves lags of one year for expenditure and two 
years for import adjustment (of desired to actual 
levels). Therefore, in this linkage there will be 
a lengthy delay between a change in fiscal policy 
and a change in the current account. 
3. 'The indirect link of the monetary impact of 
fiscal policy on the current account is expressed 
I· - """_:. ::.;.,., ,': 
by a 'real balance effect' using the polynomial 
lag distribution of the real monetary 
disequilibrium term in the real expenditure 
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equation. This monetary linkage also exhibits 
protracted lags between the policy change and the 
response in the current account aggregate. 
The results of five policy simulations, including the 
control simulation, are presented in the following 
sections. 
7.2.1 Results of the control simulation 
The analyses of ex post or historical simulation of the 
entire system of equations using a set of imposed policy 
responses requires a base, or control simulation, to 
compare differences in the actual and simulated values 
of endogenous variables. As Pindyck and Rubinfeld state, 
"a comparison of the original data series with the 
simulated series for each endogenous variable can 
provide a useful test of the validity of the model" 
(p.359). Appendices 9a and 9b present graphs of actual 
I 
and simulated values, and a summary of the relevant 
statistics for five endogenous variables: total income 
taxation; real private expenditure; private imports; I·' 
money demand; and the current account of the balance of 
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payments. These results are encouraging although, in 
comparison to the other endogenous variables, the 
tracking of simulated real private expenditure on actual 
is a little disappointing. Nevertheless, the two 
'important' endogenous variables - private imports and 
the current account of the balance of payments - perform 
well when the model is simulated. 
Using the experimentation technique of IIletting 
exogenous policy variables follow different time pathsll 
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld, p. 359), it is possible to 
examine the economic consequences of what 'would' have 
resulted given different policy settings. 
7.2,2 Simulation experiments 
Four different types of policy changes were imposed on 
the model to examine the effects of alternative 
instrument 
I 
settings of fiscal and debt management 
policy. First, the unadjusted Government deficit before 
borrowing was lowered by half through an 8.2% reduction 
in Government expenditure over the period 1970:(J) 
1983: (J). In addition, a 6.0% reduction of Government 
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expenditure was simulated; this is equivalent to a 
reduction in the unadjusted Government deficit of one 
third. The results of these simulations are presented in 
Table 7.2. As expected, the larger the reduction in 
Government expenditure, the greater the decrease in 
private imports. Of note, however, is the differences in 
the impact of the change in fiscal policy across the 
three time periods. The average reduction in private 
imports per quarter is higher between 1979(8) and 
1983(J) than either of the previous periods. 
The second simulation restricts Government credit 
creation, equation (6.11) to equal zero, by setting the 
change in sales of Government debt to non-M3 
institutions equal to the unadjusted deficit plus net 
Government current account transactions ... This policy 
attempts to establish independence between monetary 
policy and fiscal policy. However, a more comprehensive 
model, one that includes a function describing the 
demand, for Government securities by the non-M3 
insti~utions, and a function explaining movements in 
interest rates, may indicate that continually large 
amounts of Government securities cannot be sold to the 
private sector without implications for monetary policy 
see Friedman (1978). He states that "even 
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TABLE 7.2 
Summary of policy simulation experiments and their results 
l(a) 6.0% reduction in Government expenditure. 
Equivalent to 1/3 reduction in the unadjusted 
Government deficit before borrowing. 
(b) 8.2% reduction in Government expenditure. 
Equivalent to ~ reduction in the unadjusted 
Government deficit before borrowing. 
2. Restrict Government credit creation to equal zero 
by ensuring that the internal Government deficit 
is financed by sales of debt to the private sector 
only. This requires an 18% increase in non-M3 
Government debt sales. 
3. In addition to 2., because of the assumed reduction 
in external debt, Government invisible payments are 
lowered by 70%. 
4. 
1 (a) 
LlPM 
1 (b) 
LlPM 
2. 
LlPM 
3. 
LlPM 
LlCUB 
4. 
LlPM 
LlCUB 
LlX. 
1 
A combination of l(a) and 3. Note that the amount 
of debt sold to the private sector will be smaller 
than in 2. 
1970(S)- 1974(S)- 1979(S)- 1970(S)-
1974(J) 1979(J) 1983(J) 1983(J) 
n=16 n=20 n=16 n=52 
$m $m $m $m 
11 .~ 9 2 44.84 75.81 132.57 
16.31 61. 36 103.75 181. 42 
-0.54 -3.77 0.74 -2.49 
0.54 -3.77 0.74 -2.49 
-23.1.57 -940.29 -1839.98 -3011.82 
5.58 11. 41 17.34 34.34 
-244.63 -989.31 -1922.81 -3156.78 
= LX. (Control) - LX. (Simulated) 
1 1-
where Xl = PM (Private imports) 
X2 = CUB (Current account balance) 
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debt-financed deficits are inflationary because what 
matters for prices is not only the money stock but some 
combination of money plus the outstanding 
interest-bearing Government debt ll (p.595). 
The results of the second policy simulation (in Table 
7.2) indicate clearly that, in this simplified model, 
the 'real balance effect' does not dramatically impinge 
on the demand for private imports. However, the 
implications for balance of payments policy of financing 
Government deficits through internal borrowing 
preferably from the non-M3 sector - rather than external 
borrowing, are expressed in the results of the third 
simulation. 
In the third simulation it is assumed that Government 
current payments for invisibles will reduce by 70% 
following the financing of all the internal Government 
deficit by sales of debt to the private (non-M3) sector. 
! 
The impact of this policy simulation on the current 
account of the balance of payments is distinctly 
demonstrated in Table 7 .2. The sum of the control 
simulations of the quarterly current account balances 
(1970: (8) - 1983:(J) is $6722.86 million. This compares 
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satisfactorily with the sum of the actual values which 
is $6937.78 million. The third policy simulation reduces 
the sum of the quarterly current account balances by 
$3011.82 million. This is a substantial reduction of 45% 
on the control simulation result. 
The fourth policy simulation experiment combines a 6.0% 
reduction in Government expenditure with the assumptions 
used in the third simulation. However, instead of the 
18% increase in the change of sales of Government debt 
required to neutralise the monetary impact of the budget 
deficit in the second simulation, an increase of only 
13% - over the 52 quarters - in CGSP is required. As 
expected, the combined impact of both reducing the 
Government's budget deficit and restricting Government 
security sales to only the private sector (~nd therefore 
reducing Government invisible payments) results in a 
greater reduction in the external current account 
deficit than either policy applied separately. More 
importantly, the 'direct' influence of reduced official 
I 
debt ,interest payments on the current account far 
outweighs the influence of either the indirect impact of 
only fiscal policy or the indirect monetary impact of 
the Government deficit on the external current account. 
I.~.';<-:-.--=-,--.---> ~-:-<.;. 
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7.3 Summary and Conclusions 
This thesis has examined New Zealand's balance of 
payments problem from a new perspective. It has 
abstracted from the central debate in balance of 
payments issues which revolves around the choice of one 
theoretical approach from those reviewed in Chapter 2. 
Instead, assuming that 'free' international trade is 
indeed desirable, the approach offered investigated the 
economic problem by analysing the inter-relationships 
between Government expenditure, its consequent financing :: ,'~ : ~ >:_~ ~: ._. _ ~ T 
and impact upon both the private sector's demand for 
imports and the Government's net current account 
position. 
The brief overview of New Zealand's balance of payments 
situation highlighted that the New Zealand economy is 
dependent upon changes in the world economy and, 
! 
compar.ed with other nations, has experienced a volatile 
terms of trade. Nevertheless, the use of overseas 
reserves management and short-term borrowing as 
instruments to cope with dramatic changes in import 
payments and export receipts is appropriate in the 
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short-term. However, given a long-term decline in the 
terms of trade, sustaining real incomes at the 1972 
level, using external borrowing to buoy up internal 
expenditure, is not a sensible policy. 
It was suggested that the growth in the 'invisibles' 
deficit gives cause for concern, and is conspicuously, 
not only contributing but, in all (June) years since 
1975, determining, the continual chronic external 
deficits. The policy of 
reflected in the rise 
increasing the 
in official 
external debt is 
debt interest 
payments. The thesis indicates that the economic problem 
behind balance of payments deficits, rather than export 
uncompetitiveness, 1S the policy of regular and 
increasing official overseas borrowing. 
The division of the current account data into Government 
and private sector contributions indi~ated the 
importance of demand management policy 1n influencing 
the p~ivate sector's external activity. The division 
also disclosed that the trend towards larger current 
account deficits is supported entirely by the continuing 
rise in the Government's current account deficit. 
However, having focussed attention at the Government's 
".-.--' 
:".'"" 
, 
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current account deficit as the economic problem to be 
addressed, the thesis acknowledges the presence of 
alternative and conflicting economic objectives. 
The issue of the role of fiscal policy in stabilizing 
economic conditions was discussed, and the uncertain 
effect of lags on the implementation of such policy was 
outlined. Difficulties in the measurement of the impact 
of fiscal policy were outlined. A qualitative 
comparative static model was developed to discuss the 
theoretical fiscal multiplier effects of changes in 
Government expenditure. In addition, two alternative 
measures of monetary multipliers were estimated for New 
Zealand data to gauge the monetary impact of financing 
fiscal deficits. The results of estimation of a money 
multiplier proved to be inconclusive, -and it was 
concluded that several factors impinge on changes in 
monetary conditions. As a background to the model 
~ .. 
development, the stance of New Zealand's fiscal policy 
was discussed, along with a comparison of Swedish 
stabilisation policy. 
A critique of the relevant literature on analytical 
frameworks for exploring relationships between fiscal 
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policy and the external accounts was presented. A policy 
simulation model was developed. Subsequent amendments to 
the initial hypotheses proved to be sufficient to 
proceed with historical policy simulations. These 
experiments strengthened the argument for considering 
the effect of Government expenditure and its financing 
upon the external accounts, especially when sectors of 
the economy lobby for fiscal incentives to export or ask 
the Government to provide fiscal concessions for 
'import-substitution' industries. 
To conclude: the new approach taken in this thesis, 
which highlights the transmission of the budget deficit 
and its financing to New Zealand's balance of payments, 
has indeed turned the spotlight toward the Government's 
current account deficit as the external constraint. The 
analysis has shown that for stabilisation purposes there 
are lengthy lags involved in the private real 
expenditure and private import stock adjustment 
processes. This implies that 
I 
fiscal policy should not be 
used to insulate the economy from fluctuations in the 
external current account, especially when the costs of 
servicing the increased official debt exacerbate the 
external deficit. This conclusion is supported by the 
historical policy simulations imposed on the econometric 
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model, where the impact of the direct link between 
Government deficit spending, financed by external 
borrowing, and the current account balance overshadows 
either the fiscal or monetary indirect channels of 
influence. As a result, the Government, using external 
borrowing to finance the budget deficit, has allowed the 
New Zealand economy to still select its lunch - albeit 
at the expense of future generations - from the 1972 
menu. However, the cost of servicing the external debt, 
which resulted from overseas borrowing to finance the 
budget deficit, may now serve as a constraint on the 
economy as it restructures itself to combat the 
continuing decline in the terms of trade. Therefore the 
New Zealand economy may yet be facing bread and red wine 
for its supper. 
7.4. Further Areas for Research. 
The model presented employed the general price level as 
! 
an exogenous variable, and therefore the analysis did 
not incorporate discussion on the effects of fiscal 
policy on prices in the economy. A rise in the internal 
price level, which may follow a period of 'excessive' 
monetary expansion, would impact on the current account 
~.cc:;: ,,',' ;"';';"'," , : 
L "-.:.".-".'-
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balance through relative price effects. Thus, a large 
fiscal deficit financed by money creation will have 
repercussions on both the domestic demand for private 
imports and the overseas demand for New Zealand's 
exports. Future research may involve the inclusion of a 
price equation in the model presented to account for 
these effects. 
;': .. ',' .- .. _-.,. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Surrunary of invisible transactions 
!IJ 
(lJ !IJ (lJ (lJ !IJ !IJ (lJ !IJ (lJ 0'1' 
Years r-l +l +lr-l+l +l +l r-l+l r-l .Q PI I1l .Q s:: . !IJ . • s:: r-l .Q s:: .Q+l 
ending • .-1 • .-1 :> • .-1 (lJ +l +l (lJ +l U (lJ 11l • .-I (lJ • .-1 • .-1 III !IJ (lJ • .-1 !IJ ~ :> .Q H :> !IJ ~ +l !IJ ~ !IJ U Q 
June • .-1 U H • .-1 o (lJ (lJ 0·.-1 0·.-1 • .-1 • .-1 0 :> (lJ P< :> I1l 0Q+l o ::<:: I1l 8 :> I1l :>4-1 s:: p:; s:: P< s:: P< s:: P< s:: (lJ 
H H H H HQ 
1970 156 300 35 36 370 4.1 
1971 210 322 33 37 392 3.0 
1972 266 372 33 44 450 2.6 
1973 350 451 37 61 549 2.4 
1974 424 561 34 62 657 2.5 
1975 493 696 61 86 843 
" . 
3.4 
1976 617 882 119 84 1085 3.8 
1977 699 1135 170 108 1413 4.9 
1978 752 1324 208 132 1664 5.8 
1979 836 1557 254 186 1997 6.8 
1980 1036 1799 312 211 2323 6.0 
1981 1311 2352 350 211 2912 6.6 
1982 1640 2805 519 197 3521 6.6 
1983 1937 3136 670 251 4058 6.9 
-_ .. 
1983: 
1970 12.4 10.5 ~9.1 7;.3 11. 0 
'V 
13.0 >, -",., •••• _-_._-1<'"'7 p.-.-,-.: ~-.-.-,-:---
1983: 
1974 I 4.6 5.6 t 9 • 7 4.0 6.2 
" 
I 
9.6 
._ c 
SOURCES RBNZ Longterrn Statistical Series, 1978 
RBNZ Bulletin various issues 
New Zealand Statistics Dept. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Summary of private capital flows, IMF transactions and 
official reserves. 
Years 
ending 
June 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
Private 
Capital 
Account 
Balance 
+7 
+62 
+81 
+95 
-1 
+276 
+183 
+213 
+283 
-148 
+118 
+101 
+354 
+1324 
SOURCES 
IMF Change in Official Official 
Transactions offical Overseas Reserves 
(including Overseas Reserves as a % 
S.D.R's) Reserves of Current 
+5 
+19 
+19 
o 
o 
+101 
+250 
+60 
-15 
-39 
-128 
-137 
-85 
-24 
RBNZ Bulletins 
+114 
+298 
+336 
-500 
-30 
+8 
+166 
+197 
-3 
-220 
+11 
-22 
+840 
- Sept. 1970, 1974-1983 
345 
459 
758 
1094 
594 
564 
572 
738 
935 
932 
712 
723 
701 
1541 
- Oct. 1971, 1972, 1973 
Payments 
27.4 
32.4 
49.8 
60.8 
23.7 
17.5 
15.0 
16.2 
20.0 
17.3 
10.6 
8.8 
7.1 
15.0 
Oil 
APPENDIX 3 
Quarterly Government and pr~vate sector current account balances,OET basis. .I 
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1970:1 
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1971:1 
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1974:3 
1'l7":" 
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1976:2 
1976:3 
1976:4 
1977:1 
1977:2 
1977:3 
1977:4 
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1978:2 
1978:3 
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1980:4 
1981:1 
1981:2 
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19a1:4 
19i:12: 1 
1982:2 
1962:3 
1932:4 
19a3:1 
1983:2 
CUf;G ClIrG GufT PC: PI-I pon Cl.!B 
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\ 0.41300 27.70000 -27.2~7DU 337.45100 ~bo.4b899 7~.§~3uu q3.69cou 
\ 3.29700 -2~.6000D -24.30300 32Q.419U1 2d5.0409<l 39.37b~~ 15.0750i 
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\ 35.05300 3bo.20001 -331.1;700 2544.14697 211b.300u5 427.b4b~2 90.09991 
SOURCES: CURG from Reserve Bank of New Zealand Balance of Payments Section. 
PE obtained as residual. Others from RBNZ Bulletin, various issues. 
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APPENDIX 4 
Comparison of various measures of Government's net 
overseas exchange current account transactions. 
$m 
Year 
ending Buckle and Deane and Difference 
March Snively Smith 
1969 99.7 79.9 19.8 
1970 103.6 85.0 18.6 
1971 107.2 91. 0 16.2 
1972 119.4 96.9 22.5 
1973 129.2 96.6 32.6 
1974 135.4 100.3 35.1 
1975 219.6 170.3 49.3 
1976 344.8 263.5 81. 3 
1977 376.6 297.5 79.1 
1978 445.7 336.6 109.1 
1979 559.6 459.0 100.6 
SOURCES: Buckle and Snively indicate their data is from 
"Reserve Bank of New Zealand," Bulletin, 
Government Overseas Exchange Transactions, 
"Imports" plus "Other Current Payments" and 
"RBNZ, Balance of Payments Section, 
"Government Overseas Investment Income" (p.42). 
Deane and Smith do not give a source, rather 
they claim that their data represents 
"Government's deficit on Current OET Transactions 
viaiReserve Bank" (p.25). 
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APPENDIX 5A 
Buckle and Snively's estimated regression equation 
compared with two updated versions (ordinary least squares 
and first-order autoregression) using more recent data. 
Variables Estimated Coefficients t-values 
Buckle U12dated Buckle Updated 
M3 
Notes 
-Snively OLS ARI -Snively OLS 
Bt 0.20 0.16 0.14 4.69 5.14 
Bt - 1 0.15 0.11 0.09 3.43 3.24 
Bt - 2 0.24 0.16 0.11 5.63 4.36 
Bt - 3 
0.17 0.18 0.11 4.03 4.77 
C 3.99 0.05 0.05 6.73 8.97 
Sl -6.00 -0.07 -0.07 6.03 4.98 
S2 -2.59 -0.03 -0.02 3.85 4.15 
S3 -3.77 -0.05 -0.04 3.85 5.02 
p 0.45 
R2 0.86 0.81 0.90 
DW 1. 65 1. 25 2.04 
(i) Both M3 and B' 1 were measured as quarterly 
per cent changes, i. e. (M3t-M3t_1)/M3t_1 
(ii) Data period - Buckle-Snively 
1961(M) - 1978(D) 
-Updated 
1964(S) - 1983(J) 
ARI 
4.42 
2.50 
2.76 
3.10 
9.43 
10.15 
3.48 
6.53 
3.93 
(iii) Data: - for updated version in Appendix 5B. 
(iv) Durbin-watson critical levels for 
95% confidence with n = 76. 
dL = 1.51 and d u = 1.77. 
(v) t-statistic - all the t-values above are 
significant at the 99% confidence level. 
,_ - ,_ 0'. ',' ' •• ~ 
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APPENDIX 5b 
Data for Appendix 5a 
PC~O POI 3 8 ~1 ) M3B 
------------------~----------------------------------
1969 1 \ -U.016oo -iJ.07tlUb 2b21.19995 1110.-I.37793 
196 9 2 \ o • () 3 31) (J U.02bh9 27U7.O':l9':15 1U51.512!Ju 
1969 J \ 1I.01ll,13 U .1l3 91 Y 2'757.61)010 1 9 :2'1 • 0 ., U 9 U 
1969 il \ O.llb35b I) • C) 7 HOI 2~{Jo.30UI)5 :.1074.17603 
1970 1 \ -O.I)J.51l. -0. I) Y J ~.\ :i.llt) l.3':1991) IHUO.:.!2b9j 
19'70 ? \ o • I)] 'i. 9 2 1).1) '1171 :i.955.o01110· 19511.b~~03 
1970 ::I \ 0.111414 \l • 02 (17 Y :'!997.3YYYU 199':1 •. 36707 
1970 ,j \ ().1)'1~91 o. 051l fl.l :I 13 :; • 0 (J II (J Ii :.!11b.9H901 
1971 1 \ - 0 • ('l1l3 7 -0.07252 3077.39'190 19f)J.1I7JO? 
l. y 71 2 \ 0.1)25311 U.0227'1 .:l155.50UOU :i.OOH.IHuY 
1 ~17 1 3 \ (l.1.l13111 (1. (1). J 7. 3 ;j 1 4'/ • 11) II til ·~05'1. 7o.lYb 
19'11 1 \ O.(J~72t\ O.107bil .:l3110.11)010 2275.':14507 
1.972 t \ (1.(10444 -0.075bl> .1.:l':l5.1110lU 210.:l.7S0YIJ 
1972 :I \ O.O!:i1YO O.1135Q .i~j'l1.30U05 'i.34:.!.blYUl 
1972 J \ O.03YtI!; 0.04b35 :l'l 1 2 • L 91) 9 5 2451.l9tl97 
1 ~l'l 2 'I \ O. t () 4 <I () O. I. '197:2 'I 1 II (J • 1 () 0 1 (J ;!Ul!l.1':JU92 
197 :i 1 \ O,02IJhO -0.057 :13 'lllJlJ .1:l999iJ 2b511.355~b 
1473 2 \ 0.07031 O,O'/llll!:i .\ :) L '2 • 6 0 0 1 0 :l1l44.5!)l1tJtj 
197 3 3 \ O.1I39f17 u.03239 ·lb92.500UO 29Jb.ilHbU4 
1973 ,1 . \ Il,Oh033 O.llhB!'l3 4Y7S.bUOI0 3137. Y4CJ92 
197'1 1 \ -ri.O;!7bl -0.t39t5 4H31J.:20020 2'/01.30200 
197,1 2 \ O.Ulb97 -U.009b7 ,\,92 0 • 2 9 9 11 (I 267b.ltJUlIJ 
1974 3 \ - Ii. II 0 fI f> '\ -0.03052 'Iii '1 7 • 7 9 9 ~ 0 259.:l.!:i32Yu 
1 <j 7 'I " \ () • I) 4 B.\ ·l O.1'lun 51L2.bUUIU 3030.30~11 1,975 1 \ -O.027b'i. -0.13213 49'11.399YO 2635.10'71U 1975 2 \ O.0'17ll7 O.IlU103 . !:i ~ () 5 • 3 9 9 9 II 204 H ,l)2b95 
197~ 3 \ O.027H2 O.OOJ!bU 5J50.200:l0 2tl5b.27002 
19'/5 " \ 0.07179 ".12621 5734.29'.:180 321b.7()~14 .trl '/ 6 1 \ 0.014!)o -(1,117949 5tJ17.799UO 29td.U7J9'1 
19'111 :1 \ O.Ob95b 0,10493 t.222.50000 3271.'1b611 
L 976 :l \ O.OO91l0 -U.02'::110 b2iJ3.~()UllO 3175,!:ib!:i92 
1.976 'I \ 0.07b~)h O. 10 It3 5 b7b'/.10u1u .,:jSl':i,b47Y5 
1. 9 '17 t \ -f).aObI9 - (). 1/1 H 9 B 07:.!5.2(JU;'!O :.!995.2':ilnO 
1977 :.! .. \ 1l.U<1hfJlI 11.11 02:l 7 I) 3 9 • 1 0 Ii 1 \) 3]1\.:l.'!l)OUb 
L 97'1 3 '\ () • 0 11 B ~I -(J.02U?7 712'1..'1~l)lju 324tl.HH5ll1 
L977 4 \ O.ObU77 u. 1 h () IJ 4 '7 II 1 2.60010 373U.9::1H9o· 
t 97 tl 1 \ (\ • 0 U 11 " O,Oh35? '7bH.OOOUO 3 9 3 ~I • (J .,:j lH) .;I 
197H 2 \ 0.07005 -(l.01917 U159.39990 306.:1.52197 
197A 3 \ O. () '1:l8 (J (J. () 1\ 81(1 tJ5llH.5':1901 Q04Y.36Ull 
1970 4 \ O.OH570 O.1.:l~i4() 9 'd 3 "I • 7 9 9 ti I) 4597.h211Yl 
L'179 1 \ n.OIOh7 - I) • () b '},!j b Y336,IJOIJ39 'L310.05Y()H 
1979 ? \ () • 011 J 5!) -O.o27'l9 '!743.UOU\I\I ···:jiOY.<lOtluY 
1979 3 \ Ii. (H lun O.()~il.37 10142.4443'1 ·11\04.!.i9912 
1979 It \ ll. n u 4 'I!I 0.14073 1 0 \1 9 9 • 3 "/ -I (J 2 5U24.44727 
BI:JO J. \ -I) • 0 1 813 -O.02S03 1 0 H (J 0 , (h) U U (l '1H9tl. bH311 
1900 ? \ O.051\3Y -0,01233 1138'7.41016 4B.3U.'i.71()O 
19RO 3 \ U.02451 I) • () 2 6 r>3 11obtJ.~'IOO'l It 9 6 ., • 1 2 5 0 () 
19 B 0 ,) \ O.Oh{)~,o} (). I.I~ t\ 9 J 12372.8300lJ 52.3~l. U5.l 07 
198'1 1 \ -0. 002lf~' -().OlU7'1 1233b.29YlilJ !) 1'11. btl51)'}, 
19B1 2 \ () • 07 ti !I ~j U. () '}, 3 (J i., 1 3J 1 0 • 2 (J l) :l (I !>2(iO,23193 
198J. .I \ o.o3~9tj -O.O:2iJ~)3 137'19.2uIJ4!u 5L52,22.:lt,} 1901. 1 \ O.0501l~ {J.OS012 144<ltJ.OOll{JO S410.'!b026 L982 1 \ -0.00.312 - () • 0 'I it ':I '.I 11l1}O2.901l39 5145.'1U674 1 '.:I U2 2 ! \ (). ()113 1·9 -0.0013<1 J. 0 I) ~ 5 • () U U (J I) !:i 1.i ~ • ·1 9 1 ~ J 1902 :I \ -(l.O027~ -0.03-1'12 1 '19!:l'l. 20020 1\9!j~.IH39b 19 H 2 "I . \ O.061J1J'J O.'i.t9b7 1 r,ilOq .'10u39 bOil U • .:l ':II) ~ U 1 9 03 1 \ (1.1.1 (I t> 4 5 il.105h.:l \tl107.70ll2U o 6 tJ " • 2 9 !oj H iJ 19B3 2 \ Ii. 0 Ii I.J () '7 -(I. "19:1. t 6 162!:>3.'7':J')bO o(l71.IJOO(J0 
PCM3 = (M3-M3_ 1 ) /M3_ 1 
PCM3B = (M3B -M3B _1)/M3B -1 
SOURCES: M3 - Reserve Bank of New Zealand data base 
- Jan. 84. 
M3B - Trading banks cash (from RBNZ bulletins) 
+ Reserve asset holdings, trading banks 
(RBNZ data base - variable : FTR) 
~ Govt. security h6ldings, other M3 
insti tutions (RBNZ data base - var'iable: 
OM3G) + currency, notes and coins of 
public (RBNZ data base, variable : CUR). 
--- ... , --_OP __ v _________ _ 
--' 
APPENDIX 6 
Quarterly data used for econometric estimation. 
£ G P Px PI "TV TltJ rraO ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1969 2 \ 2'J18.64'~93 304.2qY':'9 IJ.47600 O.42911C \J .·3I;VOG ~o.U51ol-' 
1903 3 \ 2·).17.97498 342.3'1399 u.'HSlClO ').44700 C. 370')(' 1 Q ';i. -l-l ~ (I 1 
1969 4 \ 22'16.9589!3 338.&9999 Q.48300 O. 'l<IYOO v •. H7vu ':Il.!:!24(JU 
1970 1 \ 2038.44202. .328.39Y!:!<; u.~9300 -o.43~OO 0.3,=,~vU 4::>1.7'1d<j~ 
1')71) 2 \ 227.2.62720 3,,').70001 0.5020(J O.437t1C U.;O .. iJl1 • Il}4. o..;.j~~ 
t·q 7 0 3 \ 2174.32397 3 '!t',. u (; Of> oJ (J • 5 11 U 0 (\.44 ... 
"
U (;. '1u5.)" 103.02,,00 
1970 4 \ 231A.3410b 427.00'liJO u.53200 ·).44':~O il • '< 1 7 U U lL-l.33uuU 
1971 1 \ 21177.50l.04 "1';.L9~"Y O.54bOO O.4SuGO \i.:,;~oOiJ :;o~.U""~J; 
1971 2 \ 2137.Qo308 40<:<.2 fJ Ii:) 1 U.S56UU O.4b~00 0.'<21UO 1::'l.75~OU 
1971 3 \ 2185.7708f' ·143.799'19 0.56800 0.47<0(; 1; ... 37 Oil 22:'.4",,(,<) 
1971 4 \ 2371.835q4 5\J7.799'3<· ~.5bl00 0.51 u llO Ll • '!:l" II V 1;j 3. oJ 1 JIJV 
1972 1 \ 2)22.91797 5 u 2 • 0 0 ,]I) 1 0.5911)0 {).53t:lJO O .... 3!:ll)U b:t".kii:2uL 
1972 2 \ 2337.6u7'l1 :'~J7. 7""'9'; 1).5Y;;00 (; .5S·/UU U .'hlf..(, 1:> 7. ·114" u 
1972 3 \ 22ll3.91099 53'1.7 1;""1 o. nO~('O 1.'.513 bUll ".442vv 262.:>t<3vl 
1972 ,1 \ 2o r)c).61 11)1 "1~.7yqq .. 0.61200 U.o2cuO O.Hdav L7~.513uu 
1973 1 \ 2406.8751)C) 552.(\(10:)0 u.b2ouO U.7tJ.j(;U O."6:l0lJ '11 d. 9d ·h' l 1q73 2 \ 2486.B9209 571.9r.,w2 U.t>43UO 0.747uu o.'1"UUU 1~3.3:;~fJl 
1'l7) 3 \ 2592.3230') 634.';0(11)2 lJ.b5700 0.7:'5UC 0.·:,7000 :l';jl.3b2I.'u 
1973 .. \ 29fl 1.03·\03 740.0IH )(l0 0.6"/500 l). 7 S':' I) (j O ... 77!)u .3:' 1. 3uq'~!:.' 
1 ~7 'i 1 \ 2663.430 0 4 nxo.7":9':J9 I). b:' (lOO 0.7 .. 7,'0 I). ~Odl)o ti '1. b 'j! ',<,j 
197'1 2 \ 285t.96289 o'l d. 2'j g ')9 u.70RUO 0.733U(: u.S7!:!Ou 2:>1.u.:!4vu 
197 .. 3 \ 2'<15.30794 812.2') 0 Ii 1 0.73H'O 0.71 f; l' (j O.blbliU 'I:>'1.2ldUlJ 
t 97 '1 '1 \ 2913.8d«10 ~39. 794'33 U.753C1U 0.70Ul'u O.oI:>UUU j"'7.o14"~ 
1975 1 \ H79.87:'''8 970.:;O:JOo 0.78100 u.br.7uli O. t.~7'Jl. I'J.B.i3"",, 
lCJ75 2 \ 2&72.61401 lu'l1.:''iCJ9H (;.l!13uO u.07JlJC o. -, 2 ~ 'Jl, i':lo.<'b/u1 
1'175 3 \ 2(0-,(1. 1540S lo97.t""'')S (i.o42ClO (J. 7 1 "u 0 'i. 7 791)\} -It:!j.u,j2~9 
1:.75 ~ \ 2847.~i:!"9q 11 ~ r, • (, ,; D 'Hl (j.~77(iO IJ.8U6GG u.1:I99lJU .gk.~ 1::'~~ 
t'nl; t \ 2s;n .03564 102".59Y'l!i 0.91700 (j.8HSl,O 0.g2-iv\} 1l)t,7. 20 1::"1 
1970 2 \ 2S55.5S')Cl5 1(lQo.jIJ 1i;)5 0.<;5700 u.':12<;itj(j u.':l,,7uO 2dL.Ul1~';j 
197b 3 \ 26)Cj.2g296 1163.~OOii5 0.'.l:>700 v.95Sf.J0 U.9d201J c23.4uf;"l 
1971> 1 \ 29'l3.9f3022 10eo.1~9Y5 1.01S00 1.0070C 0.':19300 571'.:>:l1;'! 
1977 1 \ 24S4. B1714 1151:1. ~1(;OilO 1.0UOO 1.10:'(,(; 1.051::0u l,j17.~c;:,~'1 
1977 2 \ 2S34.304()1 125:' • 30 ,) () 5 1.0<?20f) 1.0fl:tUO 1.\J-'I~(lU 3"q.i!7~.,~ 
l'n7 3 \ 2505. 264~l9 1 3 il 3 • .! <j 0 I) 2 1 .1 ::s () II 0 1.0090C 1.v03;)U Hu3.~\lHv~ 
1977 4 \ 2520.99-114 161Lt;'.<JG5 1.17u()0 1.0'WuO 1.·Otl4Ul! o [l U • l;, 31: \} 
1978 1 \ 2271.34692 1415.3 J f) ilS 1.1:'400 1.u9100 1.0730u 1:'45.;)u799 
117<1 2 \ 23B8.81104 1 ·13 :) • (; 0 t) " 5 1.22SUO 1.13100 1.1U2(;1,; 3 ~ '1 ." 0 1 'J 1 
1978 3 \ :.!ol10.990 0 7 1727.09 4 YIl 1.25500 1.1500U 1.11()(lv ".i'l • <1<:''> 9!:! 
1975 ~ \ 2607.86537 200i'!.50fll)U 1.2B800 1.;!29UC 1.1 L'.lOll 0·1.:3.() 109t> 
197') 1 \ 2333.3':1282 1 0'3,2 • ()9'1";8 1.31700 1.250UO 1.1:<Uu!J 10&:./. 77':l;)~ 
1979 2 \ 241>5.63306 Ib58.90D02 1.37700 I.JHI0U ·1.172UO Uu.5:;bSl:! 
197G 3 \ 240CJ.12012 19';7.90tHl 2 1.44600 1.4331;0 1.29'10u d~o·.(j07u1 
1979 '1 \ 2627.00415 19H9'.50;)OO 1.5uI0L) 1.52400 1.3~ .. UO 7,1.U51lJ3 
19BO 1 \ 2416.4860B 1970.400C)2 1.56000 1.:>,noo 1.50100 2U6.1'llll 
1980 2 \ 213').33867 2232.1999:" 1.024UO 1.~770U 1.50u00 ::>"'7."bot.ll l. 
1980 3 \ 2423.74805 2170.39':1'lLl l.b~200 1.b14()0 1.b7:Guu 11~3.9(j5~0 
19110 .. \ 26·'6.7160b 24S5.ll99'l0 1.74300 1.b Q I00 1.';ooO() d33.0::lt91:l 
1981 1 \ 2109.0319B 2274.89990 1.7Y700 1.12700 1.710UO 2 .. u7.~O~9b 
19B1 2 \ 2519.15503 2512.19995 1.&6800 1.77300 1.7tHU() iliO.tl<l302 
1981 3 \ 2571.17505 2660.09995 1.94200 ·1.l:!bl00 1.8~300 1361.96399 
19H1 4 \ 2R01.I0400 3028.S999C) 2.Cl17UO 1.95100 1.93dUO t2'i~. 79297 
1982 1 \ 256'1.85913 2988.69995 2.0d200 1.97~OO 1."S')00 2ti22.201l93 
1982 2 \ 2597.35205 2R45.tiOO05 2.1,,700 2.0()900 ~ .03\)00 1132.2299ti 
1962 3 \ 254'l.t!!>49B 3080.19995 2.205uO 2.03200 2.Ub7iJO 1 Ho.119v2 
1982 4 \ 2b95.97412 3529.19995 2.32000 2. IH~OO 2.112vO lO"".t<07u1 
1983 1 \ 2-158.254B& 3217.30i)()S 2.34500 2'.11:.110 () 2.H2ilO 2~Yo.29d1U 
19B3 2 \ 2515.20313 3144.09995 2.3(>700 :l.156UO 2.232UO 10u1.32bOU 
.. .. 
SOURCES: G. from Buckle & Snively Table Nand RBNZ Bulletin, Dec. 1983 p.566. 
other data from RBNZ data base - Jan. 1984. ~ 
':: 
'J 
137.9q'VI 2/do.SoOvo 
121./;:,5uu £/;'3.122\17 
1'J".7/~';j9 3~J7.'1v9"1 
9u.922 ... 0 Lo 1L.~1:l<'~ 
1,-,0.2::.o~ll 2';jU"'.9::'~"'b 
1~::>.1.,f4vl 'i,oe·'. ~:<;:,,, t> 
1.32.\Jb~\JU :to 17 .3b~'><' 
11~.255"Ju Jlbo.l:;'1~:> 
Hili.~4~\)1 ,jdO.bllJll 
149.u300\1 j .3 ~ 9 • 2 2 ·/l. 5 
! (j \} • \J!S I ~' 1 3002. lI':;13 I, " 
1l'l. !;l7';', J/"1.!,q"il"" 
Lj.:l~~~",lJv ,j'>,,0.,;(,7':1c 
t.,:'.tilo~~. ,j::"J"I.:',jblJ!I 
:lOll. 'j,,7 UlJ .,,,e5.!:!7J1'; 
bb.'.:i1<Jv2 "v13.bbt:~~ 
25".:51()~Y .. U b 3.:"1 c ~ U 
:i1S.S.n~9 4L'tb.1t7C, I 
Ib:i.::."::. ... j .. 1l0."15~J 
1:>'1.1.·<79\/ " l' 0 ~ • <,j 4 lJ !> ). 
"b~.0"DU2 -i"~0.57n3 
:t41.i:>!:!0<,1 ""401.33~"t. 
1~1.3b~iJ1 :>';c~.3.:!721 
1:'U • .:!o!:/u2 :> U c 3 • 1 J 4 '} -, 
.J1 ... u.:l2!:>\l ;:,luo.U83"b 
,j';j1.:ttdUu o:>"4.5u~bb 
1,,~.31.,*u'! ;:'''lU.U'''~!:>'' 
:./2v.13,(.ub :>;:,11.121:>,,1 
"'::'O.L",7"" 00vS.b1::23 
,j75.';j,,2LoU 07"i5.52j~;' 
"1u.~n",v.:! 7,jiu.b;'l.vl> 
137 .~I~"VO '1 ,j 11 • 15 e:< () 
::'24. 2~t.u.3 001~.21:il:" 
'1:t2.!:!() 1 \j d IL"O.~lJ~b,j 
3~~.~'i7vO 7'12.1:!~'nu 
:l&b.U3196 1~<'7.17"~1I 
b0l:!.!:/Jo\lb oLL5.1(j(,QO 
"'1~.ov",,!:! ,,:',j5.51cev 
:.~<,r.3L'>U4 .,,,d2.ti!iI,,,,, 
311J.7:.1u~::, 9; Vb. 'II:: ~ J b 
oob.7q.:!llJ ".<e3.yuI3/ 
b07.2".l':'7 r;;u7v.71:;""/ 
,,3ti.v .. bYS "/"b.2ubUi 
q20.9:;"'90 !:!olJ4.3Y1bv 
_ b<t':l.u:;lJ9'i 101Y4.472t:t> 
017.11'1l!1 100LO.0073b 
7~0.()Ul:!00 11 /I~ .20313 
414.3~u14 11!:!40.3!>74<! 
~&b.15bS.tl 124.ltl.Y35~!> 
&11.2359b 12509.111:11b 
~5b.lub93 13bv9.6<!lLY 
.. 92.9';j';j1,)2 l-ilJU3.7275-1 
';jUU.90",.,'1 13Uti?8:.t<'14 
dbU.'idlLlij 1't';j:'9.b!>7'1:<: 
12!:!u.:'!i3U~ lhl~.1757b 
~1:.1. 701';jU 1 Y 10 .... 7 ." '1 11 
luv5.71l97 ItlL14.b3l:t" 
TI A." .. , 
fi['!! 
t-' 
'" ~
" , 
APPENDIX 6 - continued. 
enS ,- "I'm .;zen C(;i'l' 'l'K CCMSP. bee R ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
i 9(,Q 2 \ 2767.699% 0.09200 O.tJl>uOO -- :'5~40vGi 2. '13000 -~:b:J\llil -3.~1"01 4.i:~vvv 
1969 3 \ 2757.b0010 O. ;)9YJv 1 .0 ll,:'O 0 U.299~~ 3.~7,H)O -,n.~':1~"" -21./1""'9 '1.73(;Cv 
196'< 4 \ 2G05.30:)05 0.12300 1.0uOOO -25.799~9 -5.JotlOO lS.200uv 14.0L09i:1 4.,<0(,vlI 
1971) 1 \ 2361.399QO ~ _ Q.I04IJO 1.UiJOOO "6.29,.~5 5.7-1~OO 33.1 iJv" 1 15u.7ljlOS 'I.50\j(;u 
197) 2 \ 2955.(,01)1<. - 0-. 'n HOil 1.001")0 5.100.,4 3.2LbOO ... lb • .3\JvlJu 1:<.7-ibVO 4.b1vGu 
1971 3 \ 2997.39990 0.1193'),) 1.0u o uO ~.59~St 3.':>15uo -·H.7ulll;tj 3v.1':J7'::i7 'l.buuUl' 
1 Ci 7 i) 4 \ 3I35.0rlOOO D.113nCI 1.0llliOO 12.29~~S 13.17':>00 i':'.bUUOU tJ.':I:iSoYtl ".hHJ\;u 
1971 1 \ 3()77.3'l9':lO O. 1 () lj iJ (I 1. I; 0 LJ 0 0 -O.U9<;~o 27.;12500 2.,..50u'.ilJ l.jo.tlulO'; 5.10uOv 
1971 2 \ 31':lS.51)O()0 ().101)QU 1. (I n 000 U.90(;I'i It .2::;SOv -20.80(1)0 -:Jo./1'1YI:S ':l.15vUlJ 
1"71 3 \ 3I Q 7.10')10 1).09,,011 1.0uOOO 2a.59Y~H 17.37400 -J<!.1I9~~~ -".~~2v2 !).13uuL 
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1975 'j \ 573~. "2"'%1) (1.0 .. 6110 _ O. U()'J(;U O. ,~u002 47.75tlvu "] L. :'U\I(JO 7\i.11~\)" -i.8L1UvL, 
1976 t \ ">Il17.79'180 u.Ob':lIJO O. ()(JUV') 1 tJ7 • 4 Q l' 0 2 7b.11YiJU .i~.6':1!:!~1 J2".451~U 5 • 1 (II.: v v 1970 '2 , 67.22.50000 0.0501) 0 (i.UUOOO -1bO.4.)u02 4S.12~0() 2':>.l>Oul.I 42.oY';11 5.-;7\..v\l 
1975 .l \ b283.500 0 0 0.06200 0.00000 19S.19595 52.tj\l10U -':l:>.1I00U 109.27j,/ 5.47\..uL 
1976 <I \ 6767.1()1)10 0.06000 o.oooou 56.70(JC7 7o.0440u 0:l.3Ill)V' 1~~.2<jtl9~ 6.b2Jl.u 
1977 1 \ 6725.20020 O.ObjOO o. () ')0 OU 79.001:00 33.0'190(; '>tj.!l9::.98 4:l7.44oiJ~ 0.62::;1;(; 
11)77 2 \ 7(;39.1001U {) • I) 4 q 0 () I;.II(,UOO -23.L'9s-~a 5C.4530v -';1.~':i998 -2v.k/Ou7 <>. t.!' '/IJU 
1977 3 \ 7122.79':)H0 0.ObO)()0 II.OOO{JO -1~liUll05 59.o930v -!;l. uuUOO H5.:)J.j19 7.~1~~v 
1'l77 4 \ 7612.00'110 0.067uO 0.00000 85.3u005 b1.932uu 131.U9998 51.10<'Y" b.lluvu 
197>1 1 \ 7621.00000 O.Ob,H)O (i.onooo 28.19;,95 oo.3115Uu 3~.9u002 321:1.01:l:;\lu 1:I.77cliu 1~7s; 2 \ 8159.39990 0.U5500 (;.00000 147.~ulJ()0 73.00000 -:>.4uu02 54.~tlU93 o.b23uu 
1978 3 \ 85')8.599;:'1 0.U6100 O.OIJOOO -59.50000 -4.1350u -\10.39999 2bv.~1~2U ~.56ivo -1" 7 (j 4 \ 9237.799!lfJ 0.01661)0 u.Of)OOO 373.10(;10 92.24700 16'0.39999 319. J43"0~ 10.u£,30(; 
19H 1 \ 9336. ,lflO3'l 0.00 ,IOu v.lIuOOO -230.7'!eI0 -9.0970Li 41.00004 55i.!1'1293 lfl.!)3uvu 
1979 2 , Y713.0 0 000 0.Ot,2')0 U.ooOOO .. 05.4'll;v5 -23. -l2f>.Vv -5J.30002 139.tlj41:1b ll.u17UO 
1979 3 \ lC1H2.4,143'! 0.0·]200 O.UOOOO 1l.490S'7 23.17500 ->H.2u(;Ol 302.74200 ,10.t>ilUl.U 
1979 ,1 , 10999.37402 (,.04500 0.00000 134.1(}5~6 93.10100 Ijtj.li9999 154.~:I3tl2U 11.~nl>OO 
19 fill 1 \ 1(801).00000 0.04800 0.110000 -210.21~S7 :'.37900 -3.0999b 512.7b1~2 11.l;2'/UU 
1980 2 \ 113R7.4101b O.04~00 0.00000 358.899<;0 -4.'/tsilOu 10'>.5000G 9.'1';091 12.1bvUU 
1980 3 \ I1h66.5400~ 0.04600 0.0000;0 61.30vUS 2(; .50UOO -1,.7.4uOO2 2tl2."}~515 11.S21(;lJ 
1980 4 \ 12372.83008 0.05300 G. (,,)000 1 96 ... IJ ,; 1 S 33.30000 l.~:l.:iOOOU :;94.';2lJ~9 11 • 9':>1J \J I.! 
1961 1 \ 12330.29<)130 (}.0~"d00 u.OOOCO 3.2"'':obO 3(:.9000u -17.7UliOI 5tl3.3':lL~7 11."9u(;0 
1981 2 \ 13310.20020 O.OBOO 1).00000 304.60(,10 1:'.6000U j':l.dOOO::i 277.47:.102 11.IHlGuu 
1<)91 3 \ 13H9.20020 0.05_00 U.COOOO -41.69Y95 --l2.4000Q -2~7.1000';' 7bO.4'"i-'20 11.41lVlJO 
1<)Bl 4 \ 14448.00000 0.00000 0.110000 233.199S5 33.70000 2bO.79999 255.13UI:I7 1l.90:lIJU 
1382 1 \ 14402.90039 0.05')110 0.(;0000 "59.S~::.90 1.:!c .10001 1':l1.20(!01 ~73.~":tbO l2.o0v\!U 
1982 2 \ 15025.0000() 0.04600 O. fI U.lOO Ib9.1U~13 226.7000u Ibti.bOOO" 23.45':> .. 1 12.UouLu 
1982 3 \ 149B~.20020 0. 1)5',00 G. ill,OOO 156.00v(.0 13d.bOO01 -127.1uOO't :<7o.YS .. lJtl 1l.77LvtJ 
1982 1 \ 1600~.40(J39 O.O51[)0 O. (l1,QOO 290;29,,80 3bO.29999 '410.100U" -20c.uu:;S7 11.31uGIJ 
191:13 .1 \ 16107.70020 0.05100 O.UI.IOOO 39.2973b 5:'2.099% 3uJ.69!195 3db.UVU.l'l 12.2~LUU 
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SOURCE: RBNZ data base - Jan. 1984. 
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APPENDIX 7a 
Graphs of fitted and actual series. 
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(2) Real private expenditure equation 
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(4) Money demand equation 
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APPENDIX 7b 
Summary of 
Comparison 
statistics equations. for individual 
predicted of actual and series. ... 
(2 ) 
(3 ) 
ACTUAL SERI~S' TY 
PR6DICTSD SERIES' If 
CURRBNT SAHPLE , 1%9: 4 
ACTUAL s~nlf;SI ~ 
pnEUICI~n SBIlIESI Ef 
CIJ~lIf;'1T SAlWLo I 19&9: J 
TO 1983:2 
1U 19H31~ 
t:UI-I~hl'1HIJIl Itt" "c'rII Id .• ",.11 l'III:.IIIC"II-.11 81:,.1111-;;; 
4 ••• 44 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • 
-ellnnr-LATlOIJ r.n~frJr.H;"" = O.H9;> cunn~L"TIOU CUfo;rfJCIElll :;IIU""~;ll = O.B4!Jl4 
II\JU·r .. ,~EAII .. SfJlI"'I ... U EIiIIOII;: U9. HIOJO 
m:AlI ",wuLlln: f.ltllfJII = 73. """91 
H~AIJ 01111011 • Ib.15b16 m:Grl~:n511H1 <:1JE:fflCU..N'f Of flCTUI\I, 1111' 1'1:1',11 1 C'1I,,', O.910!tl 
TIII::Jl,'n IlltUU"hltY: CUEFfJCU.1I1 J:: f,.IJU1'olU 
~J:~€~UW 8~ ~~~m: l::;~ ~g r,lP~lRf.~·i'I~~,\7,,'l'1IJfI = fJ."01J!n 
f'Ulte'UUII Uf .,nHUU UUl TU 1J1fflIH./lCf. CIIVtllUAl'lUli 1: O.9h'l2t:1 
·I!.L'l't:HlH\T 1 VI-: IJF:COHI'OS I'll 0/1 ll,I\51 "i"/ll ClII1PlJllt.It'r:l) I 
fUACTllll1 Of tUBUli IJU~; 111 I:IFfhlft,IIt:I-. lit· 1,,·;t;I(tSSlLlI CIJ1::n u;u.tn ~/(u,'1 111111''1' 
FHAC'nUl, ,Uf JoWIIt!It JIII~. 'co ~F.:;l1l1l"L VAHlfllIC~ = O.91tJ4h 
ACTUAL 8ERIHS: LPH 
PREDICTED SERIES: LPHF 
CURRENT Sn/1PLE : 1%9:~ 10 1983:2 
CUHl'nRlSON OF ACTUAL nNU PREOICTED ~EHIES 
AAAAA.AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA •••• AA •• AA. 
CORRBLnTION COEFfICIENt = 0.99191 
CURRELATION COEF~ICIEHT SUUARE~. 0.989D1 
~~X~-~~~~L8¥U"U~~[J~R~UR 0.053936905 / 
M~AN Hf<ROR '" -0. 00'J43 
'~B'E'II¥NE63R[II~J~GIFPlct6~¥ft~ ON G~BBJ~3EU • I.OOGOO 
FRACTION Of ERROR DUE TO ~IAS • 0.00001 
FRnCtlON OF ERROR UUE 10 DIFfERENT VARIAIION = 0.01193 
fRACTION Of ERRUk UUH tu OJFFERENCH CUVAkIAIION m 0.'98805 
o. v,l h j'J 
ALTERNATIVE DECUMPUSITIUN (LASI IWU CUH~OHENTS): 
FRACIJOtl Of EkRUR ~IIE TO DIffERENCR OF REGRESSION COEFFICIENT fRUM UiITY ~ 0.00345 
FRACTION OF ERRUR DUE tU REHIDUAL VARIANCE' 0,99&51 
(4 ) 
ACTUnL 8ERIES: M3D 
PREDICISD SERIES: H30F 
CURR~NT SAMPLH : 1969:1 TO 1983:2 
. I 
CUM~nkISUN OF ACTUAL nl40 l'k~UICTHU SERJE9 
.A.AAAA.AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA.AAA •• AAAAAA.AAAA. 
mm~m~ gmnm~I SUUA~F.~9~IG 0.98&37 
ROOt-HEAN-HDUARED ERRUR' 4U7.U3113 
M~AU ABSOhUIH KRRUR· 359.31037 
H~nN ERkOk n O.7a7~3 
~EURBS910N C(IEFFIC1ENI ur ACTU~L ON I'RE~ICrED n 0.99652 
niHIL'S 1I1EUUAL.lTY I:UIiFnI:IENT' {).0031a 
fRnCII(IN Uf URRUR DIIE tU ~IAS ~ J.GCIH71U-OG 
fRACTIUI4 Of HRROR UIJE lU UlrfRR~NI VARI~rlUH ~ 0.00093 
, FRACIIUU Uf ERROR ~UE tu DIFfER~NCH COUARIAIION· 0.9991& 
ALTeRNATIVE DECUMPOSITIUN (LASt tWU CUM~ONCNTS): 
FRACTION UF ERROR DUE 10 UIEf~R~'lC~ OF REGRESSION conFFrCIGNI FRUM UNIIY ~ 0.00088 
FkACIIUN Of ERkUk UUE IU RHSJUUnL VAklANCE ~ O.9991~ 
(1) Income ~axation equation 
(2) Real private expenditure .equation 
(3) Private import equation 
(4) Money demand equation 
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APPENDIX 7b - contd 
Notes on summary of statistics 
(i) 
1 T 
Mean error = T L: 
t=l 
where T = the no. of 
yf = the fitted 
t 
ya - the actual t 
periods in the series 
value of Y 
value of Y 
The mean err~r also gives a measure of the deviation 
of the fitted value from its actual time path -
however the root-mean-square error outlined in 
Table 6.2 gives a better measure of the simulation 
performance, since it penalizes large individual 
errors more heavily. 
(ii) Theil's inequality coefficient is defined as 
I~ ~ (y!)2 
t=l 
this scales the root-mean-square error to lie between 
f a o and 1. If U= 0, Y
t 
= Yt for all t and there is a 
perfect fit. 
The decomposition of U reveals the bias, variance and 
covariance proportions. The bias proportion refers 
to:~he systematic error as it measures .the extent to 
which the average values of the fitted and simulated 
series deviate. It is desirable for this to approach 
zero. According to Pindyck and Rubinfeld lIa large 
value ... would be quite troubling, since it would 
mean that a systematic bias is present II • (p. 365) . 
The variance proportion indicates the ability of the 
equation or model to replicate the amount of varia-
bility in the series. Ideally this proportion should 
be small. This leaves the covariance proportion as a 
I residual I and therefore ideally should approach one. 
.' .. - _. -
~,x·:.,.:»:·.·;·>;::·~.,;.·.: 
Ikc:;;;t2.;x;, 
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APPENDIX 8 
Copy of 'The Press l article relating to the 
International Investor and 'Standard and Poors'. 
&\Z" .'.... d"1 r . ...... · }'i',,!~;,,;.:,'~, S.;Cr:,~" .1;, ,8. 1 pS aga!J!:, 
;NZPA', staff, corrcspondent' , polling 75 to:l0.o bankers, "" OHr tbe year. T~e. a,verage " Internationally. ',' " ; ~', , 
'New', .. Zealand's"inter·' , 'Topping the"lIst' is the rating Is 41.0.i," ,i,_. 'Major ratings, whlch',can 
In.allona!'; credit "rating': has United' States" with 96.4' "Australia feU: from sixth' affect ; the' interest rates 
~IiRped again:\~~(:>:"::,: ' , , points' - up' O.S,between 'i in' 'the' March' survey' tt , ' New Zealand pays,areiput 
.' ,'Institutional ;Investor/' a ' March, and Sep~embeJ;' but: ninth In the September sur- ,out by such firms as 'Stand-
month1yd,New~l'ork:based down,0.7 points since Sep-.:',vey, with falls, of 3.1 over, ard and Poors and Moody's 
maliazine~~almed :-at', insure, ,,~ember 1982."", "- ! " .' , ',';, six months and 4.3 .over the .Investors' service. ,', 
ance complinles~and 'similar ;'A(the other :end' of the "year. Its rating.1s now 84.6.' Standard and'Poors re-
big ", investors, :',has pulled', ,scale :,Is Uganda, with 4.1 ' 'The "lnstUutlonaIInves- " , cently 'knocked New Zea-
New Zealand's, rating down' . points' (up 0.1 over six' tor" quotes one banker" as.-:'. ,land down from 'AAA to AA 
3.1 poin~8 (out' of 100) over months but, like thc United saying New Zealand "Is on a.' ,plus,' and Moody's Is due to 
the,.Ias~ six: months,' and 4.3 ~ States, down 0.7 over the trip back 25 'years In time" 'put out a revised rating any 
points oVer 'the last year. ',' .' : year). ' . and 'a British,' lender as day now. The Prime Minis-
"New Zeal\Uld' slips "from" '." New 'Zealand's credit rat- saying that "New Zealand is:" .Ier,' Mr Muldoon, told jour-
fifteenth/to,:nlnet,eenth';of' !ng:ls:70.7 points.. a land of perennial prob- -' nalists, In Washington;re-
the 107- countrles:,surveyed,: i;The New, Zealand ,falls,:., .Ienis -:- from boom to bust, ,centiy .that he, was 'no 
sliding past Hong Kong ~.,as " 3.1; Qver six 'months and 4.3')'and ',' back, again .i - every' worried' by the change in 
Italy ,and, Belgl~m . rise :'to: . over)he'year, are. consider- " time they have an election." the,Standard and Poor'~rat 
positions' ;a~ovll,·:New, ,Zea- .; ably hlgher than the aver- :. ,:'" .The '''Institutional Inves- ing. and that bankers he had 
land. ·,oJ""",", I..',;::, ;,,:, ' age'of the 107 countries - ',;,tor" . rating is, unllkely to, .. talked to in Washington;,had 
The.- magazinj)'s: cr~dlt', down 1.2'points over the slx;;"mak~:~more expensive for'" assured him New Zeal'tlld' 
ratings are '" allotted' tfter . months and' down' 2.7 points . New '~aland to borrow credit was· still excelle~~: 
See also RBNZ - New Zealand News Review (Vol.2, No.5, p.?) 
especially that "the downgrading reflects the public 
sector's large and increasing debt burden and the 
deterioration of the current account balance of payments." 
I -. - ~ : • - -
~ -;:,~,!"_~:;""._';'·_-r-~ ~'. 
f;';~;"';';':':":~";''o-:; 
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APPENDIX 9a 
Graphs of' Isimulated and actual series 
(1) Income taxation 
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(2) Real private expenditure 
3000 
2800 
2600 
" " 2400 , , , , CO , 
L , 
ItI , , 
~ 2200 
~ 
0 
CO 
E 2000 
0-4 
0-4 
1: 
1800 
1600 
A Actual 
1400 F 1 tted 
1200 
, 
" , 
,\ "  ,  . " , I 
" 
" 
" , 
, 
~ e 
, 
" 
,. 
, J • • 8. , , , 
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 
, _. - - -
I ~ ..-_ ' ," ~ 
I-~· ~ '. -~~.- -~.~; .. -'''~'.' ;'.' 
r·;::::::;~~~~~~Y 
,', .. , .. ----; ... -. 
205 
/ 
(3) Private imports 
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(4) Money demand 
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(5) Current account of the balance of payments 
400 
200 
(I) 
c... 
10 
0 ~20°1 Cl <t-
o 
(I) I c 0 -t 
-t -400 I, l:: ~ , 
...... - ... 
-600 
A~ Actual 
• FItted 
-800 
-1000 
'--;-,' :<,. - " 
" / 
" 
-,..-----, 
,J - -------, .,. . -- --
, ,-
208 
".;.. 
APPENDIX 9b 
Summary of 
actual and 
statistics 
simulated 
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